Collected5 000 €
Objective40 000 €
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PALIER 1
15000 €
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PALIER 2
30000 €

Legal troubles and Kabila’s return leave Tshisekedi under pressure on several fronts

Analysis · Searches took place on 14 October at Belgian residences frequented by the Congolese head of state. Two days earlier, Joseph Kabila had announced that he was taking charge of the rebellion in eastern DR Congo. The two simultaneous events threaten the very stability of the country.

Félix Tshisekedi, upon his arrival in Moscow for the Russia-Africa Summit on October 27, 2026.
DRC Presidency

Surprises, not to say misfortunes, rarely come alone: as popular wisdom has it, they fly in squadrons. Two events have just reminded the Democratic Republic of Congo (DR Congo) of this: the proclamation of the “Front for the Refoundation of the Congo” (FRC), made in Goma on 12 October by former president Joseph Kabila, to replace the M23 (see Kristof Titeca’s analysis); and, on 14 October, searches carried out by Brussels police at several residences of President Félix Tshisekedi.

The police of the Kingdom thus went to places where the Congolese president and his family were in the habit of staying. Among them, a villa in Uccle, in a residential district in the south of Brussels, not far from the former estate of ex-president Mobutu Sese Seko, and regarded as the presidential couple’s second home1, was carefully searched by investigators. The luxurious residence is rented, for €20,000 a month, from a Belgian-born banker living in Goma.

The Belgian investigators were acting on a complaint lodged by Katangese civil society a year ago, in November 2025. Trade unionists, local NGOs and former executives of the mining company Gécamines had instructed the Belgian lawyer Bernard Maingain to put together a file for the federal prosecutor’s office. They denounced the “plundering” of mining sites and money-laundering operations. The complaint was also signed by the Katangese lawyer Hervé Diakese, a close associate of Moïse Katumbi, the former governor of Katanga who is now in opposition.

An “Aladdin’s cave”

The Congolese head of state is still a regular in the Belgian capital (his father and opposition leader, Étienne, took refuge there with his whole family), where, not long ago, he inaugurated a luxury restaurant in the smartest district of Brussels. He also travels regularly to Belgium for medical check-ups. There he is welcomed by a large diaspora, including many people from his home province, Kasai. Some have acquired Belgian nationality and hold official political posts.

For his part, Bernard Maingain, known in France for having taken part in the investigation conducted in Rwanda by Judge Marc Trévidic into the attack on the plane of President Juvénal Habyarimana, and author of the book Le Cri du Falcon (Histoire et Images, 2024), noted that several of the people named in the complaint hold Belgian nationality2. That allows Belgian justice to investigate acts of embezzlement and corruption committed by its nationals. While all those implicated are presumed innocent, and the results of the searches have not been disclosed, the lawyer spoke of an “Aladdin’s cave”.

The suspicions of enrichment hanging over the head of state are not new. André Wameso, the governor of the Central Bank of Congo, cited on the website Congo Confidentiel on 14 October 20253, had already highlighted the gap between the volume of mining exports and the deposits recorded in the national banking system. According to him, between 2023 and 2025 Congo recorded $83.2bn of exports (about €74bn). Congolese law requires companies to repatriate at least 60 % of their foreign currency. According to Wameso, companies declared that they had repatriated $54.4bn (which corresponds roughly to the mandatory minimum). Yet, the central bank governor points out, bank deposits in fact rose by only $3.8bn. The sums that may have been diverted therefore run into the billions. And, in Brussels as in Kinshasa, the lifestyle of the head of state and his entourage raises questions.

A virulent response in Kinshasa

After the searches, reactions in Kinshasa were virulent: besides summoning Belgium’s ambassador to the Congolese foreign ministry, the presidential office forbade its members from talking to the Belgian chancery. The head of state’s party, the Union for Democracy and Social Progress (UDPS), first reacted on 21 October through its secretary general, Augustin Kabuya4. He rejected the corruption allegations and denounced a manoeuvre designed to tarnish the head of state’s name and to torpedo his plan to change the constitution.

Far more worrying remarks were made the same day on a social network by Fils Mukoko, a UDPS member and acting director general of Kinshasa’s sanitation network. In a video that went viral, he declared: “We are going to hand out weapons even on football pitches. We are going to hand out weapons even in churches. We are going to hand out weapons even in universities.” Targeting foreign nationals, he asserted that they would find it hard to leave Kinshasa. Sacked from his post, Fils Mukoko, whose remarks were condemned from all sides5, was arrested at home on 22 October, and the Congolese justice system opened an investigation for “incitement to hatred”.

But these threats revived bad memories among the many expatriates living in the capital (members of diplomatic missions, humanitarian workers or simply private entrepreneurs). They remembered that the fall of Goma, in January 2025, had already prompted threats against diplomatic missions. In 1997, the resumption of the war by the Rwandan army, which had just been dismissed by Laurent-Désiré Kabila, led to violence in the capital, aimed above all at citizens who looked like Tutsis.

The creation of the FRN is “deeply illegitimate”

Between former head of state Joseph Kabila’s takeover of the rebellion in eastern Congo and the legal troubles of the Tshisekedi clan, many expatriates fear an explosion of popular anger, even though foreign embassies are keeping a low profile and officials are making reassuring statements. Weapons circulate in large numbers in this immense metropolis. And the Forces du progrès, the extremist activist wing of the UDPS, has already intimidated or assaulted members of other political parties, in particular activists of the C64, the coalition of opposition parties against the idea of a third term, which President Tshisekedi is trying to impose through a constitutional reform.

Concerned for the safety of his compatriots and keen to calm Matonge (the Brussels district frequented by the Congolese diaspora), Belgium’s foreign minister, Maxime Prévot, recalled the independence of the judiciary and reaffirmed Belgium’s wish to preserve relations of trust with its former colony. He was careful not to comment on the plan to change the constitution or on the unease spreading among expatriates. But, while he supports the negotiation processes under way in Doha and Washington, on 21 October he described as “deeply illegitimate” the creation of the Front for the Refoundation of the Nation announced in Goma by former president Kabila6.