Nigerien Uranium at the Service of France’s “Greatness”

While the benefits of uranium exploitation have been meagre for Niger, in a global system that prevents local populations from profiting from their mineral resources, what about Orano ? Has the French multinational been “gorging” on Airlit’s uranium for over fifty years, as is said in Niamey ?

The key question here is that of production costs: Is Nigerien uranium especially cheap? Does it allow the French multinational to generate comfortable margins, even when the international uranium market is depressed? It is quite difficult to answer these questions based on publicly – available data from the first decades of exploitations, when Niger, Gabon and Canada were the primary sources of supply for Cogema, Orano’s predecessor¹. In the mid-2000s, however, the production launch of the Muyunkum and Tortkuduk sites in Kazakhstan disrupted the equation: the quality of the deposits and the “in situ” leaching production method² significantly reduced costs. Kazakhstan became much more attractive than Niger.

By analysing the income statements of Somaïr³ and the Kazakh company Katco, 51 % owned by Orano, it is possible to estimate and compare the costs of the two entities. This method is not perfect, but over a decade (between 2014 and 2023), these accounts give us a fairly accurate picture of the reality of production costs and margins. The result is clear and the estimated costs are about twice as high in Niger as in Kazakhstan (see below).

If Kazakhstan is indeed a very good deal for Orano, the same cannot be said – or at least no longer can – be said for Niger over the past ten years. The French company is not losing money there, but it does not seem to be making much either. During the studied period, Areva/Orano barely covered its production costs in Niger, while it makes very comfortable profits – more than half a billion euros! -in Kazakhstan. Of course, these estimates could be skewed by commontax optimisation practices in the mining sector, for example, artificially inflating Somaïr’s production costs to reduce taxable profits in Niger. However, there is nothing in Orano’s financial publications to suggest that this is the case.

A private hunting to be preserved

One might then wonder why the multinational continues to exploit uranium from Airlit⁴ ? If Nigerien uranium exploitation offers no financial advantage, what benefit does the French company find in remaining in this country? Perhaps the answer lies elsewhere rather than in the secure supply at controlled costs offered by a deposit located in what was until recently considered the French “backyard”: It is always more convenient for a French firm to own mines in a country where it knows that the Elysée, Bercy and the Quai d’Orsay can influence the decisions of local authorities. At least, this was true until the July 2023 coup d’état and the junta’s decision to sever ties with France after it considered military intervention to reinstate ousted president Mohamed Bazoum.

The history of Franco-Nigerien relations has been marked by numerous interventions, from the ousting of Bakary Djibo by the Gaullist regime in 1958, even before independence, to France’s blind support for Mahamadou Issoufou’s regime between 2011 and 2021. This, despite numerous human rights abuses and France’s dubious role during the brief presidency of another military coup leader, Ibrahim Bare Mainassara, by the end of the 1990s⁵.

Even before independence, Niger was seen in Paris as a private hunting ground that should not be left to “competitors”. In the 1950s, this meant first controlling the “backyard” of Algeria when it was still “French” (Niger shares a nearly 1,000 km border with Algeria); then ensuring control of the uranium deposits after their discovery in 1958. Jacques Foccart, the “Mr. Africa” of Charles de Gaulle and George Pompidou, admitted at the end of his life: “[In the 1960s], uranium ore was rare and France needed it. Niger became our main supplier, which made others envious: the Nigeriens were courted by the Americans, Germans and Japanese. General de Gaulle wanted to secure a monopoly, but Diori did not want to give up this card⁶.”

Uranium «free to use»

There may also be another explanation for France’s interest in Nigerien uranium: military supply. According to a 2013 Senate report entitled “Africa Is Our Future,” Nigerien uranium at the time covered 30 % of France’s civilian requirements… 100 % of its military requirements. France “is particularly dependent on Niger’s mines for its supply of uranium for strategic military use”, the authors of the report state⁷. While many countries impose restrictions on the military use of uranium they produce, Niger’s ore is classified as “free to use”, meaning it can be used for military purposes.

Nuclear deterrence, which requires a secure uranium supply, has been the cornerstone of France’s defence strategy for several decades. It is also a key argument for continuing to wield influence in global affairs.

Political scientist Bruno Tertrais notes that “no other country [except perhaps Israel] has so closely linked military nuclear capability with national independence”⁸. This independence is quite relative, if not imagined, since France has not produced a single kilogram of uranium on its territory since 2001. “How can we talk about independence when uranium […] is entirely from abroad ?” asks independent researcher Raphael Granvaud in The Empire That Won’t Die. According to him, this “stubborn myth” has hidden, from the general public, the importance of African uranium (Nigerien, but also Gabonese) in the history of French nuclear power.

Growing diversification at EDF...

France’s strategy for civil nuclear supply has been quite different. Today, the French nuclear fleet consumes about 8,000 tons of natural uranium annually, from which nuclear fuel known as “enriched natural uranium” (ENU) is produced, supplemented by “MOX” fuel, derived from recycling nuclear waste, accounting for about 5 to 10 % of fuel needs⁹.

As previously mentioned, French nuclear plants supply long relied, in part, on national uranium production and mainly or Nigerien, Gabonese and Canadian production by Cogem, supplemented by some purchase contracts with South Africa and Australia. From the 1960s to the late 1990s, Électricité de France (EDF) would have struggled without its African suppliers. Everything changed in 2004, when the public company adopted a proactive policy of diversifying its suppliers to reduce costs and geopolitical risks. Fifteen years later, Orano supplies only about 40% of the natural uranium consumed by the French nuclear fleet¹⁰. Canadian Cameco and Anglo-Australia BHP Billiton have become major suppliers to EDF, while Orano now sells most of its production to foreign actors (notably the UK, the US, Japan or Sweden).

The origin of the natural uranium purchased by EDF and then enriched for use in French nuclear power plants remains a closely guarded secret. It is even more difficult to determine because natural uranium before becoming nuclear fuel, passes through conversion and enrichment plants that are not necessarily located in France. Some of the fuel used by EDF is converted and enriched abroad. It is then these countries (Russia, Germany, Netherlands and the UK) that appear in import statistics, not the natural uranium-producing country – while some of the imported natural uranium, converted and/or enriched in France in Orano’s plant, is later re-exported to other countries.

As Pierre Breteau indicates in an article in the French newspaper Le Monde, which reveals previously unpublished data on French imports of natural uranium (see below), these figures tell us more about Orano’s conversion and enrichment activities than about the origin of the fuel powering French nuclear plants: between 2018 and 2022, Uzbekistan, Australia and Namibia – countries where Orano does not operate any mines – became key suppliers to the French company, accounting for 19.6 %, 17.2 % and 11.9 % of natural uranium imports respectively.

Conversely, uranium from Canada where Orano operates major deposits, is not converted and enriched in France. It therefore does not appear in these statistics even though it also powers French nuclear plants.

... but Orano is still dependent on uranium from Niger

The latest official statistics on the origin of the fuel used by EDF dates back to 2008–2012¹¹. They confirm EDF’s diversification strategy, as countries like Australia, Namibia and Uzbekistan, where Orano does not operate any deposits, appear among its suppliers (see below). Nevertheless, its purchase from 2008 to 2012 remained concentrated on four main countries, with Niger in second place (22.6 %, excluding stockpile withdrawals), behind Kazakhstan (27.6 %) but ahead of Canada (21.8 %) and Australia (16.1 %). There’s no indication that Niger’s share has since declined in French supplies.

Thus, Niger remains an important supplier to the French nuclear fleet, but not a strategic one in terms of dependency risk, as other market producers could easily replace this supply if it faltered – as happened in 2003–2024 with the halt of Nigerien uranium exports. The situation is different for Orano, whose 31 % of production is still supplied by Niger (2020–2022) – even peaking at 35% in 2020. The company needs Nigerien uranium to meet its fuel supply contracts, both in France and abroad. While its diversification ambitions, particularly in Mongolia and Uzbekistan are slow to materialise, it likely has much more to lose in the Nigerien crisis than EDF.