What did the International Monetary Fund (IMF) know? And to what extent does its responsibility lie in Senegal’s ’hidden debt’ scandal? Since the publication of an audit in February 2025 revealing the catastrophic state of the country’s public accounts, doubt has taken hold. Several economists—notably former executives from the Bretton Woods institutions—are convinced: the IMF knew more than it is officially acknowledging. In December 2025, during a conference organized by International Development Economics Associates (IDEAs) in Dakar, the Senegalese Minister of Justice, Yassine Fall—an economist herself—suggested that the blame was not limited to the national level alone.
To understand how we got here, let’s go back. At the start of his term in April 2024, President Bassirou Diomaye Faye requested that the Court of Auditors launch a comprehensive audit of public finances covering the period from 2019 to March 2024. The findings hit like a bombshell: as of December 31, 2023, the actual outstanding public debt reached nearly 99.7% of GDP (18,559 billion CFA francs, or 28 billion euros), compared to the 74% officially reported under Macky Sall’s presidency. The discrepancy is staggering.
The Court of Auditors has identified budget deficits far exceeding published figures, incomplete accounting of state commitments—specifically contracted loans—irregular treasury practices, and off-budget bank debt... Auditors are explicitly referring to this as ’hidden debt.’
In the following weeks, the IMF—linked to Senegal through a financial assistance program—confirmed the existence of undeclared commitments totaling approximately $7 billion (€6 billion) between 2019 and 2024. Subsequent independent audits, including one by the firm Forvis Mazars, suggested even higher figures—upwards of $11 billion—pushing the debt to 132% of GDP by the end of 2024. For a country long hailed as a model of macroeconomic stability, the shock is brutal. Senegal is now among the most heavily indebted nations on the African continent.
“Unprecedented” on the continent
The primary responsibility for this scandal lies with the Senegalese state, as debt management and the reporting of budgetary data fall under its jurisdiction. The decision to conceal the figures was therefore, first and foremost, a political and administrative one. However, the problem is not limited to Senegal. Other actors played a significant role—among them, the IMF. During the period in question, it approved a major $1.8 billion loan in June 2023, which would not have been possible had the actual figures been considered. In total, the loans contracted by the government since 2019 under various IMF programs exceeded the levels officially reported by the Fund by more than 40% of GDP.
In March 2025, the IMF mission chief for Senegal, Edward Gemayel, spoke of a ’shared responsibility.’ However, he quickly added a nuance: ’We are not auditors,’ he said, asserting that the institution could ’absolutely not have suspected this under-reporting.’ A few months later, in November 2025, he would state: ’We have never seen hidden debt of this magnitude in Africa.’
When the matter was made public, the financial institution suspended its lending program with Dakar and initiated a formal ’misreporting’ procedure. However, it did not demand the immediate repayment of funds already disbursed—contrary to its past actions elsewhere, notably in Mauritania during the 2000s. In October 2025, its Managing Director, Kristalina Georgieva, praised the ’significant progress’ made by the Senegalese authorities, congratulating them on their ’admirable commitment to transparency’ and their close cooperation.
Visible signs of slippage
The IMF was, however, the institution best positioned to spot such slippage. Was it a case of oversight? In any event, doubts already existed regarding the quality of the monitoring performed by its teams. In November 2024, economists Peter Doyle, a former senior IMF official, and Ndongo Samba Sylla1 pointed out ’deeply concerning’ errors in inflation projections for Senegal, which they deemed to have no logical basis. They feared that these approximations were ’only the tip of the iceberg’2.
In this context, the hypothesis put forward by Martin Kessler, Executive Director of the Finance for Development Lab—namely, that excessive trust was placed in the figures provided by the Senegalese administration and that there was insufficient monitoring of commitments—appears to be a possible explanation. However, it is hardly convincing. As the economist explained in December 2025, inconsistencies were detectable3. By the end of 2023, the amounts signed between 2018 and 2023 represented 84% of GDP, while the sums disbursed amounted to only 51%. Such an unusual discrepancy should have been viewed as a red flag, justifying a more thorough examination of the situation.
The IMF had, in fact, already noted flaws in Senegal’s fiscal transparency back in 2019, specifically a ’lack of publication of certain existing administrative documents,’ such as reports on tax expenditures or the list of on-lent loans and state-guaranteed debt. ’It should therefore have been more vigilant,’ observes Ndongo Samba Sylla. This caution was especially necessary given that the institution had already been caught off guard in Mozambique, he points out, referring to the 2016 ’hidden debt’ scandal involving loans contracted following the discovery of vast offshore gas reserves. The Mozambican case demonstrated that the anticipation of future hydrocarbon revenues could create a context ripe for the rapid and opaque accumulation of debt. Senegal found itself in a comparable situation: it too had discovered significant hydrocarbon resources—gas in 2014, followed by oil between 2014 and 2016.
“People knew, yet no action was taken”
’Clues’ that there was a problem ’were visible,’ according to John McIntire, a former senior World Bank official, citing construction projects and financial flows within the local banking system and the Central Bank of West African States (BCEAO). To him, the notion that the Fund and the World Bank saw nothing is ’neither credible nor relevant.’
’It is highly unusual for a government to increase its debt by 20, 30, or 40% of GDP without the Fund’s fiscal experts—who are typically very competent—noticing it,’ says a former IMF official who requested anonymity. One of his former colleagues adds: ’The teams conduct thorough reviews every six months. You cannot hide amounts as significant as Senegal’s. It’s impossible.’ Peter Doyle and Ndongo Samba Sylla summarize the situation: for more than 20% of the GDP to escape the Fund’s notice, it would have had to lose track of these sums ’mission after mission, for five years’ across the balance of payments, monetary surveys, national accounts, and public accounts4. A scenario that is hardly plausible.
If the hypothesis of incompetence seems hard to believe, what other explanation remains? According to a well-informed source, this was no more technical failure. Certain members of the IMF team in charge of Senegal reportedly identified anomalies and informed their superiors. However, at least one senior official allegedly ignored these warnings deliberately. This would not, therefore, be an error of ’omission,’ but rather one of ’commission’: ’People knew and did not act,’ the source insists, drawing on internal testimonies.
The ’close ties’ between the IMF, the French Treasury, and Macky Sall
Several sources suggest the hypothesis of political trade-offs. This is far from being a far-fetched theory, as Martin Kessler notes : ’There is a wealth of economic literature showing how political considerations can steer the IMF’s choices in certain directions—particularly by lowering its requirements for debt sustainability.’
Peter Doyle and Ndongo Samba Sylla raise the possibility of a ’deliberate decision not to scrutinize the figures too closely, for fear that certain transactions might enter the public domain, which could have harmed the political future of France’s best friend in Senegal, Mr. Macky Sall.’ Several former IMF officials share this view. ’Macky Sall was the star pupil of the Americans and the French… He awarded major contracts to Western companies, particularly French ones, financed by state debt. He was their golden boy, and he was being groomed to become the UN Secretary-General,’ says one of them. The former Senegalese president is currently a declared candidate for the position.
Another source confirms the existence of ’close ties between the IMF, the French Treasury, and Macky Sall.’ For France—Senegal’s second-largest bilateral creditor after China—the Senegalese president represented, alongside Alassane Ouattara in Côte d’Ivoire, a pillar for the defense of its interests in West Africa. John McIntire, for his part, emphasizes the importance for Western countries of maintaining ’Senegal’s image of stability.’
When contacted, the institution rejected any political considerations. ’The IMF,’ it noted, ’is a multilateral organization governed by its 191 member countries. All Executive Board decisions, including those regarding Senegal, are made collectively, based on staff analyses, information submitted by the authorities, and established frameworks.’
The choice of austerity
At this stage, there is no evidence to suggest that the IMF knowingly concealed information. However, it did, in effect, contribute to worsening the situation. By continuing its disbursements under the program with Senegal—when the discovery of irregularities should have led to their suspension—the institution played a part in increasing the total debt stock. Added to this is the cost of the ’surcharges’ applied by the Fund: when a country borrows beyond its quota, as Senegal did, it is required to pay additional fees.
The IMF’s role is more central as its support is a prerequisite for that of other donors, such as the World Bank or the African Development Bank, which follow suit and grant their own loans. Consequently, the Fund has contributed both directly and indirectly to increasing the country’s financial burden.
Today, the magnitude of the debt is such that it has shattered the promises made by Bassirou Diomaye Faye and his Prime Minister, Ousmane Sonko. Instead of launching a program for recovery, poverty reduction, and the restoration of sovereignty, they find themselves forced to implement an austerity plan. They have chosen to fully repay this debt—despite it being deemed unsustainable by many economists—without questioning the role of the Bretton Woods institutions. Several observers wonder whether the current impasse might be deliberate, noting that the project championed by Faye during his candidacy specifically aimed to reduce French influence over Senegal’s economic and monetary policy.
However, the social context is already precarious: nearly 37.5% of the population lives below the poverty line, with particularly high rates in rural areas (exceeding 50%) and food insecurity affecting a large portion of the most vulnerable. Any reduction in social spending or any tax increase risks further exacerbating these hardships.
Multiple other ’hidden debts’ ?
Faced with criticisms that the Senegalese people are paying for the IMF’s mistakes, the Fund defends itself: it ’fully understands the difficulty of this period’ for the population and claims to be conducting ’an internal review to understand how these discrepancies went unnoticed and to strengthen safeguards against similar failures.’ Meanwhile, the IMF states it is working ’on a request for a new IMF-supported program aimed at addressing fiscal challenges and debt vulnerabilities, while promoting inclusive growth for the benefit of the Senegalese people.’ To date, no officials have been sanctioned.
For its part, the World Bank—which has also granted loans to Senegal—maintains that following the ’audit revelations,’ it has ’strengthened its support for transparency and good governance,’ while continuing its analysis ’based on available information.’
According to several experts, the consequences of this case extend beyond Senegal: at a time when sovereignist movements have gained momentum across the continent in recent years, this situation weakens the idea that Africans can freely determine their own economic future without the constraints imposed by international financial institutions. Some even fear that other countries may be facing similar ’hidden debt’ scenarios.
One question remains unanswered: what information was held by the French Treasury, which is closely linked to the IMF and former President Macky Sall, and which monitors Senegalese finances through the CFA franc system? When questioned, the institution—which is now demanding that Dakar settle several outstanding payments, including approximately €30 million owed to the French Development Agency (AFD)—acknowledged receipt of our inquiries but did not respond. The BCEAO, which is typically well-informed regarding the accounts of its member states, including Senegal, has also remained silent.
1The author of this article has co-authored two books with Ndongo Samba Sylla, published by La Découverte (The Invisible Weapon of Françafrique: A History of the CFA Franc, 2018, and Democracy in Françafrique: A History of Electoral Imperialism, 2024).
2Ndongo Samba Sylla, Peter Doyle, ‘The IMF’s Unrealistic Inflation Forecasts for Senegal’, Financial Afrik, 3 November 2024.
3Martin Kessler, ‘What we learn from the new International Debt Statistics on the hidden debt of Senegal’, Finance for Development Lab, 08/12/25.
4Ndongo Samba Sylla, Peter Doyle, ‘The IMF must first put its own house in order’, Financial Afrik, 25 March 2025.