In early March 2025, several videos flooded Burkinabè social networks. In them, in the Solenzo region, in the west of the country, soldiers accompanied by Volunteers for the Defense of the Homeland (VDP) – armed civilians operating alongside regular forces – are seen massacring dozens of inhabitants accused of collaborating with jihadist groups. At the same time, this time near Fada N’Gourma, in the east of the country, dozens of other inhabitants reportedly suffered the same tragic fate. Furthermore, while rural areas are now plunged into what some observers describe as a “dirty war,” violence perpetrated by the state and its collaborators affects the whole of society: disappearances of opponents and human rights defenders, arrests of journalists sent to the front, intimidation, and so on.
How can we understand this multi-sectoral and multi-situated state violence on Burkinabè territory? Above all, in the face of the jihadist insurgency and the loss of control over large swathes of the national territory, how should we analyze this counterinsurgency? The violence perpetrated by armed men, whether they operate within or on the margins of the state, appears as a mode of governance, and these practices constitute a public policy, accentuated by almost a decade of violence.
First, the junta of Ibrahim Traoré, who came to power by force in 2022, is part of Burkina Faso’s history, marked by the centrality of the military institution and making violence a legitimate resource to conquer or exercise power. Indeed, these dynamics are hardly new: since independence in 1960, the predominant role of the armed forces in politics has regularly resulted in coups d’état. This “alternation through putsch” illustrates how armed violence or the threat of it has become an essential political lever.
A dual dynamic, military and militia
Furthermore, the historical militarization of power is not only manifested by the presence of military personnel at the head of the State, but also by practices, discourses, and representations that have permeated society. They notably shaped the various forms of the populations’ “governance through violence,” particularly centered on the historically situated figure of the “citizen in arms,” a concept borrowed from Thomas Sankara.
A dual dynamic of the militarization of power and the militia-ization of society is then observed.
Thus, upon his arrival in power, Captain Traoré decreed general mobilization and launched a vast recruitment campaign to reinforce the paramilitary forces engaged in the fight against jihadist groups. According to the authorities, 90,000 people have already joined the ranks of the VDP, a force timidly established in 2019 under the regime of former President Roch Marc Christian Kaboré. These Burkinabè citizens are trained, equipped, and financed by the army to participate in military operations alongside regular forces. Ultimately, thanks to the support of a militarized state and its paramilitary collaborators, we observe a “militarization of the war on terror”, which shapes political discourse and representations surrounding the conflict, while exacerbating violence and societal polarization.
The Development of a Counter-Insurgency Policy
For nearly a decade now, jihadist groups have been establishing a presence and progressively extending their control across the entire territory. Their advance has resulted in the expulsion of state representatives and is accompanied by conflict dynamics related to their administration of these civilian populations. In vast areas now under the control of these jihadist elements, the Burkinabe military forces are struggling to assert their authority. They are often confined to their bases, thereby limiting their effective presence to a few targeted operations. When they venture out on patrols, they are regularly confronted with ambushes and improvised explosive devices (IEDs), which significantly curtail their operational capabilities.
This situation led to the establishment of Rapid Intervention Battalions (BIR). Better equipped than the rest of the army, these units are tasked with tracking Jihadist groups through mobile-unit-based operations. This strategy notably follows various experiences with security arrangements, such as those of the GAR-SI (Rapid Action Group - Surveillance and Intervention), joint elite gendarmerie and army units equipped, trained, and financed, particularly, by European Union programs between 2017 and 2021. These latter elements were already involved in various abuses in connection with self-defense groups against civilian populations accused of collusion with jihadists, for example, in the Boucle du Mouhoun region. The specialization process has intensified, and the BIR has multiplied, increasing from six to twenty-eight in three years, as stated by Captain Ibrahim Traoré in his address to the nation on January 3rd.
More generally, Burkina Faso’s public policies have been progressively reoriented around a war economy, characterized by the acquisition of Russian aerial assets and the contracting of “trainers,” the procurement of Turkish drones that have become central to the regime’s military communication, and large-scale recruitment.
Armed civilians at the core of the mechanism
To address the challenge of regaining control of these areas, the second component of the strategy has involved the mobilization of armed civilians. In January 2020, the National Assembly adopted a law establishing the Volunteers for the Defense of the Homeland (VDP). This framework stipulates that these auxiliary forces will be supervised by the Defense and Security Forces (DSF) and will receive monthly financial support. The volunteers are also to be provided with material and medical assistance in the event of injury, disability, or death. An accelerated fourteen-day training program has been implemented to prepare them for their mission. The VDP were created to compensate for the army’s limited territorial coverage and its lack of familiarity with the local terrain. According to the authorities, the army’s personnel numbers approximately 14,000 military personnel, all profiles included. The VDP are therefore understood to be more numerous than the regular forces.
Operating on the front lines alongside soldiers, the volunteers provide relief to troops exhausted by years of conflict, who are often poorly equipped, rarely rotated, and inadequately trained. Their low-cost mobilization also aims to limit operational casualties. The establishment of the VDP thus entrenches the Burkinabe army’s dominance in the security sector. While self-defense groups were previously under the purview of the Ministry of Security as part of a community policing strategy, the VDP are now placed under the direct authority of the military hierarchy. Since 2022, their command has been overseen by the Brigade for Patriotic Vigilance and Defense (BVDP), a military-led structure that has accelerated the militarization of the volunteer groups.
The paramilitary force is currently at the heart of Captain Traoré’s political communication, forming a pillar of his security strategy.
Rising violence
This counterinsurgency has resulted in increased violence against the state’s peripheral populations. These acts of violence, manifesting as both strategic and instrumental actions, indicate a reshaping of relations between combatants and civilian populations. As observed in other conflicts, from a strategic perspective, for a state facing challenges in controlling significant portions of its territory, these practices serve multiple, potentially cumulative objectives, contingent upon the prevailing configurations: displacing communities to enhance territorial control, punishing a specific group, looting resources, instilling a climate of terror, or transmitting message to designated adversaries. The recurring pattern is thus consistently the same: military personnel, accompanied by VDP (presumably ’Volontaires pour la Défense de la Patrie’) units, traverse territories under the control of jihadist groups and perpetrate massacres targeting villagers, including women and children, before taking possession of whatever is found, such as valuables and livestock.
How can one explain the successive mass killings and criminal practices on the part of government forces and their collaborators ?
First, this violence is accompanied by the resurgence of the Manichaean discourse of the “war on terror,” and thus of an enemy to be eradicated with whom there is no negotiation, and more broadly of anyone supposedly in contact with them. The carte blanche given to combatants therefore increases violence, notably because counterinsurgency is accompanied by near-total impunity. The engagement of the VDP and the BIR in combat is indeed accompanied by a process of progressive learning in the collective exercise of mass violence. As operations unfold, these groups adopt increasingly brutal tactics that become systemic, crossing different thresholds in the intensity of their abuses.
Subsequently, the massive use of national VDPs – who can be deployed across the entire territory – facilitates abuses as fighters increasingly operate outside their areas of origin. Initially engaged to defend their community, these paramilitary forces become seasoned and ultimately develop operational autonomy. This evolution is notably explained by the co-production of mass violence by exogenic BIR and VDPs. Less accountable to the populations, they adopt more expeditious methods. Far from being a simple security response, the war against terrorism thus becomes an instrument to produce new forms of political violence.
The circulation of predatory practices
Furthermore, the mandate granted by the state allows the VDPs significant autonomy in the areas where they operate. It is thus observed that this co-production of violence leads to a circulation of predatory practices between the so-called state and paramilitary bodies, which interact and progress in a crescendo through the different stages of violence. This collaboration represents, in effect, an opportunity to obtain material rewards. The plundering of resources, particularly livestock, can, for example, be the result of a massacre or an act of revenge following an attack against the defense forces.
Furthermore, strategic and opportunistic motivations are frequently intertwined with dynamics of identity hierarchization, particularly concerning marginalized populations. Despite this complexity, systemic characteristics emerge in mass and predatory violence, offering insight into the current political evolution of Burkina Faso.
Finally, this strategy has also proven deadly and counterproductive for the populations in conflict-affected areas. The mobilization of armed civilians directly exposes communities to reprisals from jihadist groups. These groups target villages suspected of supporting the state or harbouring VDPs, leading to a cycle of Vendetta. These dynamics fuel a civil war which, like any civil war, is primarily a war against civilians: reprisals indiscriminately affect men, women, and children, and the lines between combatants and populations become blurred.
A military-militia political regime
The re-emergence or renewed emphasis on patriotic resources is evident within a political context in Burkina Faso characterized by a rise in nationalist rhetoric. Following the 2022 military coup d’état, the military positioned itself under the banner of the Patriotic Movement for Safeguard and Restoration (MPSR), now led by Captain Traoré. Captain “IB” has adopted a nationalist discourse, promoting patriotic ideals while simultaneously repressing and arresting opponents, or causing the disappearance of journalists and human rights activists. This political violence is perpetrated by various specialized groups, including certain police squadrons, members of the Presidency of Faso, and the National Intelligence Agency (ANR). The new Burkinabè political authorities have also secured the support of a segment of the financial sector (construction, mining, major traders, etc.) to build a war economy and capture resources, while simultaneously rewarding a political clientele.
This dynamic has been compounded by a brutalisation of political life, orchestrated by various political mobilisations supporting the junta. These range from neo-panafricanist influences to various religious movements and identitarian groups of all stripes, who do not hesitate to resort to violence and threats to silence the opposition. The “popular progressive revolution” which the President of Faso claimed to be part of in an address to the nation on April 1, 2025, also invokes, in its communication, a distorted Sankarist imagery. The militarisation of power has intensified the militia formation within society, profoundly altering the mode of governance. Coercive practices are thus progressively spreading throughout society. We observe, for instance, regime support groups controlling roundabouts in Ouagadougou and extorting money after dark.
Official communication is pervasive, featuring slogans on sovereignty and patriotism accompanied by imagery of the military in action or drone strikes. Furthermore, the targeting of all forms of dissent has become widespread, exemplified by entities such as the BIR-C (Rapid Communication Intervention Battalion), a digital propaganda effort that defends the regime by threatening and denigrating opponents on social media platforms.
Nonetheless, Burkina Faso’s counter-insurgency policy does not appear to have achieved the expected results. The recent setbacks suffered by the Burkinabe army in the East region confirm its inability to control vast swathes of its territory. Jihadist attacks persist, undermining attempts to regain control of the area and keeping large regions under the influence of armed groups. The humanitarian situation is rapidly deteriorating, with a growing number of displaced people fleeing the violence and reprisals. Concurrently, the political and security climate is becoming increasingly repressive, marked by a worrying degradation of human rights. Between the intensification of conflicts, the repression of dissenting voices, and the collapse of social structures, Burkina Faso therefore seems to be sinking into a lasting process of deep crisis.
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