
In recent years, more and more voices have risen to reject democratic values, accusing them of not being African, or even of being purely European. In this context, democracy appears to some Africans as a subtle form of recolonisation, the adoption of which would lead to the domination of African cultures by a foreign culture. Thus, a new, unrestrained generation seems to be turning towards non-democratic governance models, advocating for the restriction of individual and press freedoms, support for strong, centralised regimes, even military ones, and, at times, authoritarian systems. This choice may then appear as an ideal form of governance for Africa and a way to reject a culture considered non-African.
Yet, while these expressions of rejection of democracy and anti-democratic discourses may give the impression that Africans are resistant to the principles of freedom and human rights, they do not reflect the reality. In an article published by the BBC, Leonard Mbulle-Nziege and Nic Cheeseman assert that, despite a series of coups, the majority of Africans remain committed to democracy and reject military regimes. The apparent support for these coups is more closely related to the rejection of civilian leaders who have weakened democracy than to a rejection of the system itself.
Indeed, the statistical data from Afrobarometer surveys are clear and unambiguous. Afrobarometer is a database that collects information on the political, economic, and social attitudes of African citizens. It provides detailed statistical data from surveys conducted in more than thirty countries across the continent. Regarding Africans’ support for democracy, the results show that for decades, and regardless of the type of regime, when asked what the best form of governance for their country is, at least 70% of respondents choose democracy.
The vast majority of Africans favour democracy
However, according to these same data, there is an increase in the proportion of Africans who say they prefer a non-democratic regime (14.7% in 2024–2025, compared to 11.1% in 2014–2015), although this proportion remains low. These data show one thing: Africans clearly prefer democracy. The ideals of freedom, justice, and equity are not foreign to African political culture.
Many Africans surveyed on the issue whether to adopt a binary approach: democracy or dictatorship. This leads to an electoral autocracy being labelled as democracy simply because elections are held. However, even though elections are the most visible form of expression and one of the most important aspects of democracy, they are not enough: democracy demands much more. The classification of regimes proposed by Anna Lührmann, Marcus Tannenberg, and Staffan Lindberg is organised into four groups, although some typologies suggest more: closed autocracies, electoral autocracies, electoral democracies, and liberal democracies. In many African countries, we primarily observe electoral autocracies, where, behind a democratic façade maintained by the organisation of elections, the ruling regimes remain, in reality, autocratic.
In 2023, the differences in democracy levels between countries are striking. For example, Norway had a score of 0.84, France 0.80, and the United States 0.75, according to the V-Dem3 index. This means that Norway and France were perceived as more democratic than the United States.
Think Beyond Elections
The V-Dem index ranks countries based on their level of democracy. A score of 0 represents a complete autocracy, meaning a closed and repressive regime, while a score of 1 corresponds to an ideal liberal democracy, where freedoms and rights are fully respected. To make the interpretation of the scores easier, these indices are often converted into percentages. Thus, Norway stands at 84%, France at 80%, and the United States at 75%. Similarly, South Africa, with a score of 0.75, and Ghana, with a score of 0.57, are considered democracies. In contrast, Burkina Faso, with a score of 0.13, and Côte d’Ivoire, with a score of 0.25, are categorised as autocracies. Burkina Faso is a closed autocracy, as its score is below 0.20 while Côte d’Ivoire has a score above 0.20 and is classified as an electoral autocracy, where elections do not fully guarantee democratic principles.
It is therefore important to conceive democracy beyond just elections and to integrate other fundamental dimensions, such as freedom of expression and the press, freedom of association and organisation in civil society, as well as democratic pluralism, particularly.
Another important finding from Afrobarometer surveys is the high proportion of Africans who believe that during a crisis, a military regime should take power (around 81.1%). This group is divided into three subgroups: 16.5% want such a regime to remain in power as long as it is in the country’s best interest; 27.7% believe there should be a gradual transition to civilian rule; 36.9% think that civilian rule should be restored as soon as possible.
The Political Effects of Stress
Empirical and theoretical studies show that during times of crisis or trauma, populations react either through stress (“stress response”) or resilience (“growth response”). This dynamic is at the heart of the theory of post-traumatic political response developed by Wayde Z. C. Marsh in “Trauma and Turnout: The Political Consequences of Traumatic Events” (American Political Science Review, 2023).
The first reaction to a conflict is often fear and anxiety. In this context, the individual whose life is threatened seeks a quick solution to this intolerable situation. Studies in psychology and behavioural analysis show that during times of crisis, those who experience fear or anxiety are often more receptive to populist rhetoric and narratives offering radical and aggressive solutions, as highlighted by Vázquez, Pérez-Sales, and Matt, as well as Vasilopoulos, Marcus, and Foucault. These authors show that, in moments of vulnerability, people often rally around “strongmen” to get them out of trouble. The military and other supporters of non-democratic regimes take advantage of these opportunities to propose radical solutions and identify scapegoats, transforming fear into anger against an “enemy” community. This narrative explains why, in times of crisis, “strongmen” are well positioned to seize power.
This situation is not new. Bainville and Dickès analyse the forms of dictatorship and establish the profiles of dictators in ancient Europe. They show that in ancient Rome, there was a benevolent dictator chosen for a period of six months to restore constitutional order during wartime. However, this situation often led to abuses, with benevolent dictator-seizing power and causing chaos and instability. The same dynamic helps to understand the emergence of authoritarian regimes and dictators in Africa.
The Era of the “Strongmen”
In 2021, thirty interstate conflicts resulted in 19,325 deaths, including 8,917 in Ethiopia, according to Palik, Obermeier, and Rustad. Non-state conflicts caused 3,498 deaths, while unilateral violence – that is, attacks targeting civilians or unarmed groups carried out by either state or non-state actors – resulted in 4,170 casualties, the majority of which were attributed to government forces.

According to the theory of post-traumatic political response, in order to overcome this, populations turn to any leader they perceive as strong and capable of addressing the crisis through force. This leads to the rule of the military and dictatorial regimes.
However, this situation is not hopeless for advocates of freedom, human rights, and democratic principles. For the second response to war and violence is resilience. Marsh’s (2023) theoretical approach suggests that in the case of chronic conflicts, populations develop forms of resilience focused on family networks, a reorganisation of institutions, and political-economic structures. In such circumstances, the individual sees few short-term solutions to the crisis and grows progressively less responsive to populist and authoritarian rhetoric, having had the opportunity to observe the failures of violent and non-democratic approaches.
In a Military Regime, the Junta is the Audience
When security is delayed, populations once again demand their freedom, leading to conflict with a non-democratic regime that sustains itself through repression. In this situation, the regime is likely to become increasingly violent and panicked.
Using the theory of the “cost of the audience”, Weeks demonstrates that in a democracy, the government must take public opinion into account, as it can lead to a change in regime. But in the case of military regimes, the audience is the junta. The people may revolt, but it is difficult, if not impossible, to change the existing political situation. When popular movements multiply and repression intensifies, a junta may organise a coup d’état to replace an unpopular leadership with another, claiming to represent the people and fight against oppression. And thus, the cycle begins again.
Political space and political education are essential weapons against authoritarian regimes. When populations respond with resilience and refuse to sacrifice their freedom for uncertain security, it is crucial that the political space be occupied by radical pro-democracy discourse, rather than by “strongmen” from the armed forces. The shaping of public opinion during a crisis is highly significant. Changing the narrative is essential if we want to alter the relationship between the people and authoritarian regimes during times of war.
War, the architect of the deep state
Chong and Druckman show that the way information is presented to the public influences how it is perceived and interpreted. This is the framing theory. Similarly, the way armed conflicts and terrorism are presented to populations affects their perception of risk and their urgent needs. When information about conflicts is presented in terms of threats to life and personal security, the public tends to respond by giving up their freedom in exchange for increased security and seeking a “strongman”. In contrast, when information is presented in terms of a threat to individual freedom and as a tool of domination and alienation of rights, populations adopt a pro-democracy stance and refuse to give up their freedom. This is why controlling information during wartime becomes a frenzied and lethal race for the war entrepreneurs.
Another key point is that military and authoritarian regimes in developing countries cannot truly be revolutionary. The political economy of war shows that it is controlled by actors who hold significant portions of the economy and compete for interests. A poor state engaged in war will, sooner or later, be forced to become a ‘shadow state’, dealing with criminal actors to finance and conduct the war. Defined by Michaels, the “shadow state” refers to a parallel network of unofficial, hidden, and unaccountable power, operating outside the democratic and transparent structures of the state. The longer the war drags on, the more leaders, even those with good intentions, get caught up in underground networks, while their collaborators turn into “war entrepreneurs” at the expense of the people.
Ultimately, democracy is challenged in Africa not because Africans reject its principles, but because, in the face of crisis and conflict, the need for security often takes precedence over the need for freedom.
Democracy: The African Way
Building the resilience of populations, particularly those affected by crises, is essential for protecting democracy, as resilience is one of the key responses identified by post-traumatic response theory. Moreover, framing theory indicates that portraying democracy as the most effective tool against terrorism, especially in times of conflict, can strengthen public support. The work of Yameogo, Neundorf, Aykut, and Windsor confirms this dynamic.
Democracy – or at least the aspirations that compose it, such as the need for freedom, the ability to express oneself, and the right to criticise the governance of society – is not foreign to Africa, according to the works of Cheikh Anta Diop. While it is true that these elements were conceptualised and popularised by Westerners, other peoples could have claimed this concept in another form, while still preserving its essential components concerning freedom and the right to life. Some even suggest rethinking democracy in an African context. What they are expressing is the desire to align with democratic principles and values through an approach that is rooted in their own reality. This would help define the objective limits of each individual’s need for freedom and establish how deviations from these limits can be sanctioned.
One thing is certain: such a process will foster the desire to live, to express oneself, to criticise the management of the leaders chosen to govern the city, as well as the right to protest in case of disagreement. Democracy has a universal dimension that touches on the very essence of being human, even though communities have the right to propose a local interpretation of it.
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