Abidjan, 2022. Alassane Ouattara and his wife, Dominique, pose, flanked on one side by the former French President Nicolas Sarkozy, and on the other by Martin Bouygues, head of the eponymous industrial group.
This image is much more than a social photo: it perfectly illustrates the special nature of the relationship that Ivory Coast continues to maintain with France. While several Sahelian countries have broken with the former colonial power and a sovereignist wind is blowing across West Africa, Abidjan remains aligned with Paris, driven by a convergence of diplomatic, economic, and personal interests.
The principal architect of this alliance: Alassane Ouattara. Since coming to power in 2011, the Ivorian president has worked to strengthen Franco-Ivorian cooperation. “France is a reliable partner,” he repeats, asserting a pro-Western positioning in a region where outside influences are diversifying, with the growing presence of China, Russia, or Turkey.
Back and forth between the BCEAO and IMF
This is a long-standing position. After growing up in Burkina Faso and studying economics in the United States, Alassane Ouattara spent about twenty years going back and forth between the International Monetary Fund (IMF), in Washington, and the Central Bank of West African States (BCEAO), a pillar of the CFA franc system.
He began his career precisely in 1968 as an economist at the IMF, before joining the BCEAO (Central Bank of West African States) five years later, which was then based in Paris. He then returned to the IMF, before rejoining the BCEAO in 1982 as vice-governor, now in Dakar. In 1984, he returned to the IMF to head the Africa department, before returning one last time to the BCEAO in 1988, as governor.
These experiences between Washington, Paris, and Dakar allowed him to build relationships with French economic and administrative elites, as the BCEAO is under the supervision of the French Treasury, while the IMF handles the files of Franc Zone countries in close coordination with Paris.
Between late 1990 and late 1993, Alassane Ouattara held the position of Prime Minister in Côte d’Ivoire (Ivory Coast). This role gave new weight to his relationships with French circles of power: he became a central contact for French companies operating in the country. Steering a program of liberal economic reforms, in conjunction with the IMF and the World Bank, he oversaw a wave of privatizations affecting strategic sectors, notably benefiting several French groups.
Rapprochement with Michel Camdessus
Among them is the Bouygues group. Already the majority shareholder of the Société de distribution d’eau de la Côte d’Ivoire (Sodeci - Ivory Coast Water Distribution Company), it took control of the Compagnie ivoirienne d’électricité (CIE - Ivorian Electricity Company) in October 1990, via a negotiated, over-the-counter agreement with the Ivorian State.
During this period, Ouattara also grew closer to rising figures on the French right, and particularly to Nicolas Sarkozy, who was then Budget Minister and close to the Bouygues family. Both played a role in the devaluation of the CFA franc, which was decided by Paris and the IMF and implemented in January 1994. Zone economies which officially aimed to restore the competitiveness of the Franc Zone economies, caused a sudden rise in prices and an increase in poverty, while consolidating the commercial and industrial positions of French actors already well established in the region.
Sidelined after the death of President Houphouët-Boigny, whom he had hoped to replace, Ouattara returned once again to Washington to become one of the Deputy Managing Directors of the IMF (International Monetary Fund) in July 1994, a position he would hold until 1999.
This return to the heart of the international financial institution offers him more than a simple technocratic retreat: it becomes a lever for him to expand his networks within the French political world. He particularly solidifies his relationship with Michel Camdessus, the Managing Director of the IMF from 1987 to 2000, a central player in the 1994 devaluation of the CFA franc, a former Director of the Treasury, and Governor of the Bank of France.
Gbagbo’s disgrace in the Socialist Parti
A liberal close to the French Socialist Party, Camdessus played a mediating role: thanks to him, Ouattara met socialist figures such as Dominique Strauss-Kahn (DSK) or Laurent Fabius, who would go on to hold key positions within the French state apparatus in the 2000s.
In a mirror effect, this sponsorship will harm another heavyweight of the Ivorian political scene: Laurent Gbagbo. Although ideologically close to the French left, the latter will run up against persistent mistrust in circles where the influence of Camdessus and his protégés is strong. “Even before Laurent Gbagbo became president, in October 2000, DSK and Fabius could not stand him,” recalls Guy Labertit, former “Monsieur Afrique” of the Socialist Party and a friend of Gbagbo. The network effect then came into full play: by betting on Ouattara, Camdessus contributed to building cross-party support around him, while Gbagbo was progressively abandoned by his former French “comrades.”
Alassane Ouattara’s French address book does not solely rely on his technocratic functions and political alliances, but also on his private life, and more specifically on his wife, Dominique Nouvian, a French, widowed woman whom he met in Dakar in the 1980s.
Established in Côte d’Ivoire and well-(introduced) connected to the BCEAO Governor, Abdoulaye Fadiga, she gradually gained influence in Ivorian power circles, eventually becoming close to President Félix Houphouët-Boigny. With her Real Estate Agency of Côte d’Ivoire (Agence immobilière de la Côte d’Ivoire - AICI), she found herself in charge of managing a part of Houphouët-Boigny’s vast real estate assets in France and Switzerland – as well as properties belonging to Omar Bongo, President of Gabon. This discreet but strategic role opened the doors to influential Parisian circles.
“It’s not a couple, it’s a business”
At the time their wedding was celebrated in 1991 in Paris, the Ouattara couple’s foothold in French political and economic circles was already well established: Martin Bouygues and Jean-Christophe Mitterrand, the president’s son and Africa advisor at the Élysée Palace, were among the guests at the ceremony.
In the 1990s, Dominique Ouattara entered the media by taking control of Radio Nostalgie Afrique, based in Abidjan, while continuing to network in French political and media circles, both on the right and on the left, with some success. “She has an absolutely remarkable lobbying expertise,” the Socialist deputy François Loncle would say.
“It’s not a couple, it’s a business”, said for his part Laurent Gbagbo. This phrase is a good summary: in a context where Ivorian politics remains dependent on power networks in France, the strength of the Ouattara duo rests as much on Alassane’s technocratic skills as on Dominique’s relational talents.
In July 1999, Alassane Ouattara definitively left the IMF to take the helm of the Rally of the Republicans (RDR) in Côte d’Ivoire, a young liberal-inspired opposition party. However, he was disqualified from the 2000 presidential election in the name of the concept of ’Ivoirité’ (Ivorianness) launched in 1995 by President Henri Konan Bédié. It was ultimately Laurent Gbagbo, a long-time opposition figure and leader of the Ivorian Popular Front (FPI), who won the election in October, followed by the crisis and the rebellion of 2002.
Behind the crisis and rebellion of 2002
In the following years, Alassane Ouattara largely resided in Paris, but remained very present in Ivorian political life thanks to an active militant support apparatus. In January 2001, some of his supporters, former soldiers exiled in Burkina Faso, even attempted to overthrow Laurent Gbagbo. In September 2002, they tried again. Their coup d’état failed, but they took control of the northern half of the country. At their head: a former bodyguard of the Ouattara family, Ibrahim Coulibaly.
The political-military crisis that is opening places France at the heart of the action. A close ally of Paris, Blaise Compaoré, president of Burkina Faso, supports the rebels. At the same time, several thousand French soldiers are deployed alongside the UN peacekeepers as part of Operation Licorne. Officially present to stabilize the country, this force in fact contributes to freezing the conflict. The status quo allows the rebels to establish themselves permanently... and Ouattara to remain a key player.
Although accused by his adversaries of being the godfather of the rebellion, renamed the New Forces, the RDR leader gradually became the favored interlocutor for a portion of the international community. A role that he largely owes to the alliances he had patiently forged over the decades.
He is associated with all the peace negotiations: the Marcoussis Accords (France, 2003), those of Pretoria (South Africa, 2005), and then the Ouagadougou Political Agreement (2007), even if he is not always a signatory. Driven by Paris, these texts contributed to reducing the political and diplomatic room for manoeuvring for Laurent Gbagbo. Alassane Ouattara, on the contrary, then won a decisive victory in 2005: a presidential decree authorized him to run in the next presidential election.
Sarkozy gets personally involved
During these years of crisis, he polished his image and consolidated his support. In 2007, his position was considerably strengthened with the arrival of Nicolas Sarkozy at the Élysée Palace. As a result, on the eve of the 2010 election, which was supposed to put an end to a decade of conflict, he embodied a reassuring figure in the eyes of Western chancellories: a technocrat trained in IMF standards, a liberal, perceived as capable of stabilizing the country and guaranteeing French strategic interests.
Conversely, Laurent Gbagbo carried the international image of a divisive leader, despite solid popular support. The years spent by the Ouattara couple building ties in diplomatic, financial, media, and political circles thus finally paid off.
The relational capital network of the Ouattaras would prove even more precious in the weeks following the presidential election, when the electoral process turned into a crisis after the second round between Laurent Gbagbo and Alassane Ouattara. Convinced that his friend Ouattara’s victory was the only acceptable outcome, Nicolas Sarkozy personally got involved: pressure on the president of the Independent Electoral Commission, interventions with the UN representative, and diplomatic mobilization to rally the great powers to his candidate’s cause.
It matters little that the Ivorian Constitutional Council, the only body empowered to proclaim the results, designated Laurent Gbagbo as the winner; the international community recognized Ouattara, thanks to the efforts of President Sarkozy. It was during this period that Alassane Ouattara explained to the media: “Nicolas Sarkozy is a long-time friend. If I have five or six true friends in the world, he is one of them.”
In the following months, Paris toughened its stance against Côte d’Ivoire, still led by Laurent Gbagbo: economic sanctions, diplomatic isolation, and then military engagement alongside the troops raised by Alassane Ouattara to fight the Ivorian army. In April 2011, an unprecedented military operation by the UN and France finally concluded with the arrest of Gbagbo – in violation of Resolution 1975 adopted by the Security Council. Sarkozy would later summarize this operation in a few words: “We removed Gbagbo, we installed Ouattara, without any controversy, without anything.” For his part, Michel Camdessus did not hesitate to compare his protégé Ouattara to Nelson Mandela.
Bouygues and Bolloré at the inauguration
At the end of a war that officially claimed over 3,000 lives, Ouattara thus acceded to the presidency with unprecedented international support, the culmination of a patiently constructed strategy of influence, at the junction of global technocracy and French politico-economic circles. On May 21, 2011, during his inauguration ceremony in Yamoussoukro, this convergence of interests between Paris and Abidjan was displayed for all to see. Alongside Nicolas Sarkozy were several figures from the French business world: Martin Bouygues, Vincent Bolloré, and Alexandre Vilgrain, president of the French Council of Investors in Africa (CIAN).
A few months later, in January 2012, in a speech given in Paris alongside Nicolas Sarkozy, Ouattara praised the ’efforts’ of France, “which was able to mobilize the international community to support the choice of the Ivorian people.” During a ceremony at the Ivorian embassy, he went further by rewarding those who, from behind the scenes of French power, had accompanied his journey toward the presidency.
A hundred public figures thus received the Ivorian National Order of Merit (or the Ivorian Medal of National Merit), intended to “reward personal merit and eminent services rendered to the nation”: Nicolas Sarkozy, Michel Camdessus, Martin Bouygues, Vincent Bolloré, ministers, diplomats, military personnel, high-ranking civil servants, academics... Even Pierre Mazeaud, the architect of the Linas-Marcoussis Agreement in 2003, which enshrined the political role of the rebels, was honored.
After a decade of tensions, Franco-Ivorian relations can now resume their course in complete tranquility and even intensify. Behind the image of a return to institutional ’normality,’ a model of governance aligned once again with French interests, both economic and political, is emerging with Alassane Ouattara.
