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	<title>Afrique XXI</title>
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	<language>en</language>
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<item xml:lang="en">
		<title>The Keziah Nuissier case puts France's &#8220;colonial justice&#8221; on trial</title>
		<link>https://afriquexxi.info/The-Keziah-Nuissier-case-puts-France-s-colonial-justice-on-trial</link>
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		<dc:date>2026-11-19T17:02:20Z</dc:date>
		<dc:format>text/html</dc:format>
		<dc:language>en</dc:language>
		<dc:creator>Claire Fieux</dc:creator>


		<dc:subject>&lt;span lang='fr'&gt;Justice&lt;/span&gt;</dc:subject>
		<dc:subject>France</dc:subject>
		<dc:subject>human rights</dc:subject>
		<dc:subject>Environment</dc:subject>
		<dc:subject>Martinique</dc:subject>
		<dc:subject>colonialism</dc:subject>

		<description>
&lt;p&gt;Keziah Nuissier, an anti-chlordecone activist from Martinique, appeared before the Paris criminal court on 9&#160;and 10&#160;November&#160;2026 on charges of assault and resisting arrest in Fort-de-France in 2020. But as the hearing went on, the trial took a very different turn, becoming a trial of police violence, of two-tier justice and of chlordecone poisoning. &lt;br class='autobr' /&gt; This trial could have stopped, as the prosecution's referral indicated, at the narrow question of convicting a man for wilful violence&#160;(&#8230;)&lt;/p&gt;


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 <content:encoded>&lt;img src='https://afriquexxi.info/local/cache-vignettes/L600xH338/2318792c46d1e94f17a567e825a608-29dd3.jpg?1795122317' class='spip_logo spip_logo_right' width='600' height='338' alt=&#034;&#034; /&gt;
		&lt;div class='rss_chapo'&gt;&lt;p&gt;Keziah Nuissier, an anti-chlordecone activist from Martinique, appeared before the Paris criminal court on 9&#160;and 10&#160;November&#160;2026 on charges of assault and resisting arrest in Fort-de-France in 2020. But as the hearing went on, the trial took a very different turn, becoming a trial of police violence, of two-tier justice and of chlordecone poisoning.&lt;/p&gt;&lt;/div&gt;
		&lt;div class='rss_texte'&gt;&lt;p&gt;This trial could have stopped, as the prosecution's referral indicated, at the narrow question of convicting a man for wilful violence against law enforcement. Yet this case &#8220;is anything but ordinary&#8221;, concedes the public prosecutor, given the &#8220;symbol&#8221; the defendant has become in the fight against chlordecone and police violence in the French Antilles. That of a complainant, a victim of that violence, who nonetheless sits in the dock.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Aged 28 and until now unknown to the courts, Keziah Nuissier is accused of having &#8220;wilfully committed violence&#8221; during a demonstration outside the Fort-de-France police station on 16&#160;July&#160;2020, causing a temporary interruption from work (&lt;span class=&#034;caps&#034;&gt;ITT&lt;/span&gt;) to a gendarme, Nicolas G. He is also accused of violently resisting two other gendarmes, J&#233;r&#233;my B. and Geoffroy P., as well as a police officer, Thomas P. The trial was moved from Martinique to the Paris judicial court, on 9&#160;and 10&#160;November&#160;2026, to guarantee a calm hearing.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;After a day and a half of intense debate, the defendant stands straight at his lectern, motionless and focused, a badge in the colours of the Martinican flag (red, green, black) on his chest, as the prosecution asks for a six-month suspended prison sentence. The court has reserved its verdict until 29&#160;January&#160;2027. Lawyer Eddy Arneton, one of Keziah Nuissier's three counsel, remains confident at the end of the trial: &#8220;We have police officers and gendarmes who keep on lying. We are not going to base a conviction on a file full of lies.&#8221;&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;h2 class=&#034;spip&#034;&gt;The end of justice was in the air&lt;/h2&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Anti-colonial activists, members of the Martinican and Guadeloupean diasporas, and the defendant's family and friends came in numbers to support the accused. For the defence, seven witnesses were heard, many of whom travelled from Martinique to denounce a trial they found &#8220;incomprehensible&#8221; and to testify to a judicial violence stemming from a &#8220;colonial justice&#8221;. The complainants, for their part, were absent.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;From the opening of the trial, the defendant insists on setting the record straight: the origin of this whole affair is chlordecone, a pesticide used in the banana plantations of Martinique and Guadeloupe from 1972 to the 1990s, despite numerous warnings attesting to its dangers&lt;sup class='ref_note'&gt;&lt;a href=&#034;#nb1&#034; class=&#034;spip_note&#034; rel=&#034;appendix&#034; title=&#034;Sant&#233; publique France report, October&#160;2018, available here.&#034; id=&#034;nh1&#034;&gt;1&lt;/a&gt;&lt;/sup&gt;. The presiding judge, Martine Timsit, also took care to stress this context.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Let us go back six years. On 13&#160;January&#160;2020, seven anti-chlordecone activists were tried at the Fort-de-France judicial court over clashes with law enforcement. At the time, dozens of activists gathered every Saturday outside shops belonging to the group of Martinique's biggest &#8220;b&#233;k&#233;&#8221; (the local term for the descendants of French slave-owning colonists), Bernard Hayot, to denounce the use of chlordecone on his banana plantations. The public trial of the so-called &#8220;Oc&#233;anis Seven&#8221; quickly became a symbol of the fight against the pesticide, and many had come to watch.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;But on arriving at the forecourt of the Fort-de-France courthouse, supporters were refused entry. A violation &#8220;of our rights as citizens&#8221;, says Keziah Nuissier. Clashes broke out between law enforcement and the crowd: tear gas and &lt;span class=&#034;caps&#034;&gt;LBD&lt;/span&gt; (flash-ball launcher) rounds against thrown stones and bottles. &#8220;It felt, if not like the end of the world, then like the end of justice,&#8221; says Georges-Emmanuel Germany, a former head of the local bar association, who assisted Keziah Nuissier during his police custody and who was at the courthouse that 13&#160;January.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;h2 class=&#034;spip&#034;&gt;The symbolism of the b&#232;l&#232;&lt;/h2&gt;
&lt;p&gt;It is in footage of the demonstration, shown during the hearing, that the defendant first appears. Then aged 21, he is playing the b&#232;l&#232; drum, an instrument that symbolises the fight against slavery in Martinique. It is his &#8220;way of protesting&#8221;. In other footage, he is seen moving through the crowd with a stone in his hand.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;According to the grounds set out by the presiding judge, he is accused of throwing stones at the courthouse. Images dug up to discredit him, according to his three lawyers: &#8220;You cannot convict a man on the possibility that he threw a stone.&#8221; In the courtroom, laughter is barely stifled, yet it says a great deal about the prevailing climate: a judicial administration that clings to its rigour, facing a public that no longer believes in its authority or in the symbol it represents.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;On 16&#160;July of the same year, Keziah Nuissier turns up again, this time at another demonstration outside one of Fort-de-France's police stations. With his b&#232;l&#232; drum, he has come to support activists arrested at dawn. His mother, Madly Etil&#233;, is also there, holding a Martinican flag.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Suddenly, a gendarme, Nicolas G., seizes Keziah Nuissier's drum. Madly Etil&#233; rushes towards him to get it back. But with a sudden movement, the gendarme knocks into her: she falls and breaks her arm. Keziah says he ran to help his mother up, jostling the gendarme &#8220;in his momentum&#8221; and &#8220;unintentionally&#8221;. In the video shown at the hearing, everything happens very fast. Clashes break out for a few seconds, during which the civil party accuses the activist of punching and kicking Nicolas G.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;h2 class=&#034;spip&#034;&gt;The baton blows and the insults&lt;/h2&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The image then appears, clearly, of a young man on the ground receiving &#8220;thirty-five baton blows&#8221;, according to his lawyers (blows &lt;a href=&#034;https://index.ngo/enquetes/arrestation-de-keziah-nuissier-a-fort-de-france-ce-que-montrent-les-images&#034; class=&#034;spip_out&#034; rel=&#034;external&#034;&gt;counted by the &lt;span class=&#034;caps&#034;&gt;NGO&lt;/span&gt; Index&lt;/a&gt; using several videos), before being carried to the back of a gendarmerie van, out of view of the cameras, to be taken into custody. A video filmed by a local resident, however, shows what happens behind the van. A shocked silence falls over the courtroom. Keziah Nuissier is lying on the ground, a pool of blood under his head. &#8220;When I come to, I am lying in the gutter [&#8230;]. I see a gendarme sitting on me. There is a gendarme with his knee on my private parts,&#8221; he tells the presiding judge. &#8220;A gendarme [Nicolas G.] stuck his thumb in my eye [which the civil party denies &#8211; ed.]. Meanwhile, I could hear other gendarmes telling me &#8216;die' (&lt;i&gt;meurs&lt;/i&gt;), &#8216;you fucking bastard' (&lt;i&gt;tu es un encul&#233;&lt;/i&gt;) or &#8216;dirty nigger' (&lt;i&gt;sale n&#233;gro&lt;/i&gt;).&#8221;&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;A recorded call to the Service d&#233;partemental d'incendie et de secours (&lt;span class=&#034;caps&#034;&gt;SDIS&lt;/span&gt;, the departmental fire and rescue service), made from the police station where Keziah Nuissier is being held after being taken into custody, is played in court. In it, a police officer can be heard describing a young man who has been &#8220;beaten up&#8221;, with an open head wound, and explaining that he was struck &#8220;by the gendarmes&#8221;. The firefighters, however, do not take him into their care, sent on arrival to another injured person, a gendarme, the defence says.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The first medical certificate attesting that Keziah was fit to be held in custody was issued only the following day, at 11pm. On 18&#160;July, when Keziah had gone home and was struggling to move, his doctor, who gave evidence at the hearing, found a man &#8220;in respiratory failure, in an extremely alarming state&#8221;. Nicolas G. was prescribed two days of &lt;span class=&#034;caps&#034;&gt;ITT&lt;/span&gt;; Keziah Nuissier, 21, and he will have to undergo an eye operation years later. But the harm goes well beyond that.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;&#8220;Madam President, I want to tell you that, that day, my son could have died,&#8221; says Madly Etil&#233; in a toneless voice. &#8220;What could he do against men dressed like Grendizer robots?&#8221;&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;h2 class=&#034;spip&#034;&gt;A justice that &#8220;varies by geography&#8221;&lt;/h2&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The prosecutors' unease is palpable. &#8220;While this trial is going on, the Michel Zecler case is under way: a Black man, a Martinican, a victim of police violence. Except that he was able to become a civil party, whereas Mr&#160;Nuissier appears before you in the dock,&#8221; remarks Arneton. The presiding judge, without denying what she calls &#8220;police violence&#8221;, points out that she and her two assessors &#8220;have not been asked to rule on these facts&#8221;.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The question ends up becoming obvious: how can one judge the acts of violence of activists, in the Martinican context, without taking into account the violence they suffer at the hands of law enforcement, and therefore of the state? &#8220;It is easy, in a courtroom, to say that nothing justifies violence, but to fail to see the situation of Martinican society! Who is at the origin of the violence?&#8221; exclaims lawyer Rapha&#235;l Constant, who represents Keziah Nuissier.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;&#8220;It is hard to understand [the situation] from a strictly Parisian point of view,&#8221; explains the Martinican &lt;span class=&#034;caps&#034;&gt;MP&lt;/span&gt; Jean-Philippe Nilor, who speaks of a justice &#8220;that varies by geography&#8221;. &#8220;Police repression is harsh where we live. It is blind violence, and scenes like that are unbearable. Either we accept that the Republic is also on the other side of the ocean, and not only in mainland France, or we admit that it does not apply in the colonies.&#8221;&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The witnesses called by the defence all agree on the same finding: this case goes beyond the walls of this courtroom. The video of Keziah Nuissier, on the ground, with a head wound, has racked up more than 600,000&#160;views on social media. &#8220;It is the symbol of Martinique that we saw on the ground, the blows raining down on it. Of a France that smashes,&#8221; observes Arneton coolly.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;h2 class=&#034;spip&#034;&gt;&#8220;I have rarely seen such an empty case file&#8221;&lt;/h2&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Fuelled by these images, two days of riots broke out in Martinique after his arrest, leading to two separate investigations by the &lt;span class=&#034;caps&#034;&gt;IGGN&lt;/span&gt; (Inspection g&#233;n&#233;rale de la Gendarmerie nationale, the gendarmerie's internal watchdog) and the &lt;span class=&#034;caps&#034;&gt;IGPN&lt;/span&gt; (Inspection g&#233;n&#233;rale de la Police nationale, the police's internal watchdog). The first led to an acknowledgement of an error in the description of the blows dealt to the defendant. The second came to nothing.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The defence also points to irregularities in the documents in the case file: a medical certificate was drawn up only more than 24&#160;hours after the arrest, and almost all of Keziah Nuissier's interviews were conducted without his lawyer, despite his requests. Faced with a file &#8220;full of lies&#8221;, the defence is calling for the proceedings to be declared void. &#8220;I have rarely seen such an empty case file,&#8221; declares lawyer M&#233;lanie Luce.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;After the mobilisation of 16&#160;July&#160;2020, only the complaint by law enforcement against Keziah Nuissier has led to a hearing before the Paris court. He too lodged a complaint against law enforcement in 2020, for &#8220;attempted murder, violence, acts of torture and barbarity&#8221;. But it was mislaid not once but twice by the courts. He also filed a complaint for forgery of documents, without success so far (his lawyers have appealed after a non-lieu, or dismissal, ruling).&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;&#8220;It is rather peculiar to demand accounts from activists, and not from law enforcement when it comes to police violence,&#8221; notes Jay Asani, a Martinican decolonial activist who gave evidence as a witness. &#8220;When it is activists who are the subject of complaints, procedures move much faster. [&#8230;] The proof is that after what happened to Keziah Nuissier, mobilisations have dwindled.&#8221; Another example of this state of affairs: Rodney Robert, a comrade and friend of Keziah Nuissier, was convicted of throwing projectiles even though he had been hit by a flash-ball round full in the jaw on 13&#160;January&#160;2020. His complaint for police violence was dropped without further action.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;h2 class=&#034;spip&#034;&gt;&#8220;This trial cannot be thought of independently of the injustice&#8221;&lt;/h2&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Very low-key until the closing arguments, the civil party made itself heard late in the afternoon, on the second day of the trial. &#8220;Despite what people are trying to make you believe, the case is extremely simple and stands on its own [&#8230;]. In my view, 80&lt;small class=&#034;fine d-inline&#034;&gt;&#160;&lt;/small&gt;% of what has been discussed during this day and a half is off-topic,&#8221; says lawyer Murielle Renar-Legrand, who represents one of the complainants and is used to defending law-enforcement officers accused of police violence in Martinique.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Colonial justice, the state's responsibility for slavery, the legacy of colonialism, impunity for the pollution of Martinique by chlordecone&#8230; The hearing of witnesses and the closing arguments of Keziah Nuissier's three lawyers ended up giving the trial a political dimension. &#8220;You have a fundamental responsibility, particularly with what is happening in Martinique and Guadeloupe, of truth and reparation,&#8221; said Malcom Ferdinand, a researcher at the &lt;span class=&#034;caps&#034;&gt;CNRS&lt;/span&gt; (French National Centre for Scientific Research) and a specialist in chlordecone, who gave evidence as a witness. &#8220;In the eyes of the victims, of society, this trial cannot be thought of independently of the injustice.&#8221;&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;As the lawyers' closing arguments come to an end, Arneton makes a chilling observation about an experience of &#8220;authoritarianism&#8221; in this case: &#8220;If you want to know what France could look like under the far right, study Keziah Nuissier's case file.&#8221;&lt;/p&gt;&lt;/div&gt;
		&lt;hr /&gt;
		&lt;div class='rss_notes'&gt;&lt;div id=&#034;nb1&#034;&gt;
&lt;p&gt;&lt;sup class='lien_note'&gt;&lt;a href=&#034;#nh1&#034; class=&#034;spip_note&#034; title=&#034;Footnotes 1&#034; rev=&#034;appendix&#034;&gt;1&lt;/a&gt;&lt;/sup&gt;Sant&#233; publique France report, October&#160;2018, &lt;a href=&#034;https://www.santepubliquefrance.fr/regions-et-territoires/antilles/rapportsynthese/impregnation-de-la-population-antillaise-par-la-chlordecone-et-certains-composes-organochlores-en&#034; class=&#034;spip_out&#034; rel=&#034;external&#034;&gt;available here&lt;/a&gt;.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;/div&gt;&lt;/div&gt;
		
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<item xml:lang="en">
		<title>Ivory Coast. Alassane Ouattara's democracy in name only</title>
		<link>https://afriquexxi.info/Ivory-Coast-Alassane-Ouattara-s-democracy-in-name-only</link>
		<guid isPermaLink="true">https://afriquexxi.info/Ivory-Coast-Alassane-Ouattara-s-democracy-in-name-only</guid>
		<dc:date>2026-11-13T13:10:24Z</dc:date>
		<dc:format>text/html</dc:format>
		<dc:language>en</dc:language>
		<dc:creator>Lou Morelles</dc:creator>


		<dc:subject>Human rights</dc:subject>
		<dc:subject>&lt;span lang='fr'&gt;Justice&lt;/span&gt;</dc:subject>
		<dc:subject>politics</dc:subject>
		<dc:subject>analysis</dc:subject>
		<dc:subject>human rights</dc:subject>
		<dc:subject>Ivory Coast</dc:subject>
		<dc:subject>society</dc:subject>

		<description>
&lt;p&gt;A year after his fourth election, in October&#160;2025 with 90&lt;small class=&#034;fine d-inline&#034;&gt;&#160;&lt;/small&gt;% of the vote, the Ivorian head of state is concentrating all power in himself and his party. Opposition leaders, when they are not being prosecuted, are scattered or in exile. Civic space, meanwhile, is shrinking ever further. &lt;br class='autobr' /&gt; Leaders of the presidential party insist on one point: since 25&#160;October&#160;2025, Alassane Dramane Ouattara (known as &lt;span class=&#034;caps&#034;&gt;ADO&lt;/span&gt;) has not been serving a fourth term. In their view, it is the second term of the Third&#160;(&#8230;)&lt;/p&gt;


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 <content:encoded>&lt;img src='https://afriquexxi.info/local/cache-vignettes/L600xH338/82edc4199d016ce4891683d1c68666-d943f.jpg?1794586226' class='spip_logo spip_logo_right' width='600' height='338' alt=&#034;&#034; /&gt;
		&lt;div class='rss_chapo'&gt;&lt;p&gt;A year after his fourth election, in October&#160;2025 with 90&lt;small class=&#034;fine d-inline&#034;&gt;&#160;&lt;/small&gt;% of the vote, the Ivorian head of state is concentrating all power in himself and his party. Opposition leaders, when they are not being prosecuted, are scattered or in exile. Civic space, meanwhile, is shrinking ever further.&lt;/p&gt;&lt;/div&gt;
		&lt;div class='rss_texte'&gt;&lt;p&gt;Leaders of the presidential party insist on one point: since 25&#160;October&#160;2025, Alassane Dramane Ouattara (known as &lt;span class=&#034;caps&#034;&gt;ADO&lt;/span&gt;) has not been serving a fourth term. In their view, it is the second term of the Third Republic. And the members of the Constitutional Council agreed with them in 2020, an election year that saw the head of state win a third consecutive vote: they ruled that the new constitution of 2016, which limits presidents to two terms, had reset the clock to zero. This reading allowed him to extend his rule by a decade.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Now 84, &lt;span class=&#034;caps&#034;&gt;ADO&lt;/span&gt; has ruled with an iron fist for sixteen years over this country of 33.5&#160;million people, France's last heavyweight ally in West Africa, where the creation of the Alliance of Sahel States (&lt;span class=&#034;caps&#034;&gt;AES&lt;/span&gt;) &lt;a href=&#034;https://afriquexxi.info/Au-Sahel-bye-bye-Paris-bonjour-Moscou&#034;&gt;has considerably weakened Paris&lt;/a&gt;. Paris is thus careful not to meddle in the internal affairs of Abidjan, where civic space continues to shrink. To international partners, the barons of the Rassemblement des houphou&#235;tistes pour la d&#233;mocratie et la paix (&lt;span class=&#034;caps&#034;&gt;RHDP&lt;/span&gt;, Rally of Houphou&#235;tists for Democracy and Peace) repeat a convenient and unanswerable argument: a half-democracy is better than chaos. It is a weighty argument, given that the post-election crisis of 2010-2011 left 3,000&#160;people dead. That year, the rebellion, which had been based in the north since 2002, brought Alassane Ouattara to power with the help of the &lt;span class=&#034;caps&#034;&gt;UN&lt;/span&gt; and France. The deposed president Laurent Gbagbo was dislodged from his bunker before being dispatched to The Hague, where he was ultimately acquitted in 2019.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;But never mind that Laurent Gbagbo, now in his eighties, who returned to the country where he launched the Parti des peuples africains (&lt;span class=&#034;caps&#034;&gt;PPA&lt;/span&gt;-&lt;span class=&#034;caps&#034;&gt;CI&lt;/span&gt;, African Peoples' Party), no longer has the age or the fire to lead a popular uprising; never mind either that his former right-hand man Charles Bl&#233; Goud&#233;, free although convicted by the Ivorian courts, has mellowed considerably under that sword of Damocles; and never mind, finally, that the investment banker Tidjane Thiam, whose candidacy was rejected in 2025, does not have the profile of an agitator. In a country that still bears the scars of civil war and where no major election passes without bloodshed, peace is a cardinal value.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Even if that means trampling on a few democratic principles along the way. Since his fourth election with 90&lt;small class=&#034;fine d-inline&#034;&gt;&#160;&lt;/small&gt;% of the vote on 25&#160;October&#160;2025, in a ballot marked by the exclusion of his main rivals, Alassane Ouattara has been working to prepare the rise of his younger brother T&#233;n&#233; Birahima Ouattara, whose resemblance to his elder sibling has earned him the nickname &#8220;Photocopy&#8221;. As well as being defence minister, T&#233;n&#233; Birahima Ouattara is also deputy prime minister, a post created for him, with prerogatives as vague as they are broad, but which leaves no doubt that it positions him as heir apparent.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;h2 class=&#034;spip&#034;&gt;&lt;span class=&#034;caps&#034;&gt;ADO&lt;/span&gt;'s absolute power&lt;/h2&gt;
&lt;p&gt;&#8220;There is an authoritarian drift to prepare for the advent of Photocopy in 2030,&#8221; says the president of a human rights association who asked to remain anonymous, as did most of the observers who still dare to criticise the government. &#8220;The president is also cleaning house within his ranks, to concentrate power around his little brother and a handful of barons.&#8221; According to &lt;i&gt;Africa Intelligence&lt;/i&gt; (20&#160;October&#160;2026), Alassane Ouattara is considering a reshuffle shortly and has instructed his inner circle &#8211; Vice-President Ti&#233;moko Meyliet Kon&#233;, Prime Minister Robert Beugr&#233; Mamb&#233; and T&#233;n&#233; Birahima Ouattara &#8211; to propose candidates from the &lt;span class=&#034;caps&#034;&gt;RHDP&lt;/span&gt;.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;In its 2025 Democracy Index, the Economist Intelligence Unit (the research, analysis and forecasting arm of the British media group &lt;i&gt;The Economist&lt;/i&gt;) ranks Ivory Coast 104&lt;sup class=&#034;typo_exposants&#034;&gt;th&lt;/sup&gt;, with a score of 4.22&#160;out of 10, among the &#8220;hybrid regimes&#8221;, halfway between democracy and authoritarianism&lt;sup class='ref_note'&gt;&lt;a href=&#034;#nb1&#034; class=&#034;spip_note&#034; rel=&#034;appendix&#034; title=&#034;Economist Intelligence Unit, &#8220;Democracy Index 2025&#8221;, April&#160;2026.&#034; id=&#034;nh1&#034;&gt;1&lt;/a&gt;&lt;/sup&gt;. But the balance is tipping ever more towards the latter. In its 2026 report, the American &lt;span class=&#034;caps&#034;&gt;NGO&lt;/span&gt; Freedom House also lowered the country's score from 49&#160;to 46&#160;out of 100, notably because the authorities excluded the main opposition candidates from the latest presidential election and banned their rallies&lt;sup class='ref_note'&gt;&lt;a href=&#034;#nb2&#034; class=&#034;spip_note&#034; rel=&#034;appendix&#034; title=&#034;Freedom House, &#8220;C&#244;te d'Ivoire: Freedom in the World 2026 Country Report&#8221;, 2026.&#034; id=&#034;nh2&#034;&gt;2&lt;/a&gt;&lt;/sup&gt;.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The government also controls the main organs of the state. In the National Assembly, the &lt;span class=&#034;caps&#034;&gt;RHDP&lt;/span&gt; won 197&#160;of the 255&#160;seats in the legislative elections of December&#160;2025, more than three-quarters of the total, against 32&#160;for the Parti d&#233;mocratique de C&#244;te d'Ivoire (&lt;span class=&#034;caps&#034;&gt;PDCI&lt;/span&gt;, Democratic Party of Ivory Coast), the main opposition party, led by Tidjane Thiam. In the Senate, it holds 58&#160;of the 66&#160;seats filled in 2023 by indirect election, to which are added the 33&#160;senators appointed by the president.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;h2 class=&#034;spip&#034;&gt;A Constitutional Council under his thumb&lt;/h2&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The Constitutional Council, finally, has six members: three appointed by the head of state, two by the president of the National Assembly and one by the president of the Senate, both chambers dominated by the &lt;span class=&#034;caps&#034;&gt;RHDP&lt;/span&gt;. Its president is also appointed by the head of state. The body accepted only five of the 60&#160;candidacies for the presidential election of October&#160;2025, excluding Laurent Gbagbo, Tidjane Thiam and Pascal Affi N'Guessan, among others.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Last May, the government even dissolved the Independent Electoral Commission, long criticised by the opposition, which accused it of partiality. Before the election, in April&#160;2025, the &lt;span class=&#034;caps&#034;&gt;PDCI&lt;/span&gt; of Tidjane Thiam and the &lt;span class=&#034;caps&#034;&gt;PPA&lt;/span&gt;-&lt;span class=&#034;caps&#034;&gt;CI&lt;/span&gt; of Laurent Gbagbo had already suspended their participation in its work, with the former president denouncing a commission that &#8220;breaks its own rules to serve the interests of those in power&#8221;.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The opposition has been invited to make proposals on the future electoral body. Since early October, the Interior Ministry has been collecting contributions from the parties, which are calling for an independent body made up of experts. But this outstretched hand fools no one. Opposition groups have written to the prime minister to request a broader framework for consultation. Asked about this after the Council of Ministers meeting of 13&#160;October, the government spokesman, Amadou Coulibaly, dashed their hopes: &#8220;I have not been informed that there will be a national dialogue, so I cannot relay that information.&#8221;&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The government is working to finish off an already moribund opposition. Guillaume Soro, the rebel leader and ousted heir apparent of Alassane Ouattara, sentenced in 2021 to life imprisonment for attempting to undermine state security, has been in exile since 2019 and is said to have taken up residence in Niger. Tidjane Thiam, abroad since the spring of 2025, is the target of legal proceedings challenging the leadership of his party, the hearing for which has been postponed to 19&#160;November. The &lt;span class=&#034;caps&#034;&gt;PDCI&lt;/span&gt; regularly asks the authorities for guarantees to ensure his return, without harbouring any illusions.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;h2 class=&#034;spip&#034;&gt;Deaths in detention&lt;/h2&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Opposition leaders face a wave of prosecutions linked to the electoral unrest of 2025, which officially left 11&#160;dead, including one gendarme, and around 70&#160;injured. Since Monday 19&#160;October, at least nine opponents have been placed under judicial supervision, according to their lawyers.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The fourth vice-president of the &lt;span class=&#034;caps&#034;&gt;PPA&lt;/span&gt;-&lt;span class=&#034;caps&#034;&gt;CI&lt;/span&gt;, Justin Kon&#233; Katinan, was remanded in custody on 11&#160;September. The former secretary general Damana Pickass, accused of terrorist acts, has been jailed since November&#160;2025. The &lt;span class=&#034;caps&#034;&gt;PPA&lt;/span&gt;-&lt;span class=&#034;caps&#034;&gt;CI&lt;/span&gt; spokeswoman, Habiba Tour&#233;, who is in France, is the subject of an arrest warrant, announced by the Ivorian prosecutor on 16&#160;September. On 12&#160;October, S&#233;bastien Dano Dj&#233;dj&#233;, president of the &lt;span class=&#034;caps&#034;&gt;PPA&lt;/span&gt;-&lt;span class=&#034;caps&#034;&gt;CI&lt;/span&gt;'s Strategic and Political Council, was charged with seventeen counts, including &#8220;terrorist acts&#8221; and &#8220;murder&#8221;, before being placed under judicial supervision.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;On 23&#160;October, four other opposition leaders were placed under judicial supervision, including Aziz Thiam, Tidjane Thiam's brother, and &lt;span class=&#034;caps&#034;&gt;PDCI&lt;/span&gt;-&lt;span class=&#034;caps&#034;&gt;RDA&lt;/span&gt; officials, among them its vice-president, Georges Philippe Ezaley. In a statement of 15&#160;October, the &lt;span class=&#034;caps&#034;&gt;PPA&lt;/span&gt;-&lt;span class=&#034;caps&#034;&gt;CI&lt;/span&gt; denounced &#8220;a wave of arrests&#8221; with &#8220;more than 1,600&#160;people imprisoned&#8221;, five of whom it says have died &#8220;without the causes having been established&#8221;. On 7&#160;November, the party announced a sixth death in detention&lt;sup class='ref_note'&gt;&lt;a href=&#034;#nb3&#034; class=&#034;spip_note&#034; rel=&#034;appendix&#034; title=&#034;Press release, &#8220;Sixi&#232;me d&#233;c&#232;s d'un d&#233;tenu d'opinion&#8221;, PPA-CI, 7&#160;November (&#8230;)&#034; id=&#034;nh3&#034;&gt;3&lt;/a&gt;&lt;/sup&gt;. It is demanding that &#8220;light be shed on this string of deaths&#8221; and the release of &#8220;people detained for political reasons&#8221;. For its part, the government rejects the characterisation of the arrests as political and speaks of &#8220;ordinary criminals&#8221;.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;In March, Amnesty International was already calling for the release of dozens of people arrested on the sidelines of the election protests, some of them, according to the &lt;span class=&#034;caps&#034;&gt;NGO&lt;/span&gt;, solely because they were near the unrest&lt;sup class='ref_note'&gt;&lt;a href=&#034;#nb4&#034; class=&#034;spip_note&#034; rel=&#034;appendix&#034; title=&#034;Amnesty International, &#8220;C&#244;te d'Ivoire. Des femmes enceintes parmi les (&#8230;)&#034; id=&#034;nh4&#034;&gt;4&lt;/a&gt;&lt;/sup&gt;.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;h2 class=&#034;spip&#034;&gt;The economy before democracy&lt;/h2&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The few opponents who remain, such as Charles Bl&#233; Goud&#233;, Ahoua Don Mello and the businessman Jean-Louis Billon, are forced to operate on the margins, without the backing of a major party, with the exception of Pascal Affi N'Guessan, whose Front populaire ivoirien (&lt;span class=&#034;caps&#034;&gt;FPI&lt;/span&gt;, Ivorian Popular Front) was hollowed out after Laurent Gbagbo's departure. And, for lack of a sufficiently free and well-resourced civil society, no counterweight is able to stand up to the &lt;span class=&#034;caps&#034;&gt;RHDP&lt;/span&gt; machine.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Several sources say that France, the country's main partner, was initially tempted to back Tidjane Thiam's candidacy. According to them, the fact that his procedure to renounce French nationality was fast-tracked is proof of this. But when the Ivorian courts ruled him ineligible, Paris did not press the point. &#8220;Between the putschist regimes of the &lt;span class=&#034;caps&#034;&gt;AES&lt;/span&gt; and certain autocracies of the Gulf of Guinea such as Togo, the priority in the sub-region is really not Ivory Coast, where there is no violence and growth of 6&lt;small class=&#034;fine d-inline&#034;&gt;&#160;&lt;/small&gt;%,&#8221; says, fatalistically, a Western diplomatic source who requested anonymity.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Against a backdrop of democratic backsliding around the world, the country's economic health is enough to reassure investors and keep Ivory Coast in the good books of the &lt;span class=&#034;caps&#034;&gt;IMF&lt;/span&gt;. In June, the Fund completed the review of two aid programmes, worth a total of about $4.8&#160;billion (&#8364;4.3&#160;billion), and immediately disbursed $832.8&#160;million. Kenji Okamura, deputy managing director of the &lt;span class=&#034;caps&#034;&gt;IMF&lt;/span&gt; and acting chair of its executive board, welcomed reforms carried out successfully and programmes that &#8220;helped restore macroeconomic stability&#8221;&lt;sup class='ref_note'&gt;&lt;a href=&#034;#nb5&#034; class=&#034;spip_note&#034; rel=&#034;appendix&#034; title=&#034;IMF press release No.&#160;26/222, 26&#160;June&#160;2026. Text of the press release&#034; id=&#034;nh5&#034;&gt;5&lt;/a&gt;&lt;/sup&gt;. The government thus has grounds to present its economic record as a success, while pushing into the background the question of democracy, which, in any case, now seems to weigh very little.&lt;/p&gt;&lt;/div&gt;
		&lt;hr /&gt;
		&lt;div class='rss_notes'&gt;&lt;div id=&#034;nb1&#034;&gt;
&lt;p&gt;&lt;sup class='lien_note'&gt;&lt;a href=&#034;#nh1&#034; class=&#034;spip_note&#034; title=&#034;Footnotes 1&#034; rev=&#034;appendix&#034;&gt;1&lt;/a&gt;&lt;/sup&gt;Economist Intelligence Unit, &#8220;&lt;a href=&#034;https://www.eiu.com/n/campaigns/democracy-index-2025/&#034; class=&#034;spip_out&#034; rel=&#034;external&#034;&gt;Democracy Index 2025&lt;/a&gt;&#8221;, April&#160;2026.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;/div&gt;&lt;div id=&#034;nb2&#034;&gt;
&lt;p&gt;&lt;sup class='lien_note'&gt;&lt;a href=&#034;#nh2&#034; class=&#034;spip_note&#034; title=&#034;Footnotes 2&#034; rev=&#034;appendix&#034;&gt;2&lt;/a&gt;&lt;/sup&gt;Freedom House, &#8220;&lt;a href=&#034;https://freedomhouse.org/country/cote-divoire/freedom-world/2026&#034; class=&#034;spip_out&#034; rel=&#034;external&#034;&gt;C&#244;te d'Ivoire: Freedom in the World 2026 Country Report&lt;/a&gt;&#8221;, 2026.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;/div&gt;&lt;div id=&#034;nb3&#034;&gt;
&lt;p&gt;&lt;sup class='lien_note'&gt;&lt;a href=&#034;#nh3&#034; class=&#034;spip_note&#034; title=&#034;Footnotes 3&#034; rev=&#034;appendix&#034;&gt;3&lt;/a&gt;&lt;/sup&gt;Press release, &#8220;Sixi&#232;me d&#233;c&#232;s d'un d&#233;tenu d'opinion&#8221;, &lt;span class=&#034;caps&#034;&gt;PPA&lt;/span&gt;-&lt;span class=&#034;caps&#034;&gt;CI&lt;/span&gt;, 7&#160;November&#160;2026, &lt;a href=&#034;https://www.facebook.com/PartiDesPeuplesAfricainsCoteDivoire/posts/pfbid0ZmgnxwC5LbsmTqLFbTD1H4N4jNqWAsofZCXZQTG18FbowfnjYrpL9TC6mAr9R1Ggl&#034; class=&#034;spip_out&#034; rel=&#034;external&#034;&gt;available on the party's Facebook page&lt;/a&gt;.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;/div&gt;&lt;div id=&#034;nb4&#034;&gt;
&lt;p&gt;&lt;sup class='lien_note'&gt;&lt;a href=&#034;#nh4&#034; class=&#034;spip_note&#034; title=&#034;Footnotes 4&#034; rev=&#034;appendix&#034;&gt;4&lt;/a&gt;&lt;/sup&gt;Amnesty International, &#8220;&lt;a href=&#034;https://www.amnesty.org/fr/latest/news/2026/03/cote-divoire-women-detained-without-cause/&#034; class=&#034;spip_out&#034; rel=&#034;external&#034;&gt;C&#244;te d'Ivoire. Des femmes enceintes parmi les personnes d&#233;tenues sans fondement depuis la r&#233;pression d'octobre 2025&lt;/a&gt;&#8221;, 10&#160;March&#160;2026.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;/div&gt;&lt;div id=&#034;nb5&#034;&gt;
&lt;p&gt;&lt;sup class='lien_note'&gt;&lt;a href=&#034;#nh5&#034; class=&#034;spip_note&#034; title=&#034;Footnotes 5&#034; rev=&#034;appendix&#034;&gt;5&lt;/a&gt;&lt;/sup&gt;&lt;span class=&#034;caps&#034;&gt;IMF&lt;/span&gt; press release No.&#160;26/222, 26&#160;June&#160;2026. &lt;a href=&#034;https://www.imf.org/fr/news/articles/2026/06/24/pr26222-cote-divoire-imf-exec-board-completes-sixth-rev-eff-ecf-arr-5th-rev-rsf-arr&#034; class=&#034;spip_out&#034; rel=&#034;external&#034;&gt;Text of the press release&lt;/a&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;/div&gt;&lt;/div&gt;
		
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	</item>
<item xml:lang="en">
		<title>Legal troubles and Kabila's return leave Tshisekedi under pressure on several fronts</title>
		<link>https://afriquexxi.info/Legal-troubles-and-Kabila-s-return-leave-Tshisekedi-under-pressure-on-several</link>
		<guid isPermaLink="true">https://afriquexxi.info/Legal-troubles-and-Kabila-s-return-leave-Tshisekedi-under-pressure-on-several</guid>
		<dc:date>2026-11-06T12:48:52Z</dc:date>
		<dc:format>text/html</dc:format>
		<dc:language>en</dc:language>
		<dc:creator>Colette Braeckman</dc:creator>


		<dc:subject>&lt;span lang='fr'&gt;Justice&lt;/span&gt;</dc:subject>
		<dc:subject>politics</dc:subject>
		<dc:subject>analysis</dc:subject>
		<dc:subject>&lt;span class=&#034;caps&#034;&gt;DR&lt;/span&gt; Congo</dc:subject>
		<dc:subject>Diplomacy</dc:subject>
		<dc:subject>Belgium</dc:subject>

		<description>
&lt;p&gt;Searches took place on 14&#160;October at Belgian residences frequented by the Congolese head of state. Two days earlier, Joseph Kabila had announced that he was taking charge of the rebellion in eastern &lt;span class=&#034;caps&#034;&gt;DR&lt;/span&gt;&#160;Congo. The two simultaneous events threaten the very stability of the country. &lt;br class='autobr' /&gt; Surprises, not to say misfortunes, rarely come alone: as popular wisdom has it, they fly in squadrons. Two events have just reminded the Democratic Republic of Congo (&lt;span class=&#034;caps&#034;&gt;DR&lt;/span&gt; Congo) of this: the proclamation of the&#160;(&#8230;)&lt;/p&gt;


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 <content:encoded>&lt;img src='https://afriquexxi.info/local/cache-vignettes/L600xH338/715b195ff3d97f8cb846c6a680b692-1cc06.jpg?1794584400' class='spip_logo spip_logo_right' width='600' height='338' alt=&#034;&#034; /&gt;
		&lt;div class='rss_chapo'&gt;&lt;p&gt;Searches took place on 14&#160;October at Belgian residences frequented by the Congolese head of state. Two days earlier, Joseph Kabila had announced that he was taking charge of the rebellion in eastern &lt;span class=&#034;caps&#034;&gt;DR&lt;/span&gt;&#160;Congo. The two simultaneous events threaten the very stability of the country.&lt;/p&gt;&lt;/div&gt;
		&lt;div class='rss_texte'&gt;&lt;p&gt;Surprises, not to say misfortunes, rarely come alone: as popular wisdom has it, they fly in squadrons. Two events have just reminded the Democratic Republic of Congo (&lt;span class=&#034;caps&#034;&gt;DR&lt;/span&gt; Congo) of this: the proclamation of the &#8220;Front for the Refoundation of the Congo&#8221; (&lt;span class=&#034;caps&#034;&gt;FRC&lt;/span&gt;), made in Goma on 12&#160;October by former president Joseph Kabila, to replace the M23 (see &lt;a href=&#034;https://afriquexxi.info/RD-Congo-Le-pari-risque-de-Joseph-Kabila&#034;&gt;Kristof Titeca's analysis&lt;/a&gt;); and, on 14&#160;October, searches carried out by Brussels police at several residences of President F&#233;lix Tshisekedi.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The police of the Kingdom thus went to places where the Congolese president and his family were in the habit of staying. Among them, a villa in Uccle, in a residential district in the south of Brussels, not far from the former estate of ex-president Mobutu Sese Seko, and regarded as the presidential couple's second home&lt;sup class='ref_note'&gt;&lt;a href=&#034;#nb2-1&#034; class=&#034;spip_note&#034; rel=&#034;appendix&#034; title=&#034;Arthur Sente and Xavier Counasse, &#171;&#160;&#192; Uccle, la fastueuse villa secondaire (&#8230;)&#034; id=&#034;nh2-1&#034;&gt;1&lt;/a&gt;&lt;/sup&gt;, was carefully searched by investigators. The luxurious residence is rented, for &#8364;20,000 a month, from a Belgian-born banker living in Goma.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The Belgian investigators were acting on a &lt;a href=&#034;https://afriquexxi.info/RD-Congo-La-famille-Tshisekedi-dans-le-collimateur-de-la-justice-belge&#034;&gt;complaint lodged by Katangese civil society&lt;/a&gt; a year ago, in November&#160;2025. Trade unionists, local NGOs and former executives of the mining company G&#233;camines had instructed the Belgian lawyer Bernard Maingain to put together a file for the federal prosecutor's office. They denounced the &#8220;plundering&#8221; of mining sites and money-laundering operations. The complaint was also signed by the Katangese lawyer Herv&#233; Diakese, a close associate of Mo&#239;se Katumbi, the former governor of Katanga who is now in opposition.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;h2 class=&#034;spip&#034;&gt;An &#8220;Aladdin's cave&#8221;&lt;/h2&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The Congolese head of state is still a regular in the Belgian capital (his father and opposition leader, &#201;tienne, took refuge there with his whole family), where, not long ago, he inaugurated a luxury restaurant in the smartest district of Brussels. He also travels regularly to Belgium for medical check-ups. There he is welcomed by a large diaspora, including many people from his home province, Kasai. Some have acquired Belgian nationality and hold official political posts.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;For his part, Bernard Maingain, known in France for having taken part in the investigation conducted in Rwanda by Judge Marc Tr&#233;vidic into the attack on the plane of President Juv&#233;nal Habyarimana, and author of the book &lt;i&gt;Le Cri du Falcon&lt;/i&gt; (Histoire et Images, 2024), noted that several of the people named in the complaint hold Belgian nationality&lt;sup class='ref_note'&gt;&lt;a href=&#034;#nb2-2&#034; class=&#034;spip_note&#034; rel=&#034;appendix&#034; title=&#034;Arthur Sente, &#171;&#160;Les quartiers du clan Tshisekedi perquisitionn&#233;s par la (&#8230;)&#034; id=&#034;nh2-2&#034;&gt;2&lt;/a&gt;&lt;/sup&gt;. That allows Belgian justice to investigate acts of embezzlement and corruption committed by its nationals. While all those implicated are presumed innocent, and the results of the searches have not been disclosed, the lawyer spoke of an &#8220;Aladdin's cave&#8221;.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The suspicions of enrichment hanging over the head of state are not new. Andr&#233; Wameso, the governor of the Central Bank of Congo, cited on the website &lt;i&gt;Congo Confidentiel&lt;/i&gt; on 14&#160;October&#160;2025&lt;sup class='ref_note'&gt;&lt;a href=&#034;#nb2-3&#034; class=&#034;spip_note&#034; rel=&#034;appendix&#034; title=&#034;&#171;&#160;93,2&#160;milliards de dollars export&#233;s, 3,8&#160;milliards de d&#233;p&#244;ts (&#8230;)&#034; id=&#034;nh2-3&#034;&gt;3&lt;/a&gt;&lt;/sup&gt;, had already highlighted the gap between the volume of mining exports and the deposits recorded in the national banking system. According to him, between 2023 and 2025 Congo recorded $83.2bn of exports (about &#8364;74bn). Congolese law requires companies to repatriate at least 60&lt;small class=&#034;fine d-inline&#034;&gt;&#160;&lt;/small&gt;% of their foreign currency. According to Wameso, companies declared that they had repatriated $54.4bn (which corresponds roughly to the mandatory minimum). Yet, the central bank governor points out, bank deposits in fact rose by only $3.8bn. The sums that may have been diverted therefore run into the billions. And, in Brussels as in Kinshasa, the lifestyle of the head of state and his entourage raises questions.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;h2 class=&#034;spip&#034;&gt;A virulent response in Kinshasa&lt;/h2&gt;
&lt;p&gt;After the searches, reactions in Kinshasa were virulent: besides summoning Belgium's ambassador to the Congolese foreign ministry, the presidential office forbade its members from talking to the Belgian chancery. The head of state's party, the Union for Democracy and Social Progress (&lt;span class=&#034;caps&#034;&gt;UDPS&lt;/span&gt;), first reacted on 21&#160;October through its secretary general, Augustin Kabuya&lt;sup class='ref_note'&gt;&lt;a href=&#034;#nb2-4&#034; class=&#034;spip_note&#034; rel=&#034;appendix&#034; title=&#034;Augustin Kabuya, &#171;&#160;Perquisitions visant des proches de F. Tshisekedi en (&#8230;)&#034; id=&#034;nh2-4&#034;&gt;4&lt;/a&gt;&lt;/sup&gt;. He rejected the corruption allegations and denounced a manoeuvre designed to tarnish the head of state's name and to torpedo his plan to change the constitution.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Far more worrying remarks were made the same day on a social network by Fils Mukoko, a &lt;span class=&#034;caps&#034;&gt;UDPS&lt;/span&gt; member and acting director general of Kinshasa's sanitation network. In a video that went viral, he declared: &#8220;We are going to hand out weapons even on football pitches. We are going to hand out weapons even in churches. We are going to hand out weapons even in universities.&#8221; Targeting foreign nationals, he asserted that they would find it hard to leave Kinshasa. Sacked from his post, Fils Mukoko, whose remarks were condemned from all sides&lt;sup class='ref_note'&gt;&lt;a href=&#034;#nb2-5&#034; class=&#034;spip_note&#034; rel=&#034;appendix&#034; title=&#034;&#171;&#160;Affaire Fils Mukoko&#160;: l'Assembl&#233;e nationale condamne des &#8220;propos d'une (&#8230;)&#034; id=&#034;nh2-5&#034;&gt;5&lt;/a&gt;&lt;/sup&gt;, was arrested at home on 22&#160;October, and the Congolese justice system opened an investigation for &#8220;incitement to hatred&#8221;.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;But these threats revived bad memories among the many expatriates living in the capital (members of diplomatic missions, humanitarian workers or simply private entrepreneurs). They remembered that &lt;a href=&#034;https://afriquexxi.info/A-Goma-un-mois-sous-le-joug-du-M23&#034;&gt;the fall of Goma&lt;/a&gt;, in January 2025, had already prompted threats against diplomatic missions. In 1997, the resumption of the war by the Rwandan army, which had just been &lt;a href=&#034;https://afriquexxi.info/RD-Congo-Mobutu-Kabila-et-le-plan-contrarie-de-Kagame-et-Museveni&#034;&gt;dismissed by Laurent-D&#233;sir&#233; Kabila&lt;/a&gt;, led to violence in the capital, aimed above all at citizens who looked like Tutsis.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;h2 class=&#034;spip&#034;&gt;The creation of the &lt;span class=&#034;caps&#034;&gt;FRN&lt;/span&gt; is &#8220;deeply illegitimate&#8221;&lt;/h2&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Between former head of state Joseph Kabila's takeover of the rebellion in eastern Congo and the legal troubles of the Tshisekedi clan, many expatriates fear an explosion of popular anger, even though foreign embassies are keeping a low profile and officials are making reassuring statements. Weapons circulate in large numbers in this immense metropolis. And the Forces du progr&#232;s, the extremist activist wing of the &lt;span class=&#034;caps&#034;&gt;UDPS&lt;/span&gt;, has already intimidated or assaulted members of other political parties, in particular activists of the C64, the coalition of opposition parties against the idea of a third term, which President Tshisekedi is trying to impose through a constitutional reform.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Concerned for the safety of his compatriots and keen to calm Matonge (the Brussels district frequented by the Congolese diaspora), Belgium's foreign minister, Maxime Pr&#233;vot, recalled the independence of the judiciary and reaffirmed Belgium's wish to preserve relations of trust with its former colony. He was careful not to comment on the plan to change the constitution or on the unease spreading among expatriates. But, while he supports the negotiation processes under way in Doha and Washington, on 21&#160;October he described as &#8220;deeply illegitimate&#8221; the creation of the Front for the Refoundation of the Nation announced in Goma by former president Kabila&lt;sup class='ref_note'&gt;&lt;a href=&#034;#nb2-6&#034; class=&#034;spip_note&#034; rel=&#034;appendix&#034; title=&#034;&#171;&#160;&#8220;D&#233;plorable et inacceptable&#8221;&#160;: Maxime Pr&#233;vot condamne l'alliance entre (&#8230;)&#034; id=&#034;nh2-6&#034;&gt;6&lt;/a&gt;&lt;/sup&gt;.&lt;/p&gt;&lt;/div&gt;
		&lt;hr /&gt;
		&lt;div class='rss_notes'&gt;&lt;div id=&#034;nb2-1&#034;&gt;
&lt;p&gt;&lt;sup class='lien_note'&gt;&lt;a href=&#034;#nh2-1&#034; class=&#034;spip_note&#034; title=&#034;Footnotes 2-1&#034; rev=&#034;appendix&#034;&gt;1&lt;/a&gt;&lt;/sup&gt;Arthur Sente and Xavier Counasse, &#171;&#160;&lt;a href=&#034;https://www.lesoir.be/555624/article/2023-12-15/uccle-la-fastueuse-villa-secondaire-des-epoux-tshisekedi&#034; class=&#034;spip_out&#034; rel=&#034;external&#034;&gt;&#192; Uccle, la fastueuse villa secondaire des &#233;poux Tshisekedi&lt;/a&gt;&#160;&#187;, &lt;i&gt;Le Soir&lt;/i&gt;, 15&#160;December&#160;2023.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;/div&gt;&lt;div id=&#034;nb2-2&#034;&gt;
&lt;p&gt;&lt;sup class='lien_note'&gt;&lt;a href=&#034;#nh2-2&#034; class=&#034;spip_note&#034; title=&#034;Footnotes 2-2&#034; rev=&#034;appendix&#034;&gt;2&lt;/a&gt;&lt;/sup&gt;Arthur Sente, &#171;&#160;&lt;a href=&#034;https://www.lesoir.be/776844/article/2026-10-14/les-quartiers-du-clan-tshisekedi-perquisitionnes-par-la-justice-belge&#034; class=&#034;spip_out&#034; rel=&#034;external&#034;&gt;Les quartiers du clan Tshisekedi perquisitionn&#233;s par la justice belge&lt;/a&gt;&#160;&#187;, &lt;i&gt;Le Soir&lt;/i&gt;, 14&#160;October&#160;2026.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;/div&gt;&lt;div id=&#034;nb2-3&#034;&gt;
&lt;p&gt;&lt;sup class='lien_note'&gt;&lt;a href=&#034;#nh2-3&#034; class=&#034;spip_note&#034; title=&#034;Footnotes 2-3&#034; rev=&#034;appendix&#034;&gt;3&lt;/a&gt;&lt;/sup&gt;&lt;a href=&#034;https://congoconfidentiel.substack.com/p/932-milliards-de-dollars-exportes&#034; class=&#034;spip_out&#034; rel=&#034;external&#034;&gt;&#171;&#160;93,2&#160;milliards de dollars export&#233;s, 3,8&#160;milliards de d&#233;p&#244;ts suppl&#233;mentaires&#160;: o&#249; va la richesse mini&#232;re congolaise&lt;small class=&#034;fine d-inline&#034;&gt;&#160;&lt;/small&gt;?&lt;/a&gt;&#160;&#187;, &lt;i&gt;Congo Confidentiel&lt;/i&gt;, 14&#160;October&#160;2025.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;/div&gt;&lt;div id=&#034;nb2-4&#034;&gt;
&lt;p&gt;&lt;sup class='lien_note'&gt;&lt;a href=&#034;#nh2-4&#034; class=&#034;spip_note&#034; title=&#034;Footnotes 2-4&#034; rev=&#034;appendix&#034;&gt;4&lt;/a&gt;&lt;/sup&gt;Augustin Kabuya, &#171;&#160;&lt;a href=&#034;https://www.radiookapi.net/2026/10/21/actualite/politique/perquisitions-visant-des-proches-de-f-tshisekedi-en-belgique-ludps&#034; class=&#034;spip_out&#034; rel=&#034;external&#034;&gt;Perquisitions visant des proches de F. Tshisekedi en Belgique&#160;: l'&lt;span class=&#034;caps&#034;&gt;UDPS&lt;/span&gt; d&#233;nonce un complot&lt;/a&gt;&#160;&#187;, &lt;i&gt;Radio Okapi&lt;/i&gt;, 21&#160;October&#160;2026.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;/div&gt;&lt;div id=&#034;nb2-5&#034;&gt;
&lt;p&gt;&lt;sup class='lien_note'&gt;&lt;a href=&#034;#nh2-5&#034; class=&#034;spip_note&#034; title=&#034;Footnotes 2-5&#034; rev=&#034;appendix&#034;&gt;5&lt;/a&gt;&lt;/sup&gt;&lt;a href=&#034;https://actualite.cd/2026/10/22/affaire-fils-mukoko-lassemblee-nationale-condamne-des-propos-dune-violence-inouie-et&#034; class=&#034;spip_out&#034; rel=&#034;external&#034;&gt;&#171;&#160;Affaire Fils Mukoko&#160;: l'Assembl&#233;e nationale condamne des &#8220;propos d'une violence inou&#239;e&#8221; et &#8220;contraires &#224; la loi&#8221;&lt;/a&gt;&#160;&#187;, &lt;i&gt;actualite.cd&lt;/i&gt;, 22&#160;October&#160;2026.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;/div&gt;&lt;div id=&#034;nb2-6&#034;&gt;
&lt;p&gt;&lt;sup class='lien_note'&gt;&lt;a href=&#034;#nh2-6&#034; class=&#034;spip_note&#034; title=&#034;Footnotes 2-6&#034; rev=&#034;appendix&#034;&gt;6&lt;/a&gt;&lt;/sup&gt;&lt;a href=&#034;https://www.lesoir.be/778254/article/2026-10-21/deplorable-et-inacceptable-maxime-prevot-condamne-lalliance-entre-joseph-kabila&#034; class=&#034;spip_out&#034; rel=&#034;external&#034;&gt;&#171;&#160;&#8220;D&#233;plorable et inacceptable&#8221;&#160;: Maxime Pr&#233;vot condamne l'alliance entre Joseph Kabila et le M23&lt;/a&gt;&#160;&#187;, &lt;i&gt;Le Soir&lt;/i&gt;, 21&#160;October&#160;2026.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;/div&gt;&lt;/div&gt;
		
		</content:encoded>


		

	</item>
<item xml:lang="en">
		<title>Paul Barril, the forgotten man of the genocide of the Tutsis of Rwanda</title>
		<link>https://afriquexxi.info/Paul-Barril-the-forgotten-man-of-the-genocide-of-the-Tutsis-of-Rwanda</link>
		<guid isPermaLink="true">https://afriquexxi.info/Paul-Barril-the-forgotten-man-of-the-genocide-of-the-Tutsis-of-Rwanda</guid>
		<dc:date>2026-10-30T05:00:00Z</dc:date>
		<dc:format>text/html</dc:format>
		<dc:language>en</dc:language>
		<dc:creator>Jean-Fran&#231;ois Dupaquier</dc:creator>


		<dc:subject>&lt;span lang='fr'&gt;Justice&lt;/span&gt;</dc:subject>
		<dc:subject>Rwanda</dc:subject>
		<dc:subject>France</dc:subject>
		<dc:subject>Crime de guerre</dc:subject>
		<dc:subject>analysis</dc:subject>
		<dc:subject>Genocide</dc:subject>
		<dc:subject>crime against humanity</dc:subject>

		<description>
&lt;p&gt;Paul Barril, the former head of the &lt;span class=&#034;caps&#034;&gt;GIGN&lt;/span&gt; turned mercenary chief, died on 20&#160;October. A heavy body of evidence points to his role in 1994 alongside Agathe Habyarimana, the widow of the Rwandan president, and the interim government that carried out the genocide of the Tutsis, a role he always played down; yet he had dropped off the radar of French justice. He is not even named in the dismissal of the case that she was granted in August 2025, which the prosecution has challenged. &lt;br class='autobr' /&gt; &#8220;[&#8230;] At Mrs&#160;(&#8230;)&lt;/p&gt;


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 <content:encoded>&lt;img src='https://afriquexxi.info/local/cache-vignettes/L600xH337/2301f9e15e83846afcbef9eb74e520-0588d.jpg?1793364273' class='spip_logo spip_logo_right' width='600' height='337' alt=&#034;&#034; /&gt;
		&lt;div class='rss_chapo'&gt;&lt;p&gt;Paul Barril, the former head of the &lt;span class=&#034;caps&#034;&gt;GIGN&lt;/span&gt; turned mercenary chief, died on 20&#160;October. A heavy body of evidence points to his role in 1994 alongside Agathe Habyarimana, the widow of the Rwandan president, and the interim government that carried out the genocide of the Tutsis, a role he always played down; yet he had dropped off the radar of French justice. He is not even named in the dismissal of the case that she was granted in August 2025, which the prosecution has challenged.&lt;/p&gt;&lt;/div&gt;
		&lt;div class='rss_texte'&gt;&lt;p&gt;&#8220;[&#8230;] At Mrs Habyarimana's request, I went to Kigali as soon as the attack [of 6&#160;April 1994, which cost the life of the Rwandan president Juv&#233;nal Habyarimana] took place, and I made several stays there until the fall of Kigali at the end of July&#160;1994 in order to carry out an investigation into this criminal act.&#8221; A hatchet man for the French Republic since the 1980s, after heading the &lt;span class=&#034;caps&#034;&gt;GIGN&lt;/span&gt; gendarmerie special-forces unit and the &#201;lys&#233;e's counter-terrorism cell, Paul Barril, who died on 20&#160;October&#160;2026, comes across as a talkative mercenary when questioned by Judge Jean-Louis Brugui&#232;re. Since 1998 the judge had been in charge of an inquiry into the attack that gave the signal for the &lt;a href=&#034;https://afriquexxi.info/30e-commemorations-du-genocide-des-Tutsis-au-Rwanda&#034;&gt;genocide of the Tutsis of Rwanda&lt;/a&gt; and cost the lives of two presidents of the Republic [Rwandan and Burundian], their aides and the three French crew members of the Falcon&#160;50 aircraft, felled by a missile. Brugui&#232;re's investigators questioned the mercenary chief several times, so his closeness to the widow of the Rwandan president Juv&#233;nal Habyarimana is beyond doubt.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Agathe Habyarimana-Kanziga, 83, is for her part being prosecuted in France by the National Anti-Terrorist Prosecutor's Office (&lt;span class=&#034;caps&#034;&gt;PNAT&lt;/span&gt;, which oversees the Central Office for the Fight against Crimes against Humanity and Hate Crimes) for conspiracy to commit the genocide of the Tutsis of Rwanda in 1994. The proceedings follow a complaint lodged in 2007 for &#8220;complicity in genocide&#8221;, &#8220;complicity in crimes against humanity&#8221; and &#8220;conspiracy to commit genocide and crimes against humanity&#8221;. The woman who had bought the mercenary's services to defend her interests and those of her family had the case against her dismissed on 20&#160;August&#160;2025. The &lt;span class=&#034;caps&#034;&gt;PNAT&lt;/span&gt; and the civil parties contested that decision and referred it to the Investigation Chamber, which will rule on 8&#160;April. A few days later, on 13&#160;April, Paul Barril celebrated his 80&lt;sup class=&#034;typo_exposants&#034;&gt;th&lt;/sup&gt; birthday. Despite the closeness between the two, the mercenary's name appears nowhere in the file of the former first lady.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;For more than three decades, doubts have lingered over his role in the events of April to July&#160;1994, which claimed nearly 1&#160;million lives. Curiously, during his interrogations, Brugui&#232;re and his team never asked him where exactly he was on 6&#160;April&#160;1994, the day of the attack. Barril lifts a corner of the veil in his partly autobiographical book &lt;i&gt;Guerres secr&#232;tes &#224; l'Elys&#233;e&lt;/i&gt; (&#8220;Secret Wars at the &#201;lys&#233;e&#8221;, Albin Michel, 1996), when he pays tribute to his protector at the &#201;lys&#233;e, Fran&#231;ois de Grossouvre, an adviser to Fran&#231;ois Mitterrand, who killed himself in his office the day after the attack on Juv&#233;nal Habyarimana: &#8220;I learned of the death of the man I regarded as the commander-in-chief of a new army of the shadows, able to restore France, on a lost hill in the middle of Africa. [&#8230;] Fran&#231;ois de Grossouvre died on 7&#160;April&#160;1994, shortly before 8&#160;pm. Exactly 24&#160;hours earlier, on 6&#160;April at the same hour, the plane of the Rwandan president Habyarimana exploded in mid-air above the presidential palace in Kigali.&#8221;&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;h2 class=&#034;spip&#034;&gt;Where was Paul Barril on 6&#160;April&#160;1994?&lt;/h2&gt;
&lt;p&gt;For all that he likes to feed confusion and doubt with his often contradictory chatter, Paul Barril also knows how to keep secrets, notably about the contracts concluded with Agathe Habyarimana-Kanziga and also with the &#8220;Government of Saviours&#8221;&lt;sup class='ref_note'&gt;&lt;a href=&#034;#nb2-1&#034; class=&#034;spip_note&#034; rel=&#034;appendix&#034; title=&#034;This is what the interim government, formed on 9&#160;April&#160;1994 and led by Jean (&#8230;)&#034; id=&#034;nh2-1&#034;&gt;1&lt;/a&gt;&lt;/sup&gt; which, immediately after the attack, methodically organised the extermination of the Tutsis.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Colonel S&#233;bastien Ntahobari, who died in 1999 and with whom Barril was in frequent contact at the time, left a letter dated 28&#160;September&#160;1998, addressed to the former French defence minister Paul Quil&#232;s, then chairman of the parliamentary fact-finding mission on Rwanda, which was charged with shedding light on France's role in the genocide of the Tutsis in Rwanda. In it, the Rwandan officer says he asked Barril where he was at the time of the attack: &#8220;I got to know Captain Barril after the attack. [&#8230;] As for his presence in Kigali at that time, it was his secret, he said.&#8221;&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Some of Paul Barril's &#8220;secrets&#8221;, however, were known to the Directorate-General for External Security (&lt;span class=&#034;caps&#034;&gt;DGSE&lt;/span&gt;), France's external intelligence agency, which kept a close watch on two groups of French mercenaries, Barril's and that of &lt;a href=&#034;https://afriquexxi.info/Bob-Denard-aux-Comores-Sous-le-regne-des-anges&#034;&gt;Bob Denard&lt;/a&gt;, both of whom had offered their services at a premium to the Habyarimana family and to the interim government, which was struggling militarily. In a &lt;span class=&#034;caps&#034;&gt;DGSE&lt;/span&gt; &#8220;special memo&#8221; of 25&#160;May&#160;1994 headed &#8220;Attempts by the presidential clan to hold on to power&#8221; (No.&#160;18651/N), one reads:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;blockquote class=&#034;spip&#034;&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Seeing its room for manoeuvre shrink as the rebel troops advance, the family of the former Rwandan president is ready to use every means to hold on to power. It is therefore engaged in intense diplomatic activity, notably with a view to delivering arms and ammunition to the government forces, which are desperately short of them. At the same time, Mr&#160;Bob Denard is pursuing preparations for an operation that could be linked to the recapture of Kigali international airport and the delivery of reinforcements in ammunition. He intends to reach Rwanda as early as Thursday 26&#160;May&#160;1994. Lastly, it appears that Captain Barril, head of the company &#8220;Secrets&#8221;, is engaged, in liaison with the Habyarimana family, who have taken refuge in Paris, in a conspicuous effort to supply ammunition and weaponry to the government forces.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;/blockquote&gt;
&lt;p&gt;On several occasions the &lt;span class=&#034;caps&#034;&gt;DGSE&lt;/span&gt; drew the attention of the &#201;lys&#233;e and of &#201;douard Balladur's government to the Habyarimana family's efforts to find ammunition to send to the Rwandan Armed Forces with Paul Barril's help. Yet politicians took no step whatsoever to enforce the embargo voted by the &lt;span class=&#034;caps&#034;&gt;UN&lt;/span&gt;.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;h2 class=&#034;spip&#034;&gt;&#8220;Supplying some fifty tonnes of ammunition and weaponry&#8221;&lt;/h2&gt;
&lt;p&gt;A &lt;span class=&#034;caps&#034;&gt;DGSE&lt;/span&gt; &#8220;Rwanda-France&#8221; special memo of 17&#160;June&#160;1994, devoted to the &#8220;Elements on the activities of the Habyarimana Family in France&#8221;, describes his activism as follows:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;blockquote class=&#034;spip&#034;&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Since its arrival in Paris, the family of the late Rwandan president Juv&#233;nal Habyarimana has been engaged in intense activity whose sole aim is to keep in power the northern Hutu faction, the most extremist and the most opposed to any democratic transition. The strategy of the presidential clan operates on two levels. First, in the media (letters, requests for a right of reply&#8230;), it is striving to curb the anti-Hutu campaign orchestrated by the Rwandan Patriotic Front (&lt;span class=&#034;caps&#034;&gt;RPF&lt;/span&gt;), which names the Hutu militias as chiefly responsible for the massacres. In addition, the presidential clan is working, just as intensely but more discreetly, to circumvent the United Nations embargo on exports of arms and ammunition to Rwanda. [&#8230;] Moreover, Captain Barril has apparently committed himself, through his company, to supplying some fifty tonnes of ammunition and assorted weaponry to the government forces [&#8230;].&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;/blockquote&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Paul Barril did not content himself with helping the perpetrators of the genocide and the Habyarimana family from the Paris offices of his company, &#8220;Secrets&#8221;. His presence in the land of a thousand hills during the genocide, attested by witnesses, raised many questions. In 1998 the French parliamentary fact-finding mission was careful not to investigate the point. Fourteen years later, after taking over the &#8220;Brugui&#232;re inquiry&#8221;, the investigating judges Marc Tr&#233;vidic and Nathalie Poux set out to document the contracts Paul Barril had signed with Agathe Habyarimana and with the genocidal government, as well as the mercenaries' journeys.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;h2 class=&#034;spip&#034;&gt;Reinforcing the Rwandan Armed Forces against the &lt;span class=&#034;caps&#034;&gt;RPF&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/h2&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The searches of the homes and of the head office of Barril's company, ordered in 2012 by the two investigating judges, revealed a number of items of information.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Substantial expense claims were found on one of the company's computers under the heading &#8220;Mission Kigali&#8221;, covering trips on 20&#160;May, 24&#160;May, 2&#160;June and 21&#160;June&#160;1994, for nearly 7&#160;million francs. Apparently these were round trips by Falcon&#160;50. There was also the pay of four men &#8220;plus twenty men to come&#8221; (20&#160;May&#160;1994), exactly the number provided for in an &#8220;Assistance Contract&#8221; signed with the interim government. Lastly, 1.5&#160;million francs excluding &lt;span class=&#034;caps&#034;&gt;VAT&lt;/span&gt; for &#8220;munitions and weaponry&#8221; (about $300,000). Paul Barril was questioned yet again. He told the two judges: &#8220;The company was authorised to sell defence and hunting equipment. With optics, it adds up fast.&#8221;&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The search turned up the draft of a contract between Agathe Habyarimana-Kanziga and Paul Barril. Entitled &#8220;Fichier &lt;span class=&#034;caps&#034;&gt;SAM&lt;/span&gt;&#8221; and supposedly signed on 5&#160;May&#160;1994, it is an &#8220;investigation and research mandate [&#8230;] to conduct all investigations [&#8230;] into the attack that caused the deaths of twelve people including [her] husband President Juv&#233;nal Habyarimana&#8221;. Why is this contract dated 5&#160;May when Paul Barril claims to have started investigating a month earlier? Why does it contain no mention &#8211; among other things &#8211; of any payment?&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;On his expeditions to Rwanda, Paul Barril was accompanied by two of the Habyarimana sons. And the search made it possible to identify the mercenaries who went with him: Marc Poussard, known as &#8220;Maurice&#8221;, Luc Dupriez, known as &#8220;Damien&#8221;, Christophe Meynard, alias &#8220;Christian&#8221;, Jean-Marc Souren, a Canadian, alias &#8220;John&#8221;, and Franck Appietto, alias &#8220;Fran&#231;ois&#8221;, all regulars of the lucrative dirty jobs in Africa brokered by Barril. It emerges from the documents found at Paul Barril's and from the mercenaries' various hearings before the courts that they boasted of coming to reinforce the Rwandan Armed Forces (&lt;span class=&#034;caps&#034;&gt;FAR&lt;/span&gt;) in the thick of the war against the &lt;span class=&#034;caps&#034;&gt;RPF&lt;/span&gt;.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;h2 class=&#034;spip&#034;&gt;&#8220;It's African mayonnaise&#8221;&lt;/h2&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The mercenary chief was questioned one last time on Thursday 7&#160;June&#160;2012. Besides the contract for the supply of 1,000 mercenaries, investigators recovered invoices for weapons, ammunition and personnel linked to an &#8220;assistance contract&#8221; between him and the Rwandan government, dated 28&#160;May&#160;1994. On 20&#160;December&#160;2011, Judge Marc Tr&#233;vidic questioned Captain Barril about these documents&lt;sup class='ref_note'&gt;&lt;a href=&#034;#nb2-2&#034; class=&#034;spip_note&#034; rel=&#034;appendix&#034; title=&#034;Office of Marc Tr&#233;vidic and Nathalie Poux, record of Paul Barril's hearing, (&#8230;)&#034; id=&#034;nh2-2&#034;&gt;2&lt;/a&gt;&lt;/sup&gt;. The assistance contract? &#8220;It never existed&#8221;, the man himself claims. The invoices? &#8220;That was never done.&#8221; Barril sums it up cynically: &#8220;It's African mayonnaise.&#8221;&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The complaint against his client Agathe Habyarimana-Kanziga had been lodged five years earlier. The investigation proved difficult because Agathe Habyarimana left nothing in writing, and the witnesses are, to say the least, cautious, discredited or dead. Agathe Habyarimana-Kanziga and Paul Barril did, however, acknowledge a contractual relationship, and it is astonishing that the investigating magistrates make no mention of it and did not question President Habyarimana's widow about these facts.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The 70&#160;pages of the dismissal order of 20&#160;August&#160;2025 do not mention Paul Barril's name once. As if he were a ghost. The ten magistrates who succeeded one another on the case never took any interest in him. For his part, he was still the subject of a judicial investigation for &#8220;complicity in genocide&#8221;. But, suffering from Parkinson's disease, he was deemed unfit to answer investigators. Nor did he respond to our request for contact while this article was being written.&lt;/p&gt;&lt;/div&gt;
		&lt;hr /&gt;
		&lt;div class='rss_notes'&gt;&lt;div id=&#034;nb2-1&#034;&gt;
&lt;p&gt;&lt;sup class='lien_note'&gt;&lt;a href=&#034;#nh2-1&#034; class=&#034;spip_note&#034; title=&#034;Footnotes 2-1&#034; rev=&#034;appendix&#034;&gt;1&lt;/a&gt;&lt;/sup&gt;This is what the interim government, formed on 9&#160;April&#160;1994 and led by Jean Kambanda, called itself. Kambanda was sentenced on 4&#160;September&#160;1998 to life imprisonment by the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda for his part in the genocide.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;/div&gt;&lt;div id=&#034;nb2-2&#034;&gt;
&lt;p&gt;&lt;sup class='lien_note'&gt;&lt;a href=&#034;#nh2-2&#034; class=&#034;spip_note&#034; title=&#034;Footnotes 2-2&#034; rev=&#034;appendix&#034;&gt;2&lt;/a&gt;&lt;/sup&gt;Office of Marc Tr&#233;vidic and Nathalie Poux, record of Paul Barril's hearing, 20&#160;December&#160;2012.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;/div&gt;&lt;/div&gt;
		
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		<title>Keda Ceramics, a Chinese giant under fire in Cameroon</title>
		<link>https://afriquexxi.info/Keda-Ceramics-a-Chinese-giant-under-fire-in-Cameroon</link>
		<guid isPermaLink="true">https://afriquexxi.info/Keda-Ceramics-a-Chinese-giant-under-fire-in-Cameroon</guid>
		<dc:date>2026-10-28T14:47:20Z</dc:date>
		<dc:format>text/html</dc:format>
		<dc:language>en</dc:language>
		<dc:creator>Jean Charles Biyo'o Ella</dc:creator>


		<dc:subject>Cameroon</dc:subject>
		<dc:subject>politics</dc:subject>
		<dc:subject>Economy</dc:subject>
		<dc:subject>civil society</dc:subject>
		<dc:subject>Investigation</dc:subject>
		<dc:subject>Environment</dc:subject>

		<description>
&lt;p&gt;Between a degraded environment and unmet social and tax commitments, the Chinese ceramics giant's industrial operation in the Kribi region is provoking anger and incomprehension among local communities. &lt;br class='autobr' /&gt; &#8220;Look where they started digging, right behind our houses,&#8221; says a resident of the village of Afan-Oveng, not far from the town of Kribi in southern Cameroon, pointing. He remembers the arrival of the machines, hulking things. &#8220;They turned up with their machinery. Nobody had explained&#160;(&#8230;)&lt;/p&gt;


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 <content:encoded>&lt;img src='https://afriquexxi.info/local/cache-vignettes/L600xH338/71f2d652ce881fb7ccc947297b49b8-80235.jpg?1793201520' class='spip_logo spip_logo_right' width='600' height='338' alt=&#034;&#034; /&gt;
		&lt;div class='rss_chapo'&gt;&lt;p&gt;Between a degraded environment and unmet social and tax commitments, the Chinese ceramics giant's industrial operation in the Kribi region is provoking anger and incomprehension among local communities.&lt;/p&gt;&lt;/div&gt;
		&lt;div class='rss_texte'&gt;&lt;p&gt;&#8220;Look where they started digging, right behind our houses,&#8221; says a resident of the village of Afan-Oveng, not far from the town of Kribi in southern Cameroon, pointing. He remembers the arrival of the machines, hulking things. &#8220;They turned up with their machinery. Nobody had explained anything to us,&#8221; he says angrily. Then, a year and a half later, they vanished, again without explanation. Behind the houses, the landscape has been gutted, the contours reshaped and the ground left rutted. Excavations several metres deep are filled with water. In places, vegetation has reclaimed the embankments. Elsewhere, pools of greenish or yellowish water now lie where, according to residents, there were once cultivated fields or footpaths.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;At the Afan-Oveng quarry, Keda Ceramics extracted white clay, needed to make tiles for the Cameroonian market. The site is now idle, but the pits left behind still tell a story that goes beyond the mere extraction of a raw material. It is above all the story of a village that became one of the supply points for an ambitious Chinese venture in Cameroon.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Since 2023, Keda Cameroon Ceramics, a subsidiary of the Chinese group Keda Industrial Group, has obtained permits to mine white and red clay and feldspar in several localities in the Oc&#233;an department, in the South Region. These raw materials are processed at the Bipaga 1 plant, in the district of Lokoundj&#233;, some 30km from Kribi. On paper, the activity was meant to benefit local people. On the ground, a number of residents and local officials now say the books do not add up.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;h2 class=&#034;spip&#034;&gt;Liang Tongcan, China's ceramics king&lt;/h2&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Founded in 1992 in Foshan, in Guangdong, a province in southern China, Keda Industrial Group long ago outgrew the Middle Kingdom. It has been listed on the Shanghai stock exchange since 2002 and on the &lt;span class=&#034;caps&#034;&gt;SIX&lt;/span&gt; Swiss Exchange since 2022. In building materials, its international expansion, notably in Africa, runs through Twyford International.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Its main shareholder is Liang Tongcan ($1.4bn estimated fortune according to the Hurun Global 2026 ranking), who owns 19.5&lt;small class=&#034;fine d-inline&#034;&gt;&#160;&lt;/small&gt;% of the capital. The businessman, who at one point held as much as 35&lt;small class=&#034;fine d-inline&#034;&gt;&#160;&lt;/small&gt;% of China's ceramics market, directs operations through his holding company, Hongyu. In 2025 Keda posted nearly &#8364;2.65bn in turnover worldwide, according to its latest annual report. In Africa, the Chinese industrial group is present in Ivory Coast, Kenya, Ghana, Tanzania, Senegal, Zambia and Cameroon.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;In the first half of 2026, its African factories produced about 110m&#160;square&#160;metres of tiles. Through its subsidiary Twyford International, the manufacturer operates several tile lines and is also present in glass and sanitaryware. In Cameroon, Twyford says it has created 1,200&#160;direct jobs. But workers describe safety and pay conditions as precarious: they earn a basic monthly wage of 60,000&#160;&lt;span class=&#034;caps&#034;&gt;CFA&lt;/span&gt;&#160;francs (&#8364;91.47), sometimes working close to kilns where tiles are fired at very high temperatures.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The Chinese group has formed partnerships with oil and gas companies to power its production lines. Under these agreements, the National Hydrocarbons Corporation (&lt;span class=&#034;caps&#034;&gt;SNH&lt;/span&gt;) and the Franco-British group Perenco supply its Bipaga plant, near Kribi. The arrangement forms a complete industrial chain: the gas is produced and processed by Perenco, then bought by the &lt;span class=&#034;caps&#034;&gt;SNH&lt;/span&gt;, which delivers it to Keda to run the factory.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;h2 class=&#034;spip&#034;&gt;&#8220;It was like an earthquake&#8221;&lt;/h2&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The dispute over the Afan-Oveng quarry is not an isolated case. At Mangouma, a village where the Chinese giant is working a huge rock massif to extract feldspar, a mineral prized in tile-making, communities likewise describe tensions over the exploitation of resources, benefits that fall far short of the promises and damage they attribute to blasting. &#8220;Come and see the cracks in the walls of my house,&#8221; an octogenarian tells us.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Her home is about a kilometre from the quarry. Several cracks are visible to the naked eye on the walls. It is impossible, however, to establish a causal link with the blasting carried out at the site. She, for her part, has no doubts: &#8220;These cracks appeared just after their blasts. It was like an earthquake,&#8221; she says, still stunned. To seek redress, she petitioned the prefect of the Oc&#233;an department on 30&#160;July. In her complaint, which we were able to consult, she states: &#8220;If nothing is done, we are very afraid that our house will one day collapse on top of us.&#8221;&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;At Afan-Oveng, the presence of Keda Cameroon Ceramics Limited is not illegal. In 2023 the company applied to the authorities for the temporary occupation of a plot of the natural public domain in order to run a semi-mechanised artisanal quarry. The application led to the setting-up of an administrative commission chaired by the prefect of the Oc&#233;an department. After visiting the site, the commission noted the presence of a watercourse, crops and graves. The authorities reminded the company of its responsibility towards the local population and recommended drawing up participatory terms of reference involving Keda and the communities.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The document sets out several commitments. The company is to maintain the access road to the site, compensate those affected, give priority to local labour, rehabilitate a borehole at the Afan-Oveng public school, electrify a stretch of about a kilometre and renovate a classroom. The terms of reference also provide for socio-cultural support to three churches, as well as chairs for the chiefdom.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;h2 class=&#034;spip&#034;&gt;&#8220;The whole environment has been turned upside down&#8221;&lt;/h2&gt;
&lt;p&gt;In the village, several residents say they were never told what the terms of reference contained. Above all, compensation became one of the first points of friction. Eric Ekavela, one of the affected residents of Afan-Oveng, says the compensation was won only after a long administrative tussle. He describes protracted procedures and the use of bailiffs. For the renovation of classrooms, the company reportedly offered 300,000&#160;&lt;span class=&#034;caps&#034;&gt;CFA&lt;/span&gt;&#160;francs (&#8364;457), according to the communities. They found the sum inadequate.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;At Mangouma, residents see the record on commitments as just as thin. &#8220;Nothing at all, nothing concrete, apart from the food and wine they came to hand out to the villagers,&#8221; says a local notable we met in the town centre of Lolodorf.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The other bone of contention concerns the open pits left behind, which have profoundly altered the landscape. Cameroon's mining code stipulates that &#8220;the restoration, rehabilitation and closure of sites are the responsibility of the operator&#8221;. The text also requires affected areas to be restored. Yet for Martin Biyong, coordinator of the Centre for Alternative Local Development (CeDLA), a Kribi-based &lt;span class=&#034;caps&#034;&gt;NGO&lt;/span&gt; working on environmental protection, &#8220;the whole environment has been turned upside down&#8221;.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;h2 class=&#034;spip&#034;&gt;Tax revenues slow to arrive&lt;/h2&gt;
&lt;p&gt;And what of the revenue that mining is supposed to bring local authorities? Villagers suspect town halls of having profited from the operation at the expense of the communities. In Lolodorf, the mayor acknowledges that a tax is levied on the transport of quarry products. &#8220;Our town hall collects 3,000&#160;&lt;span class=&#034;caps&#034;&gt;CFA&lt;/span&gt;&#160;francs for each lorry of stone leaving the quarry,&#8221; says F&#233;licien Ren&#233; Mballa. As for the rest, the elected official says he has no direct visibility on sums linked to the operation. By contrast, in the commune of Niet&#233;, a neighbour of Lolodorf, the mayor is categorical. &#8220;I have never received any money from Keda Ceramics,&#8221; insists Marthe Minko Abolo.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Approached for comment, Keda Cameroon Ceramics says it is acting in accordance with Cameroonian law and the guidance of the authorities. The company disputes the criticism levelled at it. &#8220;We pay the state and the communes what is due to them, which is why we are still operating,&#8221; the Chinese giant says in its defence.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;On complaints and community claims, Paul Yves Boyolo Biondi, the company's head of raw materials, also denounces what he regards as a form of &#8220;overbidding&#8221; by some communities. &#8220;At the Mangouma site there is a sort of exaggeration of the damage by the communities. Yet we have repaired all, or almost all, of the damage caused by our blasting operations,&#8221; he says. He also believes that some of the cracks are not directly linked to the company's work, but to the &#8220;dilapidated state of the houses&#8221;.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Keda also says it took security measures after its departure to limit villagers' access to the site, notably by building embankments to serve as barriers. &#8220;We did it because we know we will be going back to continue mining,&#8221; the company says.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;h2 class=&#034;spip&#034;&gt;&#8220;A casual approach to environmental management&#8221;&lt;/h2&gt;
&lt;p&gt;To accusations that its industrial activities pollute watercourses in villages, the Chinese giant points to its recycling facilities. &#8220;We discharge nothing into the environment. The water used in the factory is recycled in large basins, then reused to cool the production lines,&#8221; explains the head of &lt;span class=&#034;caps&#034;&gt;HSE&lt;/span&gt; (health, safety and environment). Residents, for their part, complain of a watercourse that has turned whitish. When &lt;i&gt;Afrique&#160;&lt;span class=&#034;caps&#034;&gt;XXI&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/i&gt; asked to tour the recycling basins in order to check that there were no muddy discharges or pipes that might lead to the watercourse a few metres from the factory, the manager flatly refused.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;In Cameroon, environmental matters fall under the Ministry of Environment and Nature Protection. In the Oc&#233;an department, where Keda operates, field monitoring is the responsibility of the departmental delegation. Jean Daniel Mewoli, head of the monitoring unit in that administration, laments &#8220;a casual approach to environmental management at some Keda quarries&#8221;, even if efforts have reportedly been made at other sites. &#8220;We are hopeful that the company will bring itself up to standard on the environmental front once it actually moves from artisanal to industrial mining,&#8221; says the official.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;According to data published by the Ministry of Mines, Industry and Technological Development, the group obtained further quarry permits in Cameroon between 2024 and 2025, notably at Mengong, in the South, but also at Manjo and Dizangu&#233;, in the Littoral region.&lt;/p&gt;&lt;/div&gt;
		
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		<title>Burkina Faso: Ibrahim Traor&#233; tramples Sankara's legacy</title>
		<link>https://afriquexxi.info/Burkina-Faso-Ibrahim-Traore-tramples-Sankara-s-legacy</link>
		<guid isPermaLink="true">https://afriquexxi.info/Burkina-Faso-Ibrahim-Traore-tramples-Sankara-s-legacy</guid>
		<dc:date>2026-10-16T12:39:44Z</dc:date>
		<dc:format>text/html</dc:format>
		<dc:language>en</dc:language>
		<dc:creator>Evan Michel Traor&#233;</dc:creator>


		<dc:subject>&lt;span lang='fr'&gt;Burkina Faso&lt;/span&gt;</dc:subject>
		<dc:subject>R&#233;volution</dc:subject>
		<dc:subject>politics</dc:subject>
		<dc:subject>analysis</dc:subject>
		<dc:subject>human rights</dc:subject>

		<description>
&lt;p&gt;Ibrahim Traor&#233;, who seized power in a coup on 30&#160;September&#160;2022, regularly invokes his illustrious predecessor. But in many respects his &#8220;Progressive Popular Revolution&#8221; has little to do with the principles laid down by the captain who was assassinated almost 40&#160;years ago, on 15&#160;October&#160;1987. &lt;br class='autobr' /&gt; &#8220;Revolutions around the world do not resemble one another. Each revolution brings its own originality, which sets it apart from the others,&#8221; observed Captain Thomas Sankara, who was brought to power&#160;(&#8230;)&lt;/p&gt;


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 <content:encoded>&lt;img src='https://afriquexxi.info/local/cache-vignettes/L600xH338/7528c27ab74033a3b7698be6b9d1bf-fb6da.jpg?1792157538' class='spip_logo spip_logo_right' width='600' height='338' alt=&#034;&#034; /&gt;
		&lt;div class='rss_chapo'&gt;&lt;p&gt;Ibrahim Traor&#233;, who seized power in a coup on 30&#160;September&#160;2022, regularly invokes his illustrious predecessor. But in many respects his &#8220;Progressive Popular Revolution&#8221; has little to do with the principles laid down by the captain who was assassinated almost 40&#160;years ago, on 15&#160;October&#160;1987.&lt;/p&gt;&lt;/div&gt;
		&lt;div class='rss_texte'&gt;&lt;p&gt;&#8220;Revolutions around the world do not resemble one another. Each revolution brings its own originality, which sets it apart from the others,&#8221; observed &lt;a href=&#034;https://afriquexxi.info/Comment-peut-on-vouloir-tuer-quelqu-un-comme-Sankara&#034;&gt;Captain Thomas Sankara&lt;/a&gt;, who was brought to power by a group of young officers on 4&#160;August&#160;1983. Taking the measure of his responsibilities in the light of the immense and countless expectations of the people of Upper Volta, renamed Burkina Faso a year later, he proclaimed the Democratic and Popular Revolution (&lt;span class=&#034;caps&#034;&gt;RDP&lt;/span&gt;) and then delivered the Political Orientation Speech (&lt;span class=&#034;caps&#034;&gt;DOP&lt;/span&gt;).&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;In that address, given on 2&#160;October&#160;1983, Captain Sankara and his comrades-in-arms set out their plans in a document meant to serve as a programme and a point of reference, in keeping with the tradition of revolutionary regimes. The &lt;span class=&#034;caps&#034;&gt;DOP&lt;/span&gt; thus took its place alongside Muammar Gaddafi's &lt;i&gt;Green Book&lt;/i&gt;, Mao Zedong's &lt;i&gt;Little Red Book&lt;/i&gt; and Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels's &lt;i&gt;Communist Manifesto&lt;/i&gt;.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The speed with which the new course was charted shows &lt;a href=&#034;https://afriquexxi.info/Thomas-Sankara-une-revolution-murement-reflechie&#034;&gt;how carefully Thomas Sankara&lt;/a&gt; and his comrades-in-arms had prepared. They had organised themselves into Marxist-leaning discussion circles, Sankara having founded, in 1976, the Regroupement des officiers communistes (&lt;span class=&#034;caps&#034;&gt;ROC&lt;/span&gt;, Communist Officers' Group), whose best-known members were Henri Zongo, Boukar&#233; Kabor&#233; and Jean-Baptiste Lingani. These men had already experienced war against Mali in 1974&lt;sup class='ref_note'&gt;&lt;a href=&#034;#nb3-1&#034; class=&#034;spip_note&#034; rel=&#034;appendix&#034; title=&#034;The two-day war, from 15 to 17&#160;December&#160;1974, pitted Mali against Burkina (&#8230;)&#034; id=&#034;nh3-1&#034;&gt;1&lt;/a&gt;&lt;/sup&gt;, as well as the exercise of power in various forms. They had also joined the National Council of the Armed Forces at the request of President Saye Zerbo, after his coup in November 1980.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Unlike the charismatic leader of the &lt;span class=&#034;caps&#034;&gt;RDP&lt;/span&gt;, Burkina Faso's new strongman, Captain Ibrahim Traor&#233;, unknown to the general public, forced his way into the country's history, outmanoeuvring Lieutenant-Colonel Emmanuel Zoungrana, whose name was chanted by part of the crowd that welcomed the coup of 30&#160;September&#160;2022.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;h2 class=&#034;spip&#034;&gt;Two years of improvisation, and five more&lt;/h2&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Once installed at the summit of the state apparatus, the captain decreed the advent of the Patriotic Movement for Safeguard and Restoration (&lt;span class=&#034;caps&#034;&gt;MPSR&lt;/span&gt;), supposedly the embodiment of the transition, then, a few weeks later, its second version, &#8220;&lt;span class=&#034;caps&#034;&gt;MPSR&lt;/span&gt; 2&#8221;. In practice, he has governed through a mixture of improvisation, climbdowns and accusations. Tearing up the civilian transition and the elections scheduled on the original timetable &#8211; which he had judged too long when he seized power, boasting that he would solve the country's insecurity within six months &#8211; he awarded himself, in May 2024, five more years in office.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;It took two and a half years, until 1&#160;April&#160;2025, at the end of a flag-raising ceremony at the Koulouba Palace, for Captain Ibrahim Traor&#233; finally to announce the outlines of &#8220;his transmutation&#8221;: &#8220;Let us stay focused and, if it must be said loud and clear here, we are not in a democracy. We are indeed in a progressive popular revolution&#8230; This question of democracy or of licence in action or expression has no place. [&#8230;] We would end up in a society of disorder.&#8221; He then dawdled until 26&#160;April&#160;2026, more than a year later, before allowing his head of government to present the Manifesto of the Progressive Popular Revolution (&lt;span class=&#034;caps&#034;&gt;RPP&lt;/span&gt;) officially.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;div class='spip_encadre'&gt;
&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;&lt;span class=&#034;caps&#034;&gt;AT&lt;/span&gt; &lt;span class=&#034;caps&#034;&gt;THE&lt;/span&gt; &lt;span class=&#034;caps&#034;&gt;UN&lt;/span&gt; &lt;span class=&#034;caps&#034;&gt;GENERAL&lt;/span&gt; &lt;span class=&#034;caps&#034;&gt;ASSEMBLY&lt;/span&gt;, &lt;span class=&#034;caps&#034;&gt;BURKINA&lt;/span&gt; &lt;span class=&#034;caps&#034;&gt;FASO&lt;/span&gt; &lt;span class=&#034;caps&#034;&gt;DOES&lt;/span&gt; &lt;span class=&#034;caps&#034;&gt;NOT&lt;/span&gt; &lt;span class=&#034;caps&#034;&gt;BOYCOTT&lt;/span&gt; &lt;span class=&#034;caps&#034;&gt;ISRAEL&lt;/span&gt;!&lt;/strong&gt;&lt;br class='autobr' /&gt;
&lt;details&gt;&lt;br class='autobr' /&gt; &lt;summary&gt;&lt;i&gt;Click the arrow to read the box&lt;/i&gt;&lt;/summary&gt;&lt;br class='autobr' /&gt;
On 24&#160;September, around twenty countries, including Senegal and Niger (the latter being a member of the Alliance of Sahel States, &lt;span class=&#034;caps&#034;&gt;AES&lt;/span&gt;, alongside Mali and Burkina Faso), walked out of the &lt;span class=&#034;caps&#034;&gt;UN&lt;/span&gt; General Assembly chamber during the speech by Benjamin Netanyahu, the Israeli Prime Minister. Burkina Faso and Mali did not take part in this boycott, which was intended to protest against the ongoing genocide being committed by Israel against the Palestinian people. &lt;br class='autobr' /&gt;
The stance taken by Captain Ibrahim Traor&#233;, who came to power in Burkina Faso following a coup in September 2022, may come as a surprise: it stands in stark contrast to the position of Thomas Sankara, whose legacy he nevertheless regularly invokes. Thomas Sankara, who came to power in 1983 and was assassinated along with other comrades in 1987, certainly did not mince his words when it came to Israel.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;In a long-forgotten interview, unearthed by Afrique &lt;span class=&#034;caps&#034;&gt;XXI&lt;/span&gt;, he compared Zionism to &#8216;racism': &#8220;We know that both Israel and South Africa have police forces and armies that know exactly where their fascist methods come from. Just as they were all opposed to Hitler's fascism, so too were they close to it,&#8221; he asserted. This stance is a far cry from that of Burkina Faso's new strongman, who openly maintains ties with Tel Aviv&lt;sup class='ref_note'&gt;&lt;a href=&#034;#nb3-2&#034; class=&#034;spip_note&#034; rel=&#034;appendix&#034; title=&#034;&#171;Ibrahim Traor&#233; soigne ses relations avec Isra&#235;l&#187;, Africa Intelligence, 14 (&#8230;)&#034; id=&#034;nh3-2&#034;&gt;2&lt;/a&gt;&lt;/sup&gt;. &lt;strong&gt;M.P.&lt;/strong&gt;&lt;br class='autobr' /&gt; &lt;/details&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;/div&gt;
&lt;p&gt;This strategic document, which sets out the main political, economic and social orientations of Captain Ibrahim Traor&#233;'s regime, remains impossible to find, like the remains of the mite, a microscopic creature that stores its waste in its own body and releases it only after its death. The much-discussed guide circulates only among the captain's cronies and henchmen, who have commented on it at length on social media. But very little can be learned from it. The local press, brought to heel, barely reports that the manifesto runs to 52 pages and six chapters, covering the vision of national defence and war, inclusive socio-economic progress, cultural rearmament, diplomacy and international relations, the strengthening of governance and societal issues.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;h2 class=&#034;spip&#034;&gt;For Sankara, &#8220;it is no longer enough to call oneself a revolutionary&#8221;&lt;/h2&gt;
&lt;p&gt;In adopting this reference document, the aim, according to Prime Minister Rimtalaba Jean Emmanuel Ou&#233;draogo, was to set the course for Burkina Faso's current momentum, which, he said, reveals the great historic, transformational projects the president of Faso has in store for the country. The real question is whether that momentum can withstand the test of &#8220;revolutionary morality&#8221;.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The concept is spelled out in a section of the &lt;span class=&#034;caps&#034;&gt;DOP&lt;/span&gt; entitled &#8220;On revolutionary morality within the &lt;span class=&#034;caps&#034;&gt;CDR&lt;/span&gt;&#8221;, delivered by Captain Sankara on 2&#160;October&#160;1983. In it he drew the typical portrait of the &lt;span class=&#034;caps&#034;&gt;RDP&lt;/span&gt; militant:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;blockquote class=&#034;spip&#034;&gt;
&lt;p&gt;
It is no longer enough to call oneself a revolutionary; one must also absorb the deep meaning of the revolution of which one is a fervent defender, by linking revolutionary theory to revolutionary practice, matching one's deeds to one's words, and so distinguishing consistent revolutionaries from those driven by motives foreign to the revolutionary cause.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;/blockquote&gt;
&lt;p&gt;President Sankara lived his commitments in a spirit of sacrifice. His legacy speaks volumes, with no trunk of cash and no djembe stuffed with banknotes. The list of his possessions is meagre: a racing bike, a guitar, a suitcase containing a few personal effects, found in his student room at his father's home in the Paspanga district of Ouaga, and a plot of land and a well in sector no.&#160;1 of Bokin, his native village, as his cousin Amadou Sankara points out.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;h2 class=&#034;spip&#034;&gt;2.5bn &lt;span class=&#034;caps&#034;&gt;CFA&lt;/span&gt; francs transferred to &lt;span class=&#034;caps&#034;&gt;IB&lt;/span&gt; every week&lt;/h2&gt;
&lt;p&gt;That degree of sacrifice invites comparison with the one made by the leader of the Progressive Popular Revolution, Captain Ibrahim Traor&#233;. Having appointed soldiers to strategic civilian posts, such as the heads of the national hydrocarbons company (Sonabhy) and the national food-security stockpile agency (Sonagess), Burkina Faso's new strongman has put in place a mafia-style network, embodied by the businessman Ali Konat&#233;, a leader of the Dozo brotherhood (traditional hunters) born in the western city of Bobo-Dioulasso.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;A member of the Konat&#233; family acknowledges that the captain's rise brought the two men closer, even though they had known each other long before. At the start of Ibrahim Traor&#233;'s reign, she explains, the businessman travelled to Senegal to consult leading marabouts, with a view to consolidating the soldier's grip on power. Moreover, &#8220;he regularly sacrifices oxen at his home in Bobo-Dioulasso. The meat is shared out free of charge to the neighbours,&#8221; she says.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;At Ibrahim Traor&#233;'s side, Ali Konat&#233; has stepped up a level, going from spiritual adviser to business adviser. At the head of &lt;a href=&#034;https://www.africaintelligence.fr/search?sqe=IkthbmdhbGEgSG9sZGluZyI1&#034; class=&#034;spip_out&#034; rel=&#034;external&#034;&gt;Kangala Holding&lt;/a&gt;, registered in Dubai and Ouagadougou, he is active in construction, mining, gold brokerage, fuel transport, property, logistics and investment funds, as well as in the airline Kangala Air Express, launched on 30&#160;January&#160;2024. Every week he pays 2.5bn&#160;&lt;span class=&#034;caps&#034;&gt;CFA&lt;/span&gt;&#160;francs through informal transfer channels, outside the conventional banking system, on behalf of Captain Traor&#233;, &lt;a href=&#034;https://www.ouest-afrik.com/fr/news/enquete-ali-konate-blanchiment-d-argent-ibrahim-traore.html&#034; class=&#034;spip_out&#034; rel=&#034;external&#034;&gt;according to an investigation by the outlet &lt;i&gt;Ouest Afrik&lt;/i&gt;&lt;/a&gt; published in November 2025&lt;sup class='ref_note'&gt;&lt;a href=&#034;#nb3-3&#034; class=&#034;spip_note&#034; rel=&#034;appendix&#034; title=&#034;Armand Kabor&#233;, &#171;&#160;Ali Konat&#233;, le &#8220;banquier&#8221; d'Ibrahim Traor&#233;, au centre d'un (&#8230;)&#034; id=&#034;nh3-3&#034;&gt;3&lt;/a&gt;&lt;/sup&gt;.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;h2 class=&#034;spip&#034;&gt;Big cars all round, and patrimonialisation&lt;/h2&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The &lt;span class=&#034;caps&#034;&gt;DOP&lt;/span&gt; established that the revolutionary must &#8220;forge a new consciousness and new behaviour, through their own qualitative transformation, in order to set a good example to the popular masses&#8221;. Thomas Sankara led by example, renouncing luxury cars and material goods. His official car was a modest Renault 5, which he also imposed on the other members of the government. He also had the vehicles acquired before the advent of the &lt;span class=&#034;caps&#034;&gt;RDP&lt;/span&gt; requisitioned and sold at auction.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Today, Burkina Faso is embodied by a president who travels in style. He visits relatives in top-of-the-range vehicles such as the Luxury V8 &lt;span class=&#034;caps&#034;&gt;SUV&lt;/span&gt; and the Hyundai Crossover, says a military source, who notes that junior officers appointed to positions of responsibility also drive big, powerful cars, mostly Toyota V8s. &#8220;You will find non-commissioned officers at the wheel of that make. Some stole them from the homes of prominent figures who fled the country. That is how a former minister lost at least two big motors,&#8221; the source adds.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;An activist, a member of a pro-&lt;span class=&#034;caps&#034;&gt;MPSR&lt;/span&gt; 2 civil-society organisation who has since fallen out of favour, recounts, on condition of anonymity and with a hint of bitterness, how two pillars of the regime have grown rich: Commander Azaria Sorgho, head of the 4&lt;sup class=&#034;typo_exposants&#034;&gt;th&lt;/sup&gt; Rapid Intervention Battalion and spokesman of the Collective of Republican Organisations for Support to Governance (Korag&lt;sup class='ref_note'&gt;&lt;a href=&#034;#nb3-4&#034; class=&#034;spip_note&#034; rel=&#034;appendix&#034; title=&#034;Body tasked with &#8220;defining, monitoring and overseeing the implementation of (&#8230;)&#034; id=&#034;nh3-4&#034;&gt;4&lt;/a&gt;&lt;/sup&gt;), and Commander Oumarou Yabr&#233;, president of the National Council for State Security, both now sidelined by Captain Traor&#233;. According to this source, the first built a gigantic mansion in Borgo, a peripheral neighbourhood of Saaba, a rural commune of Ouagadougou, after having his father appointed minister in charge of infrastructure. The second is said to own petrol stations in Ouagadougou and in towns around the country, and to have bought dozens of tanker lorries, put at the disposal of the national hydrocarbons company (Sonabhy) through the good offices of its former managing director, Aim&#233; Wendpanga Nongkouni, whom he had had appointed in September 2023.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;h2 class=&#034;spip&#034;&gt;Taxes on everything, everywhere&lt;/h2&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The &lt;span class=&#034;caps&#034;&gt;DOP&lt;/span&gt; states clearly: &#8220;The revolutionary must constantly bear in mind that the interest of the popular masses takes precedence over personal interest.&#8221; In that spirit, the &lt;span class=&#034;caps&#034;&gt;RDP&lt;/span&gt;'s leader built housing developments and social housing in Ouagadougou and across the country. Under &lt;span class=&#034;caps&#034;&gt;MPSR&lt;/span&gt; 2, however, in the era of the &lt;span class=&#034;caps&#034;&gt;RPP&lt;/span&gt;, people have yet to see the colour of promises made for the benefit of the greatest number. On the contrary, under cover of the &lt;span class=&#034;caps&#034;&gt;RPP&lt;/span&gt;, gold-panning sites in the regions of Djoro, Yaadga and Guirko have been cleared. According to Ibrahim Traor&#233;, these young gold-panners contribute to the squandering of national resources. &#8220;Many go off to pay for vehicles. Take 1,000 people who each pay for a vehicle costing 20m&#160;&lt;span class=&#034;caps&#034;&gt;CFA&lt;/span&gt;&#160;francs, that makes 20bn&#160;&lt;span class=&#034;caps&#034;&gt;CFA&lt;/span&gt;&#160;francs we have given away just like that, to someone somewhere. Yet we have no roads,&#8221; he said.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Market gardeners based around the Boulmiougou and Tanghin dams in Ouagadougou, and in zone C of Ouaga 2000, have been evicted following complaints from residents about the discharge of wastewater. The operations have thrown onto the streets growers who had worked on the sites for decades.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;For now, it is above all these &#8220;popular masses&#8221; who help to finance the Patriotic Support Fund (&lt;span class=&#034;caps&#034;&gt;FSP&lt;/span&gt;), the mechanism that supports the Volunteers for the Defence of the Homeland (&lt;span class=&#034;caps&#034;&gt;VDP&lt;/span&gt;), into which Burkinab&#232; are sometimes enrolled by force. Taxes abound &#8211; on services and mobile-phone transactions, fuel, alcoholic drinks and sodas &#8211; while 1&lt;small class=&#034;fine d-inline&#034;&gt;&#160;&lt;/small&gt;% of the net salaries of public- and private-sector workers, 25&lt;small class=&#034;fine d-inline&#034;&gt;&#160;&lt;/small&gt;% of the bonuses of staff in ministerial departments, state-owned companies and public bodies, and 2&lt;small class=&#034;fine d-inline&#034;&gt;&#160;&lt;/small&gt;% of company profits are systematically levied and paid into the &lt;span class=&#034;caps&#034;&gt;FSP&lt;/span&gt;. In sum, the population is subjected to new sacrifices, without being involved in decision-making and with no scope to voice grievances.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;h2 class=&#034;spip&#034;&gt;&#8220;If anyone screws up, I will bring them to heel, without a qualm&#8221;&lt;/h2&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The &lt;span class=&#034;caps&#034;&gt;RDP&lt;/span&gt;'s revolutionary morality also holds: &#8220;The activism of certain militants nursing the counter-revolutionary dream of amassing goods and profits must be denounced.&#8221; To that end, Captain Sankara set up the People's Revolutionary Tribunals, along with departmental and conciliation tribunals, to deal with cases of embezzlement, corruption, extortion and misuse of company assets. Former ministers, heads of state, senior civil servants and traders were tried. In all, 16 hearings were held, 139 people were tried and 106 of them convicted. A sum of 3bn&#160;&lt;span class=&#034;caps&#034;&gt;CFA&lt;/span&gt;&#160;francs, at the time's value, was recovered.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Under the &lt;span class=&#034;caps&#034;&gt;RPP&lt;/span&gt;, Burkinab&#232; have witnessed a case of embezzled humanitarian funds, estimated at 3bn&#160;&lt;span class=&#034;caps&#034;&gt;CFA&lt;/span&gt;&#160;francs, which gave rise to two big moments of televised debate. First, on 26&#160;November&#160;2024, with the opening of the trial of the alleged mastermind of the scandal, Amidou Ti&#233;gnan, an official in the Directorate of Administration and Finance of the ministry in charge of humanitarian action. Then, on 27&#160;March&#160;2026, the former minister in charge of that department, Laure Zongo-Hien, was sentenced to five years in prison, with no suspension, and fined 10m&#160;&lt;span class=&#034;caps&#034;&gt;CFA&lt;/span&gt;&#160;francs. Since then, nothing: Korag's cameras have not caught a single serving official under the &lt;span class=&#034;caps&#034;&gt;RPP&lt;/span&gt; red-handed.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The &lt;span class=&#034;caps&#034;&gt;RDP&lt;/span&gt;'s revolutionary morality also lays down that the revolutionary &#8220;must eliminate showiness from his behaviour, affecting modesty while carrying out tasks with determination, without boasting&#8221;. Sankara shared powers and responsibilities with his comrades-in-arms, Captains Blaise Compaor&#233; (who took power after the assassination of Thomas Sankara in 1987 and held it until 2014) and Henri Zongo, and Commander Jean-Baptiste Lengani, often described as numbers two, three and four. Unthinkable for the &lt;span class=&#034;caps&#034;&gt;RPP&lt;/span&gt;'s leader. A great boaster, he claims a power that he conquered &lt;a href=&#034;https://afriquexxi.info/Burkina-Faso-Crimes-contre-l-humanite-et-democratie-enterree&#034;&gt;for himself alone&lt;/a&gt;, by force of arms. His latest statement, on 16&#160;July, on the sidelines of a meeting with the &#8220;forces vives&#8221; (civil-society and community leaders) in Ouahigouya, in the Yaadga region, is memorable: &#8220;There is no number one, no number two, no number whatever&#8230; There are not two captains in one boat&#8230; If anyone screws up, I will bring them to heel, without a qualm.&#8221;&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;On occasion, he has tried to rewrite the history of his putsch of 30&#160;September&#160;2022, claiming that he had the men and the equipment to impose himself, in a balance of power, on special-forces and air-force units still loyal to President Paul-Henri Damiba. That is an imposture because, in his interview of 1&#160;October&#160;2022 with &lt;i&gt;Voice of America&lt;/i&gt; (&lt;span class=&#034;caps&#034;&gt;VOA&lt;/span&gt;), he had asked for the support of the army commanders and appealed to many soldiers to rally to his side. If &lt;span class=&#034;caps&#034;&gt;IB&lt;/span&gt; won, it was mainly thanks to the mediation of religious and customary leaders who, anxious to avoid a bloodbath, ruled in his favour.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;h2 class=&#034;spip&#034;&gt;Blind repression and prisons filled with opponents&lt;/h2&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Moreover, the image of the revolutionary that the &lt;span class=&#034;caps&#034;&gt;RDP&lt;/span&gt; intended to imprint on minds is &#8220;that of the militant who is at one with the masses, who has faith in them and respects them; the militant who sheds all attitude of contempt towards them, who does not regard himself as a master and does not demand obedience and submission from the masses. On the contrary, he goes to school with them, listens to them attentively and heeds their opinions, while shedding the authoritarian methods worthy of reactionary bureaucrats&#8221;.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Thomas Sankara made these prescriptions his own, in the service of the popular masses, turning the Committees for the Defence of the Revolution (&lt;span class=&#034;caps&#034;&gt;CDR&lt;/span&gt;) into a forum for listening, information, awareness-raising and training. In a less inspired imitation, the &lt;span class=&#034;caps&#034;&gt;RPP&lt;/span&gt; created the Wayiyans, a group of activists who haunt the roundabouts. Their mission has more to do with promoting revolutionary terrorism and state terrorism, and relaying propaganda. Zealots and thugs from another century, machetes and cudgels at their wrists, they applaud noisily when Captain Traor&#233; &lt;a href=&#034;https://afriquexxi.info/Burkina-Faso-La-fabrique-etatique-de-la-violence&#034;&gt;represses and crushes every dissenting voice&lt;/a&gt; through forced abductions, &lt;a href=&#034;https://afriquexxi.info/Au-Burkina-Faso-la-guerre-selon-IB&#034;&gt;requisitions&lt;/a&gt;, illegal detentions, torture and dispatches to the front.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Today, the secret prisons of the capital, Ouagadougou, and of the interior teem with thousands of soldiers, &lt;a href=&#034;https://afriquexxi.info/Journalisme-au-Burkina-Faso-se-soumettre-ou-disparaitre&#034;&gt;journalists&lt;/a&gt;, religious leaders, politicians, leaders of civil-society organisations, human-rights defenders and anonymous citizens, held for offences of opinion. Among them are Imam Kindo, recently abducted from his home, the doctor Arouna Lour&#233;, our fellow journalist Atiana Serge Oulon and the lawyer Guy Kerv&#233; Kam, held for more than two years, and lieutenant-colonels such as Evrard Somda, Yves Didier Bamouni, Hamza Ouattara and Paul-Henri Damiba, the former head of state. The repression makes no distinction, and elders suffer the same fate: Mousbila Sankara, an octogenarian and uncle of the former president Thomas Sankara; Hermann Yam&#233;ogo, an octogenarian and former minister of state; Ablass&#233; Ou&#233;draogo, a septuagenarian and former foreign minister; and Kalifara S&#233;r&#233;, a septuagenarian and former secretary-general of the Ministry of Territorial Administration&#8230; All, sadly, have experienced the dungeons of Captain Traor&#233;'s subjugation.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;In 1983, Burkina Faso underwent a democratic and popular transformation that equipped itself with a revolutionary morality, with the ambition to serve the people as its political pole star. Since 2022, the second revolution, supposedly progressive and popular, has been devoid of morality, in the service and glory of the great sachem, Captain Ibrahim Traor&#233;, and of his personal enrichment. It sows terror, represses and consolidates its hold on power, &lt;i&gt;ad vitam aeternam&lt;/i&gt;. That is the essence of Traoreism, a profusion of illusions and manipulations designed to plunder the legacy of Sankarism.&lt;/p&gt;&lt;/div&gt;
		&lt;hr /&gt;
		&lt;div class='rss_notes'&gt;&lt;div id=&#034;nb3-1&#034;&gt;
&lt;p&gt;&lt;sup class='lien_note'&gt;&lt;a href=&#034;#nh3-1&#034; class=&#034;spip_note&#034; title=&#034;Footnotes 3-1&#034; rev=&#034;appendix&#034;&gt;1&lt;/a&gt;&lt;/sup&gt;The two-day war, from 15 to 17&#160;December&#160;1974, pitted Mali against Burkina Faso over control of the Agacher Strip, which includes the villages of Douma, Dionouga, Kounia and Oukoulourou. Thomas Sankara, then a lieutenant, distinguished himself by his bravery and was subsequently appointed head of the National Commando Training Centre in P&#244;.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;/div&gt;&lt;div id=&#034;nb3-2&#034;&gt;
&lt;p&gt;&lt;sup class='lien_note'&gt;&lt;a href=&#034;#nh3-2&#034; class=&#034;spip_note&#034; title=&#034;Footnotes 3-2&#034; rev=&#034;appendix&#034;&gt;2&lt;/a&gt;&lt;/sup&gt;&lt;a href=&#034;https://www.africaintelligence.fr/afrique-ouest/2026/04/14/ibrahim-traore-soigne-ses-relations-avec-israel,110702977-gra&#034; class=&#034;spip_out&#034; rel=&#034;external&#034;&gt;&#171;Ibrahim Traor&#233; soigne ses relations avec Isra&#235;l&#187;&lt;/a&gt;, Africa Intelligence, 14&#160;avril&#160;2026 .&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;/div&gt;&lt;div id=&#034;nb3-3&#034;&gt;
&lt;p&gt;&lt;sup class='lien_note'&gt;&lt;a href=&#034;#nh3-3&#034; class=&#034;spip_note&#034; title=&#034;Footnotes 3-3&#034; rev=&#034;appendix&#034;&gt;3&lt;/a&gt;&lt;/sup&gt;Armand Kabor&#233;, &#171;&#160;&lt;a href=&#034;https://www.ouest-afrik.com/fr/news/enquete-ali-konate-blanchiment-d-argent-ibrahim-traore.html&#034; class=&#034;spip_out&#034; rel=&#034;external&#034;&gt;Ali Konat&#233;, le &#8220;banquier&#8221; d'Ibrahim Traor&#233;, au centre d'un vaste syst&#232;me de blanchiment et de d&#233;stabilisation&lt;/a&gt;&#160;&#187;, &lt;i&gt;Ouest Afrik&lt;/i&gt;, 5&#160;November&#160;2025.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;/div&gt;&lt;div id=&#034;nb3-4&#034;&gt;
&lt;p&gt;&lt;sup class='lien_note'&gt;&lt;a href=&#034;#nh3-4&#034; class=&#034;spip_note&#034; title=&#034;Footnotes 3-4&#034; rev=&#034;appendix&#034;&gt;4&lt;/a&gt;&lt;/sup&gt;Body tasked with &#8220;defining, monitoring and overseeing the implementation of Burkina Faso's strategic vision in all fields and by all means&#8221;, according to the transition charter, and whose powers have also been extended to the fight against corruption.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;/div&gt;&lt;/div&gt;
		
		</content:encoded>


		

	</item>
<item xml:lang="en">
		<title>Mali: influence thrives first on humiliation</title>
		<link>https://afriquexxi.info/Mali-influence-thrives-first-on-humiliation</link>
		<guid isPermaLink="true">https://afriquexxi.info/Mali-influence-thrives-first-on-humiliation</guid>
		<dc:date>2026-10-09T12:02:03Z</dc:date>
		<dc:format>text/html</dc:format>
		<dc:language>en</dc:language>
		<dc:creator>Aliou Diallo, Bokar Sangar&#233;</dc:creator>


		<dc:subject>&lt;span lang='fr'&gt;Mali&lt;/span&gt;</dc:subject>
		<dc:subject>analysis</dc:subject>
		<dc:subject>Internet</dc:subject>
		<dc:subject>Security</dc:subject>
		<dc:subject>Diplomacy</dc:subject>
		<dc:subject>War</dc:subject>
		<dc:subject>Armed group</dc:subject>

		<description>
&lt;p&gt;Influence narratives in Mali owe their effectiveness not only to social media, algorithms or foreign powers. They also feed on a succession of defeats and collective frustrations. &lt;br class='autobr' /&gt; Early 2012. Images said to show the bodies of Malian soldiers killed at Aguelhok circulate on phones and on Facebook, still unauthenticated. For many Malians, the massacre is one of the first direct brushes with the brutality of the new war. Further images will follow, on a growing scale: soldiers and civilians&#160;(&#8230;)&lt;/p&gt;


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		&lt;div class='rss_chapo'&gt;&lt;p&gt;Influence narratives in Mali owe their effectiveness not only to social media, algorithms or foreign powers. They also feed on a succession of defeats and collective frustrations.&lt;/p&gt;&lt;/div&gt;
		&lt;div class='rss_texte'&gt;&lt;p&gt;Early 2012. Images said to show the bodies of Malian soldiers killed at Aguelhok circulate on phones and on Facebook, still unauthenticated. For many Malians, the massacre is one of the first direct brushes with the brutality of the new war. Further images will follow, on a growing scale: soldiers and civilians killed, villages attacked, prisoners humiliated.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;These images do not cancel one another out. Each new scene reopens earlier defeats and deepens the sense of a country permanently exposed, unable to protect its citizens or its soldiers.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;What sets the 2012 crisis apart from earlier rebellions is not only its gravity but the way it is experienced. The American social network is less widespread than it is today, but its use is growing. Discussion groups are already being used to inform, debate and mobilise around the crisis&lt;sup class='ref_note'&gt;&lt;a href=&#034;#nb3-1&#034; class=&#034;spip_note&#034; rel=&#034;appendix&#034; title=&#034;Boukary Sangar&#233;, &#171;&#160;R&#233;seaux sociaux et communication en temps de crises au (&#8230;)&#034; id=&#034;nh3-1&#034;&gt;1&lt;/a&gt;&lt;/sup&gt;. Through private radio stations, international channels and content shared on phones, Malians follow almost in real time the defeat of their army and the loss of part of their territory.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Kidal, Gao and Timbuktu fall in turn, while the authorities speak of &#8220;tactical withdrawals&#8221;, a phrase widely read as a euphemism for a rout. The Mouvement national de lib&#233;ration de l'Azawad (&lt;span class=&#034;caps&#034;&gt;MNLA&lt;/span&gt;) meanwhile takes over the media space. Its spokespeople appear in the international press and use the platform to present a secular, independence-seeking and well-organised movement. The network is not just a means of communication: it allows the &lt;span class=&#034;caps&#034;&gt;MNLA&lt;/span&gt; to build an &#8220;Azawadian&#8221; political identity, mobilise the diaspora, internationalise its cause and bypass traditional diplomatic channels&lt;sup class='ref_note'&gt;&lt;a href=&#034;#nb3-2&#034; class=&#034;spip_note&#034; rel=&#034;appendix&#034; title=&#034;Michael Keen, Azawad's Facebook Warriors: The MNLA, Social Media, and the (&#8230;)&#034; id=&#034;nh3-2&#034;&gt;2&lt;/a&gt;&lt;/sup&gt;. The military confrontation is thus joined by a battle to impose the meaning of the war.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;h2 class=&#034;spip&#034;&gt;Military defeat and &#8220;media humiliation&#8221;&lt;/h2&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Bamako loses not only control of part of the territory but also the battle of narratives. For many Malians, the country is under attack while being described to the world by those fighting it. Military defeat is compounded by &#8220;media humiliation&#8221;: Aguelhok and the fall of the northern towns are photographed, shared and commented on.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;This shock contradicts a view of national history built on the great empires and on the &#8220;heroisation&#8221; of pre-colonial figures and of those who resisted the conquest&lt;sup class='ref_note'&gt;&lt;a href=&#034;#nb3-3&#034; class=&#034;spip_note&#034; rel=&#034;appendix&#034; title=&#034;Ibrahima Baba Sidib&#233;, &#171;&#160;Les relations franco-maliennes &#224; la recherche d'un (&#8230;)&#034; id=&#034;nh3-3&#034;&gt;3&lt;/a&gt;&lt;/sup&gt;. This narrative was meant to nourish national pride and unity. Seeing the army in disarray brutally exposes the gap between the grandeur of the past as told and the powerlessness of the present as lived.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;This humiliation changes political expectations. Part of the population no longer looks merely for a government capable of administering the country. It wants a power able to restore the authority of the state, rebuild the army and give the nation back its dignity.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Even before the coup of 22&#160;March&#160;2012, some private media outlets and discussion forums give the defeats a virulent political reading. Radio Kayira is part of this critical environment. Rumours accusing President Amadou Toumani Tour&#233; (&lt;span class=&#034;caps&#034;&gt;ATT&lt;/span&gt;) of weakness, even of complicity with the rebels, circulate in the media and in conversation. Though unproven, they help turn military setbacks into proof of betrayal at the top&lt;sup class='ref_note'&gt;&lt;a href=&#034;#nb3-4&#034; class=&#034;spip_note&#034; rel=&#034;appendix&#034; title=&#034;Julien Gavelle, Johanna Sim&#233;ant and Laure Traor&#233;, &#171;&#160;Le court terme de la (&#8230;)&#034; id=&#034;nh3-4&#034;&gt;4&lt;/a&gt;&lt;/sup&gt;.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;h2 class=&#034;spip&#034;&gt;&lt;span class=&#034;caps&#034;&gt;IBK&lt;/span&gt; and the grandeur of the past&lt;/h2&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The coup that follows feeds on this anger. The soldiers promise to equip the army better and restore the authority of the state. Yet the seizure of power disrupts the chain of command and isolates the country. Armed groups quickly take Kidal, Gao and Timbuktu: presented as a response to defeat, the putsch hastens its consequences&lt;sup class='ref_note'&gt;&lt;a href=&#034;#nb3-5&#034; class=&#034;spip_note&#034; rel=&#034;appendix&#034; title=&#034;International Crisis Group, &#171;&#160;Mali : &#233;viter l'escalade&#160;&#187;, Rapport Afrique, (&#8230;)&#034; id=&#034;nh3-5&#034;&gt;5&lt;/a&gt;&lt;/sup&gt;.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The return to civilian transition opens the way to an internationalisation that Bamako itself requests. In September 2012, Dioncounda Traor&#233; asks the Economic Community of West African States (Ecowas) for military support to retake the north. The request leads to a framework bringing together Ecowas, the African Union and the United Nations, and then to the authorisation of the African-led International Support Mission to Mali&lt;sup class='ref_note'&gt;&lt;a href=&#034;#nb3-6&#034; class=&#034;spip_note&#034; rel=&#034;appendix&#034; title=&#034;Mission de l'Union africaine pour le Mali et le Sahel, &#171;&#160;Historique de (&#8230;)&#034; id=&#034;nh3-6&#034;&gt;6&lt;/a&gt;&lt;/sup&gt; (Afisma).&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The election of Ibrahim Boubacar Ke&#239;ta (&lt;span class=&#034;caps&#034;&gt;IBK&lt;/span&gt;) in 2013 also reflects the search for a restorer. His campaign contrasts the fragility of the country with the grandeur of its past and presents him as the answer to the quest for national restoration&lt;sup class='ref_note'&gt;&lt;a href=&#034;#nb3-7&#034; class=&#034;spip_note&#034; rel=&#034;appendix&#034; title=&#034;Nanourougo Coulibaly, &#171;&#160;Posture discursive et victoire &#233;lectorale : le cas (&#8230;)&#034; id=&#034;nh3-7&#034;&gt;7&lt;/a&gt;&lt;/sup&gt;. With &#8220;Le Mali d'abord&#8221; (&#8220;Mali first&#8221;) and his image as &#8220;Kank&#233;l&#233;tigui&#8221; (&#8220;the man of his word&#8221;, in Bambara), &lt;span class=&#034;caps&#034;&gt;IBK&lt;/span&gt; revives his reputation as a strongman, associated with firmness and the return of authority.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;His victory cannot be put down to this factor alone. It nonetheless shows that the need for a strong leader and for the restoration of sovereignty long predates the current transitional government (led by Assimi Go&#239;ta, who came to power in a coup in May 2021) and its geopolitical realignment in favour of Russia. As early as 2013, the promise of national recovery had already proved its power to mobilise.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;h2 class=&#034;spip&#034;&gt;Kidal, a stolen victory, an unfinished sovereignty&lt;/h2&gt;
&lt;p&gt;In January&#160;2013, &lt;a href=&#034;https://afriquexxi.info/Barkhane-De-l-huile-sur-le-feu-et-de-l-eau-dans-le-gaz&#034;&gt;the French intervention&lt;/a&gt; is presented as an urgent response to the advance of armed groups towards the south, requested by the transitional Malian authorities. This account, however, oversimplifies a more complex sequence: nothing proves that a single &#8220;jihadist column&#8221; was heading for Bamako, and the intervention had been preceded by intense diplomatic activity and military planning&lt;sup class='ref_note'&gt;&lt;a href=&#034;#nb3-8&#034; class=&#034;spip_note&#034; rel=&#034;appendix&#034; title=&#034;Gr&#233;gory Daho, Florent Pouponneau and Johanna Sim&#233;ant-Germanos (eds), Entrer (&#8230;)&#034; id=&#034;nh3-8&#034;&gt;8&lt;/a&gt;&lt;/sup&gt;. &lt;a href=&#034;https://afriquexxi.info/Operation-Serval-Des-parlementaires-au-garde-a-vous&#034;&gt;Operation Serval&lt;/a&gt; retakes Gao and Timbuktu. Fran&#231;ois Hollande is welcomed as a liberator.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;This gratitude, however, rests on an immense expectation: the war is supposed to lead swiftly to the restoration of territorial integrity. When French and Chadian forces enter Kidal without the Malian army and the &lt;span class=&#034;caps&#034;&gt;MNLA&lt;/span&gt; becomes an interlocutor again, part of public opinion experiences the episode as a fresh dispossession. Kidal becomes the symbol of a stolen victory and an unfinished sovereignty.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Serval follows a logic of reconquest &lt;a href=&#034;https://afriquexxi.info/Operation-Serval-Quand-la-diplomatie-sert-a-faire-la-guerre&#034;&gt;carried out in haste&lt;/a&gt;. The operation that succeeds it, &lt;a href=&#034;https://afriquexxi.info/Aux-origines-coloniales-de-l-operation-Barkhane&#034;&gt;Barkhane&lt;/a&gt;, then adopts a regional counter-terrorism strategy, while the &lt;span class=&#034;caps&#034;&gt;UN&lt;/span&gt; Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali (Minusma) is meant to stabilise populated areas, protect civilians and support the political process. These actors have different mandates: containing the threat is not necessarily the same as delivering the total victory that was expected.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Support nonetheless remains guarded. As early as January&#160;2016, Foreign Minister Abdoulaye Diop invites the Security Council to consider an &#8220;exit strategy&#8221; for Minusma, without calling for its immediate withdrawal&lt;sup class='ref_note'&gt;&lt;a href=&#034;#nb3-9&#034; class=&#034;spip_note&#034; rel=&#034;appendix&#034; title=&#034;United Nations Security Council, 7,600th meeting, &#171;&#160;La situation au Mali&#160;&#187;, (&#8230;)&#034; id=&#034;nh3-9&#034;&gt;9&lt;/a&gt;&lt;/sup&gt;.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;h2 class=&#034;spip&#034;&gt;The gap between containing the threat and winning the war&lt;/h2&gt;
&lt;p&gt;After the coups of 2020 and 2021, the diplomatic rupture gradually dismantles this international architecture: Barkhane and Takuba withdraw, the operational activities of the European training mission are suspended, and in 2023 the government asks for Minusma to leave&lt;sup class='ref_note'&gt;&lt;a href=&#034;#nb3-10&#034; class=&#034;spip_note&#034; rel=&#034;appendix&#034; title=&#034;International Crisis Group, &#171;&#160;Mali : &#233;viter le pi&#232;ge de l'isolement&#160;&#187;, (&#8230;)&#034; id=&#034;nh3-10&#034;&gt;10&lt;/a&gt;&lt;/sup&gt;.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;For a large part of public opinion, these institutional distinctions count for little. All of these forces are judged against the same expectation: to defeat the armed groups and allow the state to retake the entire territory. The gap between containing the threat and winning the war gradually breeds incomprehension.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Despite the scale of foreign resources, attacks persist and &lt;a href=&#034;https://afriquexxi.info/Au-Mali-survivre-aux-blocus-du-Jnim-entre-famine-peur-et-negociation&#034;&gt;violence is intensifying&lt;/a&gt; in the central regions. A question takes hold: how can so many forces be present without ending the insecurity? The failure is then sometimes attributed to a supposed desire on the part of the partners to keep the conflict going. Nothing establishes such an intention, but the gap between their operational objectives and the expectation of total victory makes the suspicion politically credible.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Influence narratives did not arrive on virgin ground. They reactivate real wounds by giving them an explanation, culprits and a promise of revenge. They can combine established facts, slanted interpretations and false or unverifiable claims. The challenge is to understand the conditions that make them credible.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;h2 class=&#034;spip&#034;&gt;The arrival of the Russians and anti-colonial imaginaries&lt;/h2&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Their mechanics are simple: recall a humiliation, name a culprit, then present a saviour. Aguelhok, Kidal and persistent insecurity become evidence of a single abandonment. Political leaders, France or the international community are blamed for Mali's powerlessness; the army or a new foreign power is then presented as the solution able to restore national dignity.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;&lt;a href=&#034;https://afriquexxi.info/Symphonie-d-un-nouvel-ordre-Wagner-en-Afrique&#034;&gt;The arrival of Russian soldiers in Mali&lt;/a&gt; in late 2021, after a brutal reshuffling of geopolitical alliances, is not merely a military turning point. It comes with an influence apparatus broadly comparable to &lt;a href=&#034;https://afriquexxi.info/En-Centrafrique-le-pari-risque-des-mercenaires-russes&#034;&gt;the one previously deployed in the Central African Republic&lt;/a&gt;.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;In Mali, however, this apparatus does not start from scratch. Today's discourse on sovereignty belongs to the long history of anti-colonial imaginaries, based in particular on territorial integrity, pan-Africanism and the rejection of foreign domination&lt;sup class='ref_note'&gt;&lt;a href=&#034;#nb3-11&#034; class=&#034;spip_note&#034; rel=&#034;appendix&#034; title=&#034;Eva Magdalena Stamb&#248;l, Almamy Sylla and Signe Marie Cold-Ravnkilde, (&#8230;)&#034; id=&#034;nh3-11&#034;&gt;11&lt;/a&gt;&lt;/sup&gt;. The humiliations accumulated since 2012 did not create this political language: they charged it with new emotional force.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;This apparatus also meets movements, activists and content creators who are already sovereigntist, pan-Africanist or hostile to the French presence. Organisations such as Y&#232;r&#232;wolo and video makers translate and popularise these messages in Mali's political idiom. These &#8220;videomen&#8221; act as intermediaries or &#8220;cyber-griots&#8221;, in the sense that they interpret the messages and adapt them to the frustrations of their audiences&lt;sup class='ref_note'&gt;&lt;a href=&#034;#nb3-12&#034; class=&#034;spip_note&#034; rel=&#034;appendix&#034; title=&#034;Stine Maya Cold-Ravnkilde, Morten B&#248;&#229;s and Boubacar Ba, &#8220;The rise of Mali's (&#8230;)&#034; id=&#034;nh3-12&#034;&gt;12&lt;/a&gt;&lt;/sup&gt;.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;h2 class=&#034;spip&#034;&gt;The internet and the co-production of narratives&lt;/h2&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The narrative put out rests on simple oppositions: France betrayed or humiliated Mali; Russia respects its sovereignty and gives it the means to win; the military leaders embody a new independence. After the &#8220;Russian turn&#8221; of 2021&lt;sup class='ref_note'&gt;&lt;a href=&#034;#nb3-13&#034; class=&#034;spip_note&#034; rel=&#034;appendix&#034; title=&#034;International Crisis Group, &#171;&#160;Mali : &#233;viter le pi&#232;ge de l'isolement&#160;&#187;, (&#8230;)&#034; id=&#034;nh3-13&#034;&gt;13&lt;/a&gt;&lt;/sup&gt;, the transitional authorities present themselves as able to wash away past humiliations and lead the country to victory.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The effectiveness of these narratives owes less to their foreign origin than to their ability to graft themselves onto an established memory: Aguelhok, Kidal, unfulfilled promises of reconquest and the impression that the partners contained the war without allowing Mali to win it. Russia did not create the desire for sovereignty or the resentment of France; its networks supplied them with a coherent interpretation, culprits and a saviour.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Changing digital habits give this encounter new reach. According to a study by the Carnegie Endowment&lt;sup class='ref_note'&gt;&lt;a href=&#034;#nb3-14&#034; class=&#034;spip_note&#034; rel=&#034;appendix&#034; title=&#034;Mirjam de Bruijn, &#8220;Digital Communication as a Weapon: The Case of Mali&#8221;, (&#8230;)&#034; id=&#034;nh3-14&#034;&gt;14&lt;/a&gt;&lt;/sup&gt;, internet access rose from 2.8&lt;small class=&#034;fine d-inline&#034;&gt;&#160;&lt;/small&gt;% of the Malian population in 2012 to around 35&lt;small class=&#034;fine d-inline&#034;&gt;&#160;&lt;/small&gt;% in early 2024. Facebook hosts public debate and its polarisation, while WhatsApp allows much wider diffusion, notably through voice messages. A claim posted on Facebook or X can be reworked as a video, then circulate in WhatsApp groups, where its origin becomes hard to trace. Since 2023, TikTok has further strengthened this circulation across platforms.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Influence thus appears less as a &#8220;manipulation&#8221; imposed entirely from outside than as a co-production. External networks supply content, resources and a geopolitical framework; Malian actors select and reformulate them according to their own struggles. This is what makes some narratives resistant to &#8220;fact-checking&#8221;: even when debunked, a falsehood can keep convincing when it is grafted onto a real political wound, a humiliation or an expectation of justice.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;h2 class=&#034;spip&#034;&gt;Examining historical experiences&lt;/h2&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The rejection can go further: even factual evidence presented by a media outlet or an organisation can be dismissed when it seems to call into question an actor, a decision or a symbol regarded as indispensable to final victory over &#8220;the enemy&#8221;. In such cases the discussion is no longer only about the strength of the evidence: accepting it is also read as a question of loyalty to the camp one identifies with.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Fact-checking remains indispensable, but it is not always enough. Showing that an accusation is false does not make disappear the feeling that makes it credible. Understanding this mechanism is not the same as excusing disinformation: it shows that influence campaigns succeed when they turn a collective wound into a demand for a saviour.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;This reading therefore warns against reducing the phenomenon to platforms, algorithms or false content. It is also necessary to examine the historical experiences, power relations and political expectations that make certain narratives acceptable. Social media speed up their circulation; they do not, on their own, explain their echo.&lt;/p&gt;&lt;/div&gt;
		&lt;hr /&gt;
		&lt;div class='rss_notes'&gt;&lt;div id=&#034;nb3-1&#034;&gt;
&lt;p&gt;&lt;sup class='lien_note'&gt;&lt;a href=&#034;#nh3-1&#034; class=&#034;spip_note&#034; title=&#034;Footnotes 3-1&#034; rev=&#034;appendix&#034;&gt;1&lt;/a&gt;&lt;/sup&gt;Boukary Sangar&#233;, &#171;&#160;R&#233;seaux sociaux et communication en temps de crises au Mali : l'exemple des groupes de discussion sur Facebook&#160;&#187;, in &lt;span class=&#034;caps&#034;&gt;ECAS&lt;/span&gt;&#160;2013, &#171;&#160;5&lt;sup class=&#034;typo_exposants&#034;&gt;th&lt;/sup&gt; European Conference on African Studies: African Dynamics in a Multipolar World&#160;&#187;, Lisbon, Centro de Estudos Internacionais, 2014, pp.&#160;1919&#8211;1942.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;/div&gt;&lt;div id=&#034;nb3-2&#034;&gt;
&lt;p&gt;&lt;sup class='lien_note'&gt;&lt;a href=&#034;#nh3-2&#034; class=&#034;spip_note&#034; title=&#034;Footnotes 3-2&#034; rev=&#034;appendix&#034;&gt;2&lt;/a&gt;&lt;/sup&gt;Michael Keen, &lt;i&gt;Azawad's Facebook Warriors: The &lt;span class=&#034;caps&#034;&gt;MNLA&lt;/span&gt;, Social Media, and the Malian Civil War&lt;/i&gt;, New York, Peter Lang, 2021.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;/div&gt;&lt;div id=&#034;nb3-3&#034;&gt;
&lt;p&gt;&lt;sup class='lien_note'&gt;&lt;a href=&#034;#nh3-3&#034; class=&#034;spip_note&#034; title=&#034;Footnotes 3-3&#034; rev=&#034;appendix&#034;&gt;3&lt;/a&gt;&lt;/sup&gt;Ibrahima Baba Sidib&#233;, &#171;&#160;Les relations franco-maliennes &#224; la recherche d'un nouveau souffle&#160;&#187;, in Gemdev and Universit&#233; du Mali (eds), &lt;i&gt;Mali-France : regards sur une histoire partag&#233;e&lt;/i&gt;, Paris, Karthala, 2005, pp.&#160;341&#8211;362.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;/div&gt;&lt;div id=&#034;nb3-4&#034;&gt;
&lt;p&gt;&lt;sup class='lien_note'&gt;&lt;a href=&#034;#nh3-4&#034; class=&#034;spip_note&#034; title=&#034;Footnotes 3-4&#034; rev=&#034;appendix&#034;&gt;4&lt;/a&gt;&lt;/sup&gt;Julien Gavelle, Johanna Sim&#233;ant and Laure Traor&#233;, &#171;&#160;Le court terme de la l&#233;gitimit&#233; : prises de position, rumeurs et perceptions entre janvier et septembre 2012 &#224; Bamako&#160;&#187;, &lt;i&gt;Politique africaine&lt;/i&gt;, no.&#160;130, June&#160;2013, pp.&#160;23&#8211;46.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;/div&gt;&lt;div id=&#034;nb3-5&#034;&gt;
&lt;p&gt;&lt;sup class='lien_note'&gt;&lt;a href=&#034;#nh3-5&#034; class=&#034;spip_note&#034; title=&#034;Footnotes 3-5&#034; rev=&#034;appendix&#034;&gt;5&lt;/a&gt;&lt;/sup&gt;International Crisis Group, &#171;&#160;Mali : &#233;viter l'escalade&#160;&#187;, &lt;i&gt;Rapport Afrique&lt;/i&gt;, no.&#160;189, 18&#160;July&#160;2012.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;/div&gt;&lt;div id=&#034;nb3-6&#034;&gt;
&lt;p&gt;&lt;sup class='lien_note'&gt;&lt;a href=&#034;#nh3-6&#034; class=&#034;spip_note&#034; title=&#034;Footnotes 3-6&#034; rev=&#034;appendix&#034;&gt;6&lt;/a&gt;&lt;/sup&gt;Mission de l'Union africaine pour le Mali et le Sahel, &#171;&#160;Historique de l'op&#233;ration &lt;span class=&#034;caps&#034;&gt;MISMA&lt;/span&gt;&#160;&#187; ; United Nations Security Council, Resolution&#160;2085 (2012), 20&#160;December&#160;2012.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;/div&gt;&lt;div id=&#034;nb3-7&#034;&gt;
&lt;p&gt;&lt;sup class='lien_note'&gt;&lt;a href=&#034;#nh3-7&#034; class=&#034;spip_note&#034; title=&#034;Footnotes 3-7&#034; rev=&#034;appendix&#034;&gt;7&lt;/a&gt;&lt;/sup&gt;Nanourougo Coulibaly, &#171;&#160;Posture discursive et victoire &#233;lectorale : le cas d'Ibrahim Boubacar Ke&#239;ta au Mali&#160;&#187;, &lt;i&gt;Argumentation et Analyse du Discours&lt;/i&gt;, no.&#160;13, 2014.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;/div&gt;&lt;div id=&#034;nb3-8&#034;&gt;
&lt;p&gt;&lt;sup class='lien_note'&gt;&lt;a href=&#034;#nh3-8&#034; class=&#034;spip_note&#034; title=&#034;Footnotes 3-8&#034; rev=&#034;appendix&#034;&gt;8&lt;/a&gt;&lt;/sup&gt;Gr&#233;gory Daho, Florent Pouponneau and Johanna Sim&#233;ant-Germanos (eds), &lt;i&gt;Entrer en guerre au Mali. Luttes politiques et bureaucratiques autour de l'intervention fran&#231;aise&lt;/i&gt;, Paris, &#201;ditions Rue d'Ulm/Presses de l'&#201;cole normale sup&#233;rieure, 2022, pp.&#160;5&#8211;29, especially pp.&#160;9&#8211;11.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;/div&gt;&lt;div id=&#034;nb3-9&#034;&gt;
&lt;p&gt;&lt;sup class='lien_note'&gt;&lt;a href=&#034;#nh3-9&#034; class=&#034;spip_note&#034; title=&#034;Footnotes 3-9&#034; rev=&#034;appendix&#034;&gt;9&lt;/a&gt;&lt;/sup&gt;United Nations Security Council, 7,600&lt;sup class=&#034;typo_exposants&#034;&gt;th&lt;/sup&gt; meeting, &#171;&#160;La situation au Mali&#160;&#187;, S/&lt;span class=&#034;caps&#034;&gt;PV&lt;/span&gt;.7600, 11&#160;January&#160;2016. The request is made by Abdoulaye Diop, Mali's foreign minister.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;/div&gt;&lt;div id=&#034;nb3-10&#034;&gt;
&lt;p&gt;&lt;sup class='lien_note'&gt;&lt;a href=&#034;#nh3-10&#034; class=&#034;spip_note&#034; title=&#034;Footnotes 3-10&#034; rev=&#034;appendix&#034;&gt;10&lt;/a&gt;&lt;/sup&gt;International Crisis Group, &#171;&#160;Mali : &#233;viter le pi&#232;ge de l'isolement&#160;&#187;, &lt;i&gt;Briefing Afrique&lt;/i&gt;, no.&#160;185, 9&#160;February&#160;2023 ; United Nations Security Council, Resolution&#160;2690&#160;(2023), 30&#160;June&#160;2023.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;/div&gt;&lt;div id=&#034;nb3-11&#034;&gt;
&lt;p&gt;&lt;sup class='lien_note'&gt;&lt;a href=&#034;#nh3-11&#034; class=&#034;spip_note&#034; title=&#034;Footnotes 3-11&#034; rev=&#034;appendix&#034;&gt;11&lt;/a&gt;&lt;/sup&gt;Eva Magdalena Stamb&#248;l, Almamy Sylla and Signe Marie Cold-Ravnkilde, &#8220;Anticolonial Imaginaries in Mali: The Longue Dur&#233;e of Sovereignty, Security, and Geopolitics&#8221;, &lt;i&gt;Geopolitics&lt;/i&gt;, vol.&#160;31, no.&#160;4, 2026, pp.&#160;1261&#8211;1286.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;/div&gt;&lt;div id=&#034;nb3-12&#034;&gt;
&lt;p&gt;&lt;sup class='lien_note'&gt;&lt;a href=&#034;#nh3-12&#034; class=&#034;spip_note&#034; title=&#034;Footnotes 3-12&#034; rev=&#034;appendix&#034;&gt;12&lt;/a&gt;&lt;/sup&gt;Stine Maya Cold-Ravnkilde, Morten B&#248;&#229;s and Boubacar Ba, &#8220;The rise of Mali's 'videomen' as cybercombatants in global crisis ecologies&#8221;, &lt;i&gt;International Affairs&lt;/i&gt;, vol.&#160;100, no.&#160;4, 2024, pp.&#160;1405&#8211;1422.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;/div&gt;&lt;div id=&#034;nb3-13&#034;&gt;
&lt;p&gt;&lt;sup class='lien_note'&gt;&lt;a href=&#034;#nh3-13&#034; class=&#034;spip_note&#034; title=&#034;Footnotes 3-13&#034; rev=&#034;appendix&#034;&gt;13&lt;/a&gt;&lt;/sup&gt;International Crisis Group, &#171;&#160;Mali : &#233;viter le pi&#232;ge de l'isolement&#160;&#187;, &lt;i&gt;Briefing Afrique&lt;/i&gt;, no.&#160;185, 9&#160;February&#160;2023.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;/div&gt;&lt;div id=&#034;nb3-14&#034;&gt;
&lt;p&gt;&lt;sup class='lien_note'&gt;&lt;a href=&#034;#nh3-14&#034; class=&#034;spip_note&#034; title=&#034;Footnotes 3-14&#034; rev=&#034;appendix&#034;&gt;14&lt;/a&gt;&lt;/sup&gt;Mirjam de Bruijn, &lt;a href=&#034;https://carnegieendowment.org/research/2025/10/digital-communication-as-a-weapon-mali&#034; class=&#034;spip_out&#034; rel=&#034;external&#034;&gt;&#8220;Digital Communication as a Weapon: The Case of Mali&#8221;&lt;/a&gt;, Carnegie, 4&#160;October&#160;2025.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;/div&gt;&lt;/div&gt;
		
		</content:encoded>


		

	</item>
<item xml:lang="en">
		<title>&#8220;Ethiopia could face a famine as devastating as the one in 1984&#8221;</title>
		<link>https://afriquexxi.info/Ethiopia-could-face-a-famine-as-devastating-as-the-one-in-1984</link>
		<guid isPermaLink="true">https://afriquexxi.info/Ethiopia-could-face-a-famine-as-devastating-as-the-one-in-1984</guid>
		<dc:date>2026-10-02T06:36:22Z</dc:date>
		<dc:format>text/html</dc:format>
		<dc:language>en</dc:language>
		<dc:creator>Michael Pauron</dc:creator>


		<dc:subject>Tigray</dc:subject>
		<dc:subject>politics</dc:subject>
		<dc:subject>Ethiopia</dc:subject>
		<dc:subject>human rights</dc:subject>
		<dc:subject>Interview</dc:subject>
		<dc:subject>civil war</dc:subject>

		<description>
&lt;p&gt;Mehdi Labza&#233;, a researcher at France's National Centre for Scientific Research (&lt;span class=&#034;caps&#034;&gt;CNRS&lt;/span&gt;), warns that the resumption of war in northern Ethiopia, combined with drought and blockades imposed by the federal government, could trigger a disastrous humanitarian crisis. In this interview with Afrique&#160;&lt;span class=&#034;caps&#034;&gt;XXI&lt;/span&gt;, he unpacks a new conflict that has already killed hundreds of people and displaced tens of thousands. &lt;br class='autobr' /&gt; Four years after the peace agreement that ended two years of devastating war in Tigray (around&#160;(&#8230;)&lt;/p&gt;


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 <content:encoded>&lt;img src='https://afriquexxi.info/local/cache-vignettes/L600xH338/f5cc752e4012919c07cd7441144498-9b7bd.jpg?1790924030' class='spip_logo spip_logo_right' width='600' height='338' alt=&#034;&#034; /&gt;
		&lt;div class='rss_chapo'&gt;&lt;p&gt;Mehdi Labza&#233;, a researcher at France's National Centre for Scientific Research (&lt;span class=&#034;caps&#034;&gt;CNRS&lt;/span&gt;), warns that the resumption of war in northern Ethiopia, combined with drought and blockades imposed by the federal government, could trigger a disastrous humanitarian crisis. In this interview with &lt;i&gt;Afrique&#160;&lt;span class=&#034;caps&#034;&gt;XXI&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/i&gt;, he unpacks a new conflict that has already killed hundreds of people and displaced tens of thousands.&lt;/p&gt;&lt;/div&gt;
		&lt;div class='rss_texte'&gt;&lt;p&gt;Four years after the peace agreement that ended two years of &lt;a href=&#034;https://afriquexxi.info/En-Ethiopie-l-effroyable-guerre-du-Tigray&#034;&gt;devastating war in Tigray&lt;/a&gt; (around 600&#160;000 dead and 800&#160;000 refugees between 2020 and 2022), the sound of gunfire is back in northern Ethiopia.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;This time, several armed groups &#8212; Amhara, Afar, Tigrayan and others &#8212; have come together under a single coalition, the Alliance of Ethiopian People's Forces for Survival. The Tigray People's Liberation Front (&lt;span class=&#034;caps&#034;&gt;TPLF&lt;/span&gt;) has allied with some of its former enemies, and its forces, the Tigray Defence Forces (&lt;span class=&#034;caps&#034;&gt;TDF&lt;/span&gt;), have been swelled by months of forced conscription, as &lt;a href=&#034;https://afriquexxi.info/Ethiopie-Au-Tigray-recrutements-forces-et-peur-du-retour-de-la-guerre&#034;&gt;&lt;i&gt;Afrique&#160;&lt;span class=&#034;caps&#034;&gt;XXI&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/i&gt; reported in July&lt;/a&gt;. According to a statement from the &lt;span class=&#034;caps&#034;&gt;UN&lt;/span&gt; Human Rights Office&lt;sup class='ref_note'&gt;&lt;a href=&#034;#nb3-1&#034; class=&#034;spip_note&#034; rel=&#034;appendix&#034; title=&#034;&#171;&#160;Ethiopia: T&#252;rk alarmed by civilian impact of hostilities, urges (&#8230;)&#034; id=&#034;nh3-1&#034;&gt;1&lt;/a&gt;&lt;/sup&gt; (&lt;span class=&#034;caps&#034;&gt;OHCHR&lt;/span&gt;), published on 25&#160;September, the same practice has reportedly also been used by the Ethiopian National Defence Force (&lt;span class=&#034;caps&#034;&gt;ENDF&lt;/span&gt;).&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Accounts vary, but the first casualties already run into the hundreds, and the displaced into the tens of thousands &#8212; including 150&#160;000 people uprooted along the front line between the Afar region and Tigray, according to a humanitarian source cited by &lt;span class=&#034;caps&#034;&gt;AFP&lt;/span&gt;&lt;sup class='ref_note'&gt;&lt;a href=&#034;#nb3-2&#034; class=&#034;spip_note&#034; rel=&#034;appendix&#034; title=&#034;&#171;&#160;As fighting intensifies, humanitarian source estimates at least 150,000 (&#8230;)&#034; id=&#034;nh3-2&#034;&gt;2&lt;/a&gt;&lt;/sup&gt; on 28&#160;September. The Ethiopian federal government, for its part, says it has killed 272&#160;&lt;span class=&#034;caps&#034;&gt;TDF&lt;/span&gt; fighters in the Amhara region&lt;sup class='ref_note'&gt;&lt;a href=&#034;#nb3-3&#034; class=&#034;spip_note&#034; rel=&#034;appendix&#034; title=&#034;&#171;&#160;Ethiopian army says 272 Tigrayan fighters killed in Amhara&#160;&#187;, Al Jazeera (&#8230;)&#034; id=&#034;nh3-3&#034;&gt;3&lt;/a&gt;&lt;/sup&gt;. Hospitals, flooded with both fighters and civilians, are said to already be overwhelmed and lacking the means to treat them.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Although the roots of this conflict are Ethiopian, a wide range of regional and international players have a stake in it &#8212; Sudan, Eritrea, the United Arab Emirates, and even the United States and Israel, as Mehdi Labza&#233;, a &lt;span class=&#034;caps&#034;&gt;CNRS&lt;/span&gt; research fellow and specialist on Ethiopia, explains in this interview. For &lt;i&gt;Afrique&#160;&lt;span class=&#034;caps&#034;&gt;XXI&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/i&gt;, he previously covered &lt;a href=&#034;https://afriquexxi.info/En-Ethiopie-l-effroyable-guerre-du-Tigray&#034;&gt;the 2020-2022 civil war&lt;/a&gt; and went on to report extensively on its aftermath, including a series on &lt;a href=&#034;https://afriquexxi.info/Ils-nous-ont-chacun-tire-une-balle-pour-verifier-si-nous-etions-morts&#034;&gt;the refugees of that conflict&lt;/a&gt;.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;h2 class=&#034;spip&#034;&gt;A reversal of alliances between the Fano and the &lt;span class=&#034;caps&#034;&gt;TPLF&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/h2&gt;
&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Michael Pauron: Can we pin down when this new civil war began, and who started the fighting?&lt;/strong&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Mehdi Labza&#233;:&lt;/strong&gt; As with the previous war, it's hard to say who fired first. But we know there was heavy fighting in August, with strikes on &lt;span class=&#034;caps&#034;&gt;TPLF&lt;/span&gt; positions near the Sudanese border that reportedly caused heavy casualties. Government forces have hit military convoys, but also schools and clinics, including in the Amhara region.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Michael Pauron: Where is the fighting heaviest?&lt;/strong&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Mehdi Labza&#233;:&lt;/strong&gt; The most intense fighting is in southern Tigray &#8212; around Korem, Maychew, Samre &#8212; as well as in Afar and various parts of the Amhara region.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Michael Pauron: Who are the forces involved?&lt;/strong&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Mehdi Labza&#233;:&lt;/strong&gt; About ten days ago, a coalition of several regional players was announced, called the Alliance of Ethiopian People's Forces for Survival. It brings together the &lt;span class=&#034;caps&#034;&gt;TPLF&lt;/span&gt;, which governed Ethiopia from 1991&#160;to 2018 as part of a coalition that designed the country's current ethnic-federal system. The &lt;span class=&#034;caps&#034;&gt;TPLF&lt;/span&gt; fought against the federal government in the Tigray war, which ran from 2020&#160;to 2022.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Then there's the Amhara Fano National Movement, a significant force. It's a coalition of Fano nationalist militias claiming to represent the Amhara people. Historically, Amhara elites played a central role in building the Ethiopian state. For a long time, being Ethiopian was almost synonymous with adopting Amhara culture. In the 1970s, a number of groups, including the &lt;span class=&#034;caps&#034;&gt;TPLF&lt;/span&gt;, began challenging that dominance. The &lt;span class=&#034;caps&#034;&gt;TPLF&lt;/span&gt; took power in 1991 and, three years later, pushed through a new constitution &#8212; this time an ethnic-federal one.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;This rapprochement between Tigrayans and the Fano marks a reversal of alliances, since during the 2020-2022 Tigray war, the Fano nationalist militias fought against the &lt;span class=&#034;caps&#034;&gt;TPLF&lt;/span&gt;, alongside the federal army.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;figure class='spip_document_3537 spip_documents spip_documents_center'
style=&#034;max-width:falsepx;&#034; data-w=&#034;false&#034;&gt;
&lt;a href='https://afriquexxi.info/IMG/png/capture_d_ecran_88_-2.png' arial-label=&#034;The main fighting is taking place in southern Tigray, in Afar and in the Amhara region.&#034; title=&#034;The main fighting is taking place in southern Tigray, in Afar and in the Amhara region.&#034; class=&#034;fond mediabox&#034; type=&#034;image/png&#034; data-photo-w=&#034;1119&#034; data-photo-h=&#034;879&#034; &gt;
&lt;picture style='padding:0;padding-bottom:78.552278820375%' class='conteneur_image_responsive_h'&gt;&lt;img src='https://afriquexxi.info/local/cache-vignettes/L160xH126/f8fae66c8260c0825275922631b25787-f3bdc.png?1790924030' alt='The main fighting is taking place in southern Tigray, in Afar and in the Amhara region.' data-src='IMG/png/capture_d_ecran_88_-2.png' data-l='1119' data-h='879' data-tailles='[\&#034;160\&#034;,\&#034;320\&#034;,\&#034;640\&#034;,\&#034;1280\&#034;,\&#034;1920\&#034;]' data-autorisees='{&#034;160&#034;:{&#034;1&#034;:&#034;local\/cache-responsive\/cache-160\/f8fae66c8260c0825275922631b25787.png?1790924030&#034;,&#034;2&#034;:&#034;local\/cache-responsive\/cache-320\/f8fae66c8260c0825275922631b25787.png?1790924030&#034;},&#034;320&#034;:{&#034;1&#034;:&#034;local\/cache-responsive\/cache-320\/f8fae66c8260c0825275922631b25787.png?1790924030&#034;,&#034;2&#034;:&#034;local\/cache-responsive\/cache-640\/f8fae66c8260c0825275922631b25787.png?1790924030&#034;},&#034;640&#034;:{&#034;1&#034;:&#034;local\/cache-responsive\/cache-640\/f8fae66c8260c0825275922631b25787.png?1790924030&#034;,&#034;2&#034;:&#034;local\/cache-responsive\/cache-1119\/f8fae66c8260c0825275922631b25787.png?1790924030&#034;},&#034;1119&#034;:{&#034;1&#034;:&#034;local\/cache-responsive\/cache-1119\/f8fae66c8260c0825275922631b25787.png?1790924030&#034;,&#034;2&#034;:&#034;local\/cache-responsive\/cache-1119\/f8fae66c8260c0825275922631b25787.png?1790924030&#034;}}' data-autorisees_webp='{&#034;160&#034;:{&#034;1&#034;:&#034;local\/cache-responsive\/cache-160\/f8fae66c8260c0825275922631b25787.png.webp?1790924030&#034;,&#034;2&#034;:&#034;local\/cache-responsive\/cache-320\/f8fae66c8260c0825275922631b25787.png.webp?1790924030&#034;},&#034;320&#034;:{&#034;1&#034;:&#034;local\/cache-responsive\/cache-320\/f8fae66c8260c0825275922631b25787.png.webp?1790924030&#034;,&#034;2&#034;:&#034;local\/cache-responsive\/cache-640\/f8fae66c8260c0825275922631b25787.png.webp?1790924030&#034;},&#034;640&#034;:{&#034;1&#034;:&#034;local\/cache-responsive\/cache-640\/f8fae66c8260c0825275922631b25787.png.webp?1790924030&#034;,&#034;2&#034;:&#034;local\/cache-responsive\/cache-1119\/f8fae66c8260c0825275922631b25787.png.webp?1790924030&#034;},&#034;1119&#034;:{&#034;1&#034;:&#034;local\/cache-responsive\/cache-1119\/f8fae66c8260c0825275922631b25787.png.webp?1790924030&#034;,&#034;2&#034;:&#034;local\/cache-responsive\/cache-1119\/f8fae66c8260c0825275922631b25787.png.webp?1790924030&#034;}}' class='image_responsive' width='160' height='126' /&gt;&lt;/picture&gt;
&lt;/a&gt;
&lt;figcaption class='spip_doc_intitules spip_doc_intitules_top'&gt;
&lt;div class='spip_doc_titre crayon document-titre-3537 '&gt;&lt;strong&gt;The main fighting is taking place in southern Tigray, in Afar and in the Amhara region.
&lt;/strong&gt;&lt;/div&gt;
&lt;div class='spip_doc_credits crayon document-credits-3537 '&gt;By Jfblanc - Own work, &lt;span class=&#034;caps&#034;&gt;&lt;span class=&#034;caps&#034;&gt;CC&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/span&gt; &lt;span class=&#034;caps&#034;&gt;&lt;span class=&#034;caps&#034;&gt;BY&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/span&gt;-&lt;span class=&#034;caps&#034;&gt;&lt;span class=&#034;caps&#034;&gt;SA&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/span&gt; 4.0
&lt;/div&gt;
&lt;/figcaption&gt;
&lt;/figure&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Next comes the Oromo Liberation Army, which is seeking autonomy for Oromia, Ethiopia's most populous region with around 40&#160;million inhabitants. There is also the Ogaden National Liberation Front, a still officially registered party that demands autonomy for the Ogaden, part of the Somali region in eastern Ethiopia. And the Gumuz People's Democratic Movement, active mainly in northern Benishangul-Gumuz, which has fought against Amhara nationalists.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The Benishangul Liberation Movement is also present. It mainly represents the Berta population and draws support from members of that community based in Sudan. This group is believed to have ties to the Sudanese Armed Forces under General Al-Burhan.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Finally, there is the Afar Revolutionary Democratic Unity Front, backed by Eritrea, where it had found refuge. A week ago, this group seized control of Abala, one of the most important towns in northern Afar.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Michael Pauron: What is the Alliance's goal?&lt;/strong&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Mehdi Labza&#233;:&lt;/strong&gt; The coalition says it wants to overthrow the government of Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed. It says it wants to establish an inclusive transitional government representing every part of Ethiopian society.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;According to the coalition, the understanding between these different groups isn't merely tactical &#8212; short-term &#8212; but genuinely strategic, with a medium-term plan to govern together once the war is over.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;h2 class=&#034;spip&#034;&gt;Eritrea, Sudan, the United Arab Emirates&#8230;&lt;/h2&gt;
&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Michael Pauron: You've mentioned two countries in the sub-region &#8212; Eritrea and Sudan. How deeply are they involved?&lt;/strong&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Mehdi Labza&#233;:&lt;/strong&gt; The roots of the conflict are genuinely Ethiopian, not regional. But like any civil war, it is becoming internationalised. The coalition is indeed backed by Eritrea and Sudan.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Cooperation between Asmara and the &lt;span class=&#034;caps&#034;&gt;TPLF&lt;/span&gt; isn't new &#8212; it now goes back more than a year. It's worth remembering they were fighting each other in 2020-2022. Here too, this is a reversal of alliances.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Khartoum is also backing the &lt;span class=&#034;caps&#034;&gt;TDF&lt;/span&gt;, hosting them on Sudanese territory and allowing equipment to pass through. Some &lt;span class=&#034;caps&#034;&gt;TDF&lt;/span&gt; members have fought in the civil war &lt;a href=&#034;https://afriquexxi.info/Soudan-Le-mepris-du-droit-international-dans-un-silence-presque-total&#034;&gt;tearing Sudan apart for the past three years&lt;/a&gt;, alongside the Sudanese Armed Forces against the Rapid Support Forces (&lt;span class=&#034;caps&#034;&gt;RSF&lt;/span&gt;), notably in Sudan's Blue Nile state.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Michael Pauron: Why is Sudan getting involved?&lt;/strong&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Mehdi Labza&#233;:&lt;/strong&gt; Because the Ethiopian federal government backs the &lt;span class=&#034;caps&#034;&gt;RSF&lt;/span&gt;. It has given them the use of a base at Assosa, near the border in the Benishangul-Gumuz region, from which drones have been able to take off. It's also from this base that &lt;span class=&#034;caps&#034;&gt;RSF&lt;/span&gt; fighters set out to retake Sudanese villages around Kurmuk, in Blue Nile state.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Michael Pauron: Who can the Ethiopian federal government count on?&lt;/strong&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Mehdi Labza&#233;:&lt;/strong&gt; Addis Ababa can count on support from the United Arab Emirates (&lt;span class=&#034;caps&#034;&gt;UAE&lt;/span&gt;), which is supplying equipment, including drones. Turkey has also provided a large number of drones.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Leaks in the Israeli press, notably in &lt;i&gt;Haaretz&lt;/i&gt;, have pointed to plans to engineer regime change in Asmara. The United States and Israel could be backing Eritrean armed opposition groups based in Ethiopia, allowing them to position themselves on the Bab-el-Mandeb strait. Ethiopia, for its part, would gain access to the sea in return&#8230;&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;This information strikes me as fairly credible: the statement issued by the &lt;span class=&#034;caps&#034;&gt;US&lt;/span&gt; ambassador in Addis Ababa on 23&#160;September&lt;sup class='ref_note'&gt;&lt;a href=&#034;#nb3-4&#034; class=&#034;spip_note&#034; rel=&#034;appendix&#034; title=&#034;Ervin J. Massinga, &#171;&#160;Statement on Recent Developments in Tigray and Afar&#160;&#187;, (&#8230;)&#034; id=&#034;nh3-4&#034;&gt;4&lt;/a&gt;&lt;/sup&gt; was strongly pro-Ethiopian-government. It clearly condemned the &lt;span class=&#034;caps&#034;&gt;TPLF&lt;/span&gt;.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;h2 class=&#034;spip&#034;&gt;The &lt;span class=&#034;caps&#034;&gt;TPLF&lt;/span&gt;'s methods now resemble Eritrea's&lt;/h2&gt;
&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Michael Pauron: What is the humanitarian situation?&lt;/strong&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Mehdi Labza&#233;:&lt;/strong&gt; We can already sound the alarm over a heightened risk of famine, for several reasons. First, rainfall has been well below average in northern Ethiopia &#8212; roughly half the usual level. Second, this famine has effectively been engineered by the federal government through blockades &#8212; of fuel, market supplies, humanitarian aid &#8212; by bombing water and health infrastructure, by blocking money transfers and creating a cash shortage&#8230;&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;In Tigray, an estimated 3.9&#160;million people, out of 7&#160;million, already need emergency humanitarian aid because of crop failures &#8212; and this is before the lean season has even begun. Add to that the obstruction of humanitarian aid, and every warning sign points to northern Ethiopia facing one of the worst humanitarian crises in its history, possibly as catastrophic as the one in 1984-1985.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;For the &lt;span class=&#034;caps&#034;&gt;TPLF&lt;/span&gt;, this will be an added difficulty if its fighters have to retreat into rural areas where people no longer have enough to eat.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Michael Pauron: The &lt;span class=&#034;caps&#034;&gt;TPLF&lt;/span&gt; is resorting to forced recruitment. Are the people leading it today the same as in 2020?&lt;/strong&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Mehdi Labza&#233;:&lt;/strong&gt; The &lt;span class=&#034;caps&#034;&gt;TPLF&lt;/span&gt; has indeed pursued a policy of conscripting young people with a very high degree of coercion &#8212; going door to door, threatening parents, forcing them to hand over at least one child per family. In June, a disproportionate national security law was introduced. It exposes anyone, including Ethiopians living abroad, who spreads propaganda likely to obstruct this conscription drive to twenty-five years in prison. That includes social media posts.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The &lt;span class=&#034;caps&#034;&gt;TPLF&lt;/span&gt;'s methods now resemble Eritrea's. The current &lt;span class=&#034;caps&#034;&gt;TPLF&lt;/span&gt; leadership bears little resemblance to the one from 2020, let alone the one from the 1990s. These leaders, who rose to power through factional infighting, have respected neither regional law nor the party's own internal conflict-resolution procedures. Some of these military figures control gold-mining sites, among other things. The &lt;span class=&#034;caps&#034;&gt;TPLF&lt;/span&gt;'s entire historic ideology &#8212; development, redistribution, the fight against poverty &#8212; has vanished.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Michael Pauron: What is the situation for refugees?&lt;/strong&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Mehdi Labza&#233;:&lt;/strong&gt; The 800&#160;000 people who fled the war in 2020 have never returned to western Tigray. Some are still in camps around various towns in Tigray, and will be the first exposed to famine; others are in different countries, including Libya, where &lt;a href=&#034;https://afriquexxi.info/En-Libye-un-systeme-carceral-meurtrier-a-l-ombre-de-l-Europe&#034;&gt;the situation facing African migrants is well documented&lt;/a&gt;. Others still are on the road, heading for Saudi Arabia &#8212; a country where the regime has no hesitation in handing down death sentences to Ethiopians, for offences as minor as being caught with a small amount of khat.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;But right now, a lot of young people tell me there's simply no future left in Tigray. For many Ethiopians, the only way to take control of their own fate is to leave &#8212; even knowing the risks involved.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;h2 class=&#034;spip&#034;&gt;#&lt;/h2&gt;
&lt;p&gt;This article was translated from French into English using &lt;span class=&#034;caps&#034;&gt;AI&lt;/span&gt; and proofread by a human journalist.&lt;/p&gt;&lt;/div&gt;
		&lt;hr /&gt;
		&lt;div class='rss_notes'&gt;&lt;div id=&#034;nb3-1&#034;&gt;
&lt;p&gt;&lt;sup class='lien_note'&gt;&lt;a href=&#034;#nh3-1&#034; class=&#034;spip_note&#034; title=&#034;Footnotes 3-1&#034; rev=&#034;appendix&#034;&gt;1&lt;/a&gt;&lt;/sup&gt;&lt;a href=&#034;https://www.ohchr.org/en/press-releases/2026/09/ethiopia-turk-alarmed-civilian-impact-hostilities-urges-de-escalation&#034; class=&#034;spip_out&#034; rel=&#034;external&#034;&gt;&#171;&#160;Ethiopia: T&#252;rk alarmed by civilian impact of hostilities, urges de-escalation&#160;&#187;&lt;/a&gt;, &lt;span class=&#034;caps&#034;&gt;OHCHR&lt;/span&gt;, 25&#160;septembre&#160;2026.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;/div&gt;&lt;div id=&#034;nb3-2&#034;&gt;
&lt;p&gt;&lt;sup class='lien_note'&gt;&lt;a href=&#034;#nh3-2&#034; class=&#034;spip_note&#034; title=&#034;Footnotes 3-2&#034; rev=&#034;appendix&#034;&gt;2&lt;/a&gt;&lt;/sup&gt;&#171;&#160;As fighting intensifies, humanitarian source estimates at least 150,000 displaced in Afar, Tigray &lt;span class=&#034;caps&#034;&gt;TV&lt;/span&gt; hit by drone&#160;&#187;, Addis Standard, 28&#160;septembre&#160;2026.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;/div&gt;&lt;div id=&#034;nb3-3&#034;&gt;
&lt;p&gt;&lt;sup class='lien_note'&gt;&lt;a href=&#034;#nh3-3&#034; class=&#034;spip_note&#034; title=&#034;Footnotes 3-3&#034; rev=&#034;appendix&#034;&gt;3&lt;/a&gt;&lt;/sup&gt;&lt;a href=&#034;https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2026/9/24/ethiopian-army-says-272-tigrayan-fighters-killed-as-conflict-escalates&#034; class=&#034;spip_out&#034; rel=&#034;external&#034;&gt;&#171;&#160;Ethiopian army says 272 Tigrayan fighters killed in Amhara&#160;&#187;&lt;/a&gt;, Al Jazeera Staff, &lt;span class=&#034;caps&#034;&gt;AFP&lt;/span&gt; et Reuters, 24&#160;septembre&#160;2026.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;/div&gt;&lt;div id=&#034;nb3-4&#034;&gt;
&lt;p&gt;&lt;sup class='lien_note'&gt;&lt;a href=&#034;#nh3-4&#034; class=&#034;spip_note&#034; title=&#034;Footnotes 3-4&#034; rev=&#034;appendix&#034;&gt;4&lt;/a&gt;&lt;/sup&gt;Ervin J. Massinga, &lt;a href=&#034;https://et.usembassy.gov/statement-on-recent-developments-in-tigray-and-afar/&#034; class=&#034;spip_out&#034; rel=&#034;external&#034;&gt;&#171;&#160;Statement on Recent Developments in Tigray and Afar&#160;&#187;&lt;/a&gt;, ambassade des &#201;tats-Unis &#224; Addis-Abeba, 23&#160;septembre&#160;2026.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;/div&gt;&lt;/div&gt;
		
		</content:encoded>


		

	</item>
<item xml:lang="en">
		<title>Senegal. In Casamance, the courts have ruled, but the zircon mining goes on</title>
		<link>https://afriquexxi.info/Senegal-In-Casamance-the-courts-have-ruled-but-the-zircon-mining-goes-on</link>
		<guid isPermaLink="true">https://afriquexxi.info/Senegal-In-Casamance-the-courts-have-ruled-but-the-zircon-mining-goes-on</guid>
		<dc:date>2026-09-25T10:06:55Z</dc:date>
		<dc:format>text/html</dc:format>
		<dc:language>en</dc:language>
		<dc:creator>Fanny Pigeaud</dc:creator>


		<dc:subject>Human rights</dc:subject>
		<dc:subject>Economics</dc:subject>
		<dc:subject>Environment</dc:subject>
		<dc:subject>Investigation</dc:subject>
		<dc:subject>Senegal</dc:subject>
		<dc:subject>Mines</dc:subject>
		<dc:subject>Soci&#233;t&#233; civile</dc:subject>

		<description>
&lt;p&gt;For twenty years, the people of Niafrang, in Casamance, have opposed zircon mining on their coastline. In November 2025, Senegal's Supreme Court struck down the company's permit. But extraction continues in defiance of that ruling, threatening the dunes, the mangrove and the village's water supply. &lt;br class='autobr' /&gt; It has been a twenty-year fight, waged relentlessly against pressure and threats. In the village of Niafrang (also known as Niafourang), in Casamance, in southern Senegal, residents have stood&#160;(&#8230;)&lt;/p&gt;


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 <content:encoded>&lt;img src='https://afriquexxi.info/local/cache-vignettes/L600xH338/43ef452eff6b92e2b6704586ea6de4-31978.jpg?1790331665' class='spip_logo spip_logo_right' width='600' height='338' alt=&#034;&#034; /&gt;
		&lt;div class='rss_chapo'&gt;&lt;p&gt;For twenty years, the people of Niafrang, in Casamance, have opposed zircon mining on their coastline. In November 2025, Senegal's Supreme Court struck down the company's permit. But extraction continues in defiance of that ruling, threatening the dunes, the mangrove and the village's water supply.&lt;/p&gt;&lt;/div&gt;
		&lt;div class='rss_texte'&gt;&lt;p&gt;It has been a twenty-year fight, waged relentlessly against pressure and threats. In the village of Niafrang (also known as Niafourang), in Casamance, in southern Senegal, residents have stood firm against a mining project that threatens their coastline.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;In November&#160;2025, their struggle reached a decisive turning point: Senegal's Supreme Court struck down the zircon extraction licence granted by the mining ministry for a site next to the village. A major legal victory &#8212; and a final one.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Yet the ruling has not been enough to halt operations. Just a few kilometres from Niafrang, the mining company continues working the mineral-rich sands to extract this highly sought-after ore.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The origins of this long battle go back to 2004. That year, the Senegalese state granted the Australian company Carnegie Minerals an exploration permit for the mineral-rich sands along the Casamance coast, which are rich in zircon, titanium and other strategic minerals. Around a hundred square kilometres of coastal dunes were affected, including the one bordering Niafrang.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;h2 class=&#034;spip&#034;&gt;A coastline vulnerable to flooding&lt;/h2&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The extraction project quickly stirred concern among local people: behind the dune lies a vast area of around 50&#160;000&#160;hectares, home to close to 25&#160;000&#160;people spread across some forty villages. Sitting at sea level, the area would be especially vulnerable to flooding should the dune deteriorate further.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;From 2006 onwards, a committee against zircon mining, bringing together forty-four villages, began lobbying the media and public authorities. &lt;i&gt;&#8220;We carried out research and visited sites where zircon had already been mined. That's how we became aware of just how serious the consequences of this kind of extraction could be for our environment,&#8221;&lt;/i&gt; the group's leader, Ousmane San&#233;, who lives in Niafrang, where he runs an eco-tourism camp, told &lt;i&gt;Afrique&#160;&lt;span class=&#034;caps&#034;&gt;XXI&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/i&gt;.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Opposition to the project grew so fierce that Carnegie Minerals eventually gave up without ever starting work. Another Australian company, Hong Kong-based Astron Corporation Limited, then took up the project and, in 2017, secured an operating permit. But it too ran into the same determined resistance from residents.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;In 2023, the government eventually cancelled Astron's permit for &#8220;inactivity.&#8221; &lt;i&gt;&#8220;We tried everything necessary to get the project off the ground &#8212; the authorities in the Ziguinchor region launched consultations. Unfortunately, there was a lack of buy-in from the local population,&#8221;&lt;/i&gt; Roseline Mbaye Carlos, the mining ministry's director-general of mines, told &lt;i&gt;Le Quotidien&lt;/i&gt; newspaper in October&#160;2023&lt;sup class='ref_note'&gt;&lt;a href=&#034;#nb4-1&#034; class=&#034;spip_note&#034; rel=&#034;appendix&#034; title=&#034;&#171;&#160;Exploitation du zircon de Niafrang&#160;: l'&#201;tat ferme la mine &#224; Astron&#160;&#187;, Le (&#8230;)&#034; id=&#034;nh4-1&#034;&gt;1&lt;/a&gt;&lt;/sup&gt;.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;h2 class=&#034;spip&#034;&gt;At Ab&#233;n&#233;, a car and envelopes stuffed with cash&lt;/h2&gt;
&lt;p&gt;But the reprieve was short-lived. Even before Astron's permit was withdrawn, the state had granted another permit to a different company, G-Sand, which has Chinese backing and is based in the Gambia. This licence covers the Ab&#233;n&#233; area, a town roughly five kilometres from Niafrang as the crow flies.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;This time, something changed: G-Sand met with no significant opposition on the ground. Although it was a member of the anti-mining committee, the population of Ab&#233;n&#233; no longer stood in the way of the project. G-Sand began operations in 2024, led by around ten Chinese nationals and dozens of workers recruited locally in Ab&#233;n&#233;.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Several accounts point to corruption as the reason for this reversal. &lt;i&gt;&#8220;The day after the agreement with the mining company was signed, the mayor of one of the municipalities covered by the zircon mining plan &#8212; the one where Ab&#233;n&#233; is located &#8212; received a car worth 3&#160;million &lt;span class=&#034;caps&#034;&gt;CFA&lt;/span&gt; francs [&#8364;4,500], along with an envelope containing 3.5&#160;million,&#8221;&lt;/i&gt; journalist Pape San&#233; reported&lt;sup class='ref_note'&gt;&lt;a href=&#034;#nb4-2&#034; class=&#034;spip_note&#034; rel=&#034;appendix&#034; title=&#034;&#171;&#160;S&#233;n&#233;gal&#160;: extractivisme pr&#233;dateur&#160;&#187;, magazine Amnesty n&#176;117, juin&#160;2024.&#034; id=&#034;nh4-2&#034;&gt;2&lt;/a&gt;&lt;/sup&gt;. According to Amnesty International, cheques worth 200&#160;000&#160;&lt;span class=&#034;caps&#034;&gt;CFA&lt;/span&gt; francs were also handed out to certain families who hold local power.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;A resident of Ab&#233;n&#233;, who asked not to be named, says: &lt;i&gt;&#8220;G-Sand bribed local officials with a few thousand euros and token promises &#8212; repairing the mosque, providing an ambulance &#8212; to win their backing.&#8221;&lt;/i&gt; In a local political system with a strong hierarchy, these influential figures were then able to impose their position on the rest of the population, particularly on young people, who were generally opposed to the project.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;&lt;i&gt;&#8220;Today, after serious tensions, the subject has become almost taboo in Ab&#233;n&#233;: most people don't want to talk about it anymore. Many are disgusted by the mining under way, but have now resigned themselves to it,&#8221;&lt;/i&gt; the same source adds. Contacted by email, neither G-Sand nor Senegal's mining ministry responded.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;h2 class=&#034;spip&#034;&gt;Niafrang keeps up the resistance&lt;/h2&gt;
&lt;p&gt;In Niafrang, the mood is altogether different: there is no question of backing down or giving in. If anything, concern and anger keep growing. Two events in particular have shaken residents.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;In February&#160;2025, they first discovered that G-Sand had gone beyond its permitted mining area and begun working part of their land. They then found out that, as far back as October&#160;2023, the company had filed a request to extend its permit to include the Niafrang dune, seen as the most promising part of the deposit.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;For the village, home to around 250&#160;people, the stakes are existential: nothing less than the balance of the whole territory is at risk. Niafrang's ecosystem is particularly fragile, as Ousmane San&#233; explains: &lt;i&gt;&#8220;To the east are the houses, with the rice paddies and other crops down in the lowlands, at sea level; to the west is the dune, the mangrove and the Atlantic Ocean. Over roughly a decade, we've seen the sea advance by more than thirty metres. And our only defence against that is the dune. In the village, everyone knows it's a natural sea wall &#8212; without it, salt water would flood the rice paddies, the other crops and the houses. For a village that depends on farming, that would be catastrophic: we'd lose everything.&#8221;&lt;/i&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;In 2015, geographers Luc Descroix and Jean-Claude Marut&lt;sup class='ref_note'&gt;&lt;a href=&#034;#nb4-3&#034; class=&#034;spip_note&#034; rel=&#034;appendix&#034; title=&#034;Luc Descroix et Jean-Claude Marut, &#171;&#160;L'exploitation des sables m&#233;tallif&#232;res (&#8230;)&#034; id=&#034;nh4-3&#034;&gt;3&lt;/a&gt;&lt;/sup&gt; were already warning that the coastal dune belt where the zircon deposit lies had been weakened by climate change and was subject to accelerated marine erosion. As they put it at the time: &lt;i&gt;&#8220;With the ocean already advancing from the west, is it really wise to add the advance of the excavators from the east?&#8221;&lt;/i&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;h2 class=&#034;spip&#034;&gt;Fears of a water shortage&lt;/h2&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The mining work would also threaten the mangrove that separates the dune from the ocean. Both fragile and exceptionally rich in biodiversity, this ecosystem plays a crucial role in maintaining the balance of the coastline. It is also a vital resource for part of the population, who gather shellfish and fish there.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Niafrang's concerns extend to water as well. Since zircon mining began, residents of several surrounding villages have noticed the water table dropping. Women, who grow vegetables, are finding it increasingly difficult to irrigate their crops. With too little water to go round, they now have to take turns &#8212; some watering one day, others the next.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;These observations echo warnings raised by scientists back when the project was first conceived. They had cautioned that the pumping operations needed for mining risked lowering the water table. Extracting mineral-rich sands requires millions of cubic metres of water drawn from underground. In northern Senegal, where another company, the French group Eramet&lt;sup class='ref_note'&gt;&lt;a href=&#034;#nb4-4&#034; class=&#034;spip_note&#034; rel=&#034;appendix&#034; title=&#034;Fanny Pigeaud, &#171;&#160;Un groupe minier fran&#231;ais d&#233;truit un d&#233;sert unique au (&#8230;)&#034; id=&#034;nh4-4&#034;&gt;4&lt;/a&gt;&lt;/sup&gt;, also mines zircon, farmers report similar water disruptions.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The water has also changed colour, according to Ousmane San&#233;: it has reportedly turned reddish. Is it toxic? Impossible to say for certain at this stage. Experts had nonetheless warned of pollution risks linked to the mining operation, particularly from the use of heavy machinery.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;h2 class=&#034;spip&#034;&gt;Procedures under challenge&lt;/h2&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Alongside these environmental concerns come questions about how the project has been run. Niafrang residents point to a lack of transparency and say several procedures have not been followed. They say they have found it extremely difficult to get information, both on the project itself and on the administrative steps that preceded it.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;According to a legal source, the permit application for Ab&#233;n&#233; was filed without an environmental and social impact assessment ever having been carried out beforehand. Yet such an assessment is mandatory, and is required to obtain the environmental compliance certificate that is itself a precondition for any mining to begin.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The impact assessment required to apply for the Niafrang permit extension was, likewise, reportedly carried out after the fact. It was in this context that a public hearing was held in October&#160;2025. It was not, however, held in Niafrang, despite the village being directly affected &#8212; it took place in Kabadio, a nearby town. Niafrang residents nonetheless travelled there to voice their opposition to the project.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Another major issue, according to Bocar Kant&#233;, a lawyer representing a group of Niafrang residents, concerns compliance with regulatory setback distances. Article 48 of the Environment Code requires this category of facility &#8212; industrial zircon mining &#8212; to be sited at least 200&#160;metres from any watercourse. Yet the Niafrang dune lies no more than 108&#160;metres from a river at most. At that distance, industrial zircon mining should not, in principle, be authorised at all.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;h2 class=&#034;spip&#034;&gt;&#8220;The MPs did nothing to stop G-Sand&#8221;&lt;/h2&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Faced with these risks and alleged failings, around fifteen residents have pursued several legal actions, despite threats and attempted bribery, in an effort to protect their land.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;It was one of these legal challenges that led to the November&#160;2025 ruling: the Supreme Court struck down the operating permit granted to G-Sand for the Ab&#233;n&#233; area, finding that procedures for consulting the population and protecting the environment had not been followed. That ruling also removes the legal basis for the permit extension covering the Niafrang area.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;In principle, G-Sand should therefore have stopped its operations. But after a brief suspension, work resumed as though nothing had happened. &lt;i&gt;&#8220;The company keeps mining five kilometres from our homes despite the Supreme Court's ruling,&#8221;&lt;/i&gt; a local source laments. Since then, Niafrang residents have stepped up efforts to get the court's ruling enforced.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;&lt;i&gt;&#8220;We wrote to a group of MPs, including one who represents our department,&lt;/i&gt; Ousmane San&#233; notes bitterly. &lt;i&gt;We called on them to act and put a stop to the project, given the many failings we had documented. A parliamentary delegation, including the chair of the mining committee, came to see for themselves. They saw the mining operation and met with us. But we came to understand that the Senegalese state was firmly committed to a pro-mining agenda. No one ever said so openly, but these MPs did nothing to stop G-Sand.&#8221;&lt;/i&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;h2 class=&#034;spip&#034;&gt;&#8220;They're trying to isolate me&#8221;&lt;/h2&gt;
&lt;p&gt;&lt;i&gt;&#8220;People in this area live off farming, fishing and tourism. So the state should be protecting them, not exposing them to risk,&#8221;&lt;/i&gt; says Serigne Sarr, one of the group's supporters and president of Senegal's Association for the Defence of Water and Sanitation Rights.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;But the village's resistance is gradually isolating it. After nearly twenty years of solidarity among villages in the area, Niafrang's stance is now viewed unfavourably across the region. Relations have soured, to the point that the village now &lt;i&gt;&#8220;finds itself alone, facing everyone else,&#8221;&lt;/i&gt; a local source observes.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Ousmane San&#233; says he has been the target of verbal and physical attacks, attempted bribery and threats. &lt;i&gt;&#8220;I've become a scapegoat because I'm originally from another part of Casamance, and the people behind the project think I'm influencing the villagers. The fact that I speak to the media and at press conferences bothers them. They're trying to isolate me.&#8221;&lt;/i&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;He also describes several intimidation attempts that could have turned violent: &lt;i&gt;&#8220;Last year, some people came all the way to my house. They surrounded it, armed with machetes and knives, intending to set it on fire. I wasn't there, but my wife went outside and stood up to them. They were young men from Kabadio.&#8221;&lt;/i&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;h2 class=&#034;spip&#034;&gt;After the mining, &#8220;hardship&#8221;&lt;/h2&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Niafrang residents do not reject the idea of development for their region, but they favour a different vision for its future. In their view, it is possible to create jobs and economic activity without sacrificing the ecosystem's fragile balance. To make the case for this alternative, the anti-mining committee has drawn up a &#8220;community protocol&#8221;&lt;sup class='ref_note'&gt;&lt;a href=&#034;#nb4-5&#034; class=&#034;spip_note&#034; rel=&#034;appendix&#034; title=&#034;&#171;&#160;Protocole communautaire bioculturel de la communaut&#233; de Niafrang&#160;&#187;, (&#8230;)&#034; id=&#034;nh4-5&#034;&gt;5&lt;/a&gt;&lt;/sup&gt;, setting out principles for managing the land, preserving biodiversity and traditional knowledge, while reaffirming local people's right to take part in decisions over their resources and to share fairly in the benefits.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;&lt;i&gt;&#8220;This area has real potential and simply needs support to pursue a form of development that is sustainable and beneficial for the population,&lt;/i&gt; explains Ousmane San&#233;. &lt;i&gt;Zircon mining is an activity that will only last a few years. After that, people will be left facing hardship, because by then they will have lost a forest and the mangrove's resources&#8230;&#8221;&lt;/i&gt; A group of residents has therefore filed a request to have Niafrang classified as a mining protection zone, under the Mining Code. Another battle to safeguard the future, against the odds.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;h2 class=&#034;spip&#034;&gt;#&lt;/h2&gt;
&lt;p&gt;This article was translated from French into English using &lt;span class=&#034;caps&#034;&gt;AI&lt;/span&gt; and proofread by a human journalist.&lt;/p&gt;&lt;/div&gt;
		&lt;hr /&gt;
		&lt;div class='rss_notes'&gt;&lt;div id=&#034;nb4-1&#034;&gt;
&lt;p&gt;&lt;sup class='lien_note'&gt;&lt;a href=&#034;#nh4-1&#034; class=&#034;spip_note&#034; title=&#034;Footnotes 4-1&#034; rev=&#034;appendix&#034;&gt;1&lt;/a&gt;&lt;/sup&gt;&lt;a href=&#034;https://lequotidien.sn/exploitation-du-zircon-de-niafrang-letat-ferme-la-mine-a-astron/&#034; class=&#034;spip_out&#034; rel=&#034;external&#034;&gt;&#171;&#160;Exploitation du zircon de Niafrang&#160;: l'&#201;tat ferme la mine &#224; Astron&lt;/a&gt;&#160;&#187;, &lt;i&gt;Le Quotidien&lt;/i&gt;, 13&#160;octobre&#160;2023.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;/div&gt;&lt;div id=&#034;nb4-2&#034;&gt;
&lt;p&gt;&lt;sup class='lien_note'&gt;&lt;a href=&#034;#nh4-2&#034; class=&#034;spip_note&#034; title=&#034;Footnotes 4-2&#034; rev=&#034;appendix&#034;&gt;2&lt;/a&gt;&lt;/sup&gt;&lt;a href=&#034;https://www.amnesty.ch/fr/magazine-amnesty/2024/2024-2/extractivisme-predateur&#034; class=&#034;spip_out&#034; rel=&#034;external&#034;&gt;&#171;&#160;S&#233;n&#233;gal&#160;: extractivisme pr&#233;dateur&lt;/a&gt;&#160;&#187;, magazine &lt;i&gt;Amnesty&lt;/i&gt; n&#176;117, juin&#160;2024.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;/div&gt;&lt;div id=&#034;nb4-3&#034;&gt;
&lt;p&gt;&lt;sup class='lien_note'&gt;&lt;a href=&#034;#nh4-3&#034; class=&#034;spip_note&#034; title=&#034;Footnotes 4-3&#034; rev=&#034;appendix&#034;&gt;3&lt;/a&gt;&lt;/sup&gt;&lt;a href=&#034;https://cqegheiulaval.com/lexploitation-des-sables-metalliferes-du-littoral-casamancais-senegal-un-projet-a-risques/&#034; class=&#034;spip_out&#034; rel=&#034;external&#034;&gt;Luc Descroix et Jean-Claude Marut, &#171;&#160;L'exploitation des sables m&#233;tallif&#232;res du littoral casaman&#231;ais (S&#233;n&#233;gal)&#160;: un projet &#224; risques&lt;/a&gt;&#160;&#187;, &lt;i&gt;Regards g&#233;opolitiques&lt;/i&gt;, 1&#160;(3), 2015, p.&#160;11-17.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;/div&gt;&lt;div id=&#034;nb4-4&#034;&gt;
&lt;p&gt;&lt;sup class='lien_note'&gt;&lt;a href=&#034;#nh4-4&#034; class=&#034;spip_note&#034; title=&#034;Footnotes 4-4&#034; rev=&#034;appendix&#034;&gt;4&lt;/a&gt;&lt;/sup&gt;&lt;a href=&#034;https://reporterre.net/Un-groupe-minier-francais-detruit-un-desert-unique-au-Senegal&#034; class=&#034;spip_out&#034; rel=&#034;external&#034;&gt;Fanny Pigeaud, &#171;&#160;Un groupe minier fran&#231;ais d&#233;truit un d&#233;sert unique au S&#233;n&#233;gal&lt;/a&gt;&#160;&#187;, &lt;i&gt;Reporterre&lt;/i&gt;, 13&#160;janvier&#160;2025.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;/div&gt;&lt;div id=&#034;nb4-5&#034;&gt;
&lt;p&gt;&lt;sup class='lien_note'&gt;&lt;a href=&#034;#nh4-5&#034; class=&#034;spip_note&#034; title=&#034;Footnotes 4-5&#034; rev=&#034;appendix&#034;&gt;5&lt;/a&gt;&lt;/sup&gt;&lt;a href=&#034;https://naturaljustice.org/publication/protocole-communautaire-bioculturel-de-la-communaute-de-niafrang/&#034; class=&#034;spip_out&#034; rel=&#034;external&#034;&gt;&#171;&#160;Protocole communautaire bioculturel de la communaut&#233; de Niafrang&lt;/a&gt;&#160;&#187;, Natural Justice, 2025.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;/div&gt;&lt;/div&gt;
		
		</content:encoded>


		

	</item>
<item xml:lang="en">
		<title>Zeinab Badawi: &#8220;African scholars' accounts carry more weight&#8221;</title>
		<link>https://afriquexxi.info/Zeinab-Badawi-African-scholars-accounts-carry-more-weight</link>
		<guid isPermaLink="true">https://afriquexxi.info/Zeinab-Badawi-African-scholars-accounts-carry-more-weight</guid>
		<dc:date>2026-09-18T04:00:00Z</dc:date>
		<dc:format>text/html</dc:format>
		<dc:language>en</dc:language>
		<dc:creator>Victoria Brittain</dc:creator>


		<dc:subject>Slavery </dc:subject>
		<dc:subject> Colonialism </dc:subject>
		<dc:subject>History</dc:subject>
		<dc:subject>Interview</dc:subject>
		<dc:subject>Africa</dc:subject>

		<description>
&lt;p&gt;With An African History of Africa, published in French on 18&#160;September, the English broadcaster and film-maker of Sudanese origin sets out to tell the continent's story through a lens other than a Western one &#8212; a project built on interviews with dozens of African researchers. &lt;br class='autobr' /&gt; Zeinab Badawi is a journalist born in Sudan and raised in Britain from the age of 2. She had a long career in television (&lt;span class=&#034;caps&#034;&gt;ITV&lt;/span&gt; Yorkshire, Channel&#160;4 News, the &lt;span class=&#034;caps&#034;&gt;BBC&lt;/span&gt;&#8230;) and as a documentary-maker, notably producing a&#160;(&#8230;)&lt;/p&gt;


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 <content:encoded>&lt;img src='https://afriquexxi.info/local/cache-vignettes/L600xH338/c64f59faf511c84e9683b047d880bf-97f72.jpg?1789726348' class='spip_logo spip_logo_right' width='600' height='338' alt=&#034;&#034; /&gt;
		&lt;div class='rss_chapo'&gt;&lt;p&gt;With An African History of Africa, published in French on 18&#160;September, the English broadcaster and film-maker of Sudanese origin sets out to tell the continent's story through a lens other than a Western one &#8212; a project built on interviews with dozens of African researchers.&lt;/p&gt;&lt;/div&gt;
		&lt;div class='rss_texte'&gt;&lt;p&gt;Zeinab Badawi is a journalist born in Sudan and raised in Britain from the age of 2. She had a long career in television (&lt;span class=&#034;caps&#034;&gt;ITV&lt;/span&gt; Yorkshire, Channel&#160;4 News, the &lt;span class=&#034;caps&#034;&gt;BBC&lt;/span&gt;&#8230;) and as a documentary-maker, notably producing a twenty-part &lt;span class=&#034;caps&#034;&gt;BBC&lt;/span&gt; television series on Africa, &#8220;The History of Africa&#8221;, broadcast in 2020. She later moved into academia, becoming president of the prestigious School of Oriental and African Studies (&lt;span class=&#034;caps&#034;&gt;SOAS&lt;/span&gt;) in London in October 2021. She is also an honorary fellow of her former Oxford college. She sits on the boards of several influential organisations, among them the International Crisis Group, Afrobarometer (based in Ghana), and the Mandela Institute for Development Studies.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Her father, Mohammed-Khair El Badawi, was a Sudanese journalist and activist heavily involved in pre-independence Sudanese politics, before joining the &lt;span class=&#034;caps&#034;&gt;BBC&lt;/span&gt;'s Arabic service in London. She is also the great-granddaughter of Babikr Bedri, a pioneer of women's emancipation in Sudan.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;At 66, Zeinab Badawi has stepped back from television studios and journalism. She now runs a communications firm, Kush, named after the &lt;a href=&#034;https://afriquexxi.info/Les-Pyramides-de-Meroe-vestiges-d-un-Soudan-glorieux&#034;&gt;powerful kingdom&lt;/a&gt; (1070 &lt;span class=&#034;caps&#034;&gt;BC&lt;/span&gt; &#8211; 350 &lt;span class=&#034;caps&#034;&gt;AD&lt;/span&gt;) that once spread across the confluence of the Blue Nile, the White Nile and the Atbara river, in what is now northern Sudan and southern Egypt. Her company produces documentaries and advises organisations and businesses.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;On 18&#160;September, the Paris-based &#201;ditions du Faubourg publish the French edition of her book &lt;i&gt;An African History of Africa&lt;/i&gt; (&lt;i&gt;Une histoire africaine de l'Afrique&lt;/i&gt;, translated by Eric Faye), which came out a year earlier under &lt;span class=&#034;caps&#034;&gt;W.H.&lt;/span&gt; Allen. She drew on dozens of interviews with researchers across the African continent, many of them conducted while filming the episodes for the &lt;span class=&#034;caps&#034;&gt;BBC&lt;/span&gt; series.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;She makes no secret of her ambition to offer a &#8220;de-Westernised&#8221; &#8212; and decolonised &#8212; account of the continent's history, accessible to everyone. She is also working on a version for younger readers. Her work was inspired in particular by Unesco's eight-volume &lt;i&gt;General History of Africa&lt;/i&gt;.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;aside class=&#034;spip_dame&#034;&gt;
&lt;p&gt; &#8220;All told, the whole project &#8212; television and writing &#8212; kept me busy for the best part of a decade&#8221;&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;/aside&gt;
&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Victoria Brittain: What was the spark that set off this whole undertaking?&lt;/strong&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Zeinab Badawi:&lt;/strong&gt; I had no idea, on a sunny afternoon in the summer of 2013, sitting in the office of my friend Getachew Engida, an Ethiopian who was then Unesco's deputy director-general, that I was about to set off on a great intellectual journey. As we drank tea, I noticed a bookshelf behind him holding a set of volumes titled &lt;i&gt;General History of Africa&lt;/i&gt;, the &lt;span class=&#034;caps&#034;&gt;GHA&lt;/span&gt;. He explained that it was a history of Africa written from its origins to the modern era, most of it by African intellectuals.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;It was a project launched in the early 1960s, at that moment of rapid African decolonisation, when newly independent African leaders felt that, with their countries now decolonised, their history needed decolonising too, and needed to be written from an African point of view. Unesco backed the ambition and set up a committee of African academics to oversee this extraordinary undertaking. I told my friend I wanted to make a &lt;span class=&#034;caps&#034;&gt;BBC&lt;/span&gt; television series drawing on these volumes, to tell the history of Africa with Africans. So I travelled, over six and a half years, to some thirty countries across the continent, interviewing dozens upon dozens of historians, anthropologists, archaeologists and cultural experts about the history of their region.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;After twenty episodes of &#8220;The History of Africa&#8221;, a great deal of material remained unused. I felt I hadn't done justice to the African scholars I had interviewed, and so I decided to write this book. That was the spark for &lt;i&gt;An African History of Africa&lt;/i&gt;. Of course, for the book I couldn't rely solely on interview transcripts; I had to do a great deal more research &#8212; fortunately, we have &lt;span class=&#034;caps&#034;&gt;SOAS&lt;/span&gt;, one of the finest libraries in the United Kingdom. It took me around two years to write the book. All told, the whole project &#8212; television and writing &#8212; kept me busy for the best part of a decade.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Victoria Brittain: You've said you wished you'd had a book like this as a child. Are you planning a children's version?&lt;/strong&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Zeinab Badawi:&lt;/strong&gt; Yes, I'm working this year on an illustrated edition for young readers, say 7 to 11-year-olds, due out sometime next year, and I'm also writing a version for children of around 12 to 16.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;aside class=&#034;spip_dame&#034;&gt;
&lt;p&gt; &#8220;A distinguished Nigerian historian told me: 'Telling the history isn't enough &#8212; understanding the African mindset matters even more'&#8221;&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;/aside&gt;
&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Victoria Brittain: What was your relationship with the African academics like?&lt;/strong&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Zeinab Badawi:&lt;/strong&gt; Every academic I interviewed is brilliant. I think there are good Africanists elsewhere in the world doing remarkable work on Africa, but there's undoubtedly something more powerful when someone from the country or region itself speaks about their own history. It seems to add an essential dimension. I felt these African academics' accounts carried more weight because it was their own story they were telling, and because they speak the local languages and are therefore more attuned to oral tradition than some Africanists are.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;What's more, they turn the telescope round and look at history from their own vantage point. A distinguished Nigerian historian, Professor Muywai Falaiye, put it to me this way: &lt;i&gt;&#8220;A Black person has to write their own history, to speak for themselves, in order to offer a different perspective from the one orchestrated by the West &#8212; and I say that bearing in mind that no one can explain your history better than you can yourself. If you approach African history and its belief systems with a Western mindset, you're bound to misunderstand what the African represents. You need to understand what Africans do, why they think the way they think. To me, that matters enormously: telling the history isn't enough &#8212; understanding the African mindset matters even more.&#8221;&lt;/i&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Victoria Brittain: Could you tell us about some of them?&lt;/strong&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;I could name so many remarkable people, and they're all in the book. Take the Cameroonian professor Augustin Holl, a genuine polymath. Trained as a palaeontologist, he chaired the &lt;span class=&#034;caps&#034;&gt;GHA&lt;/span&gt;'s international committee. The breadth and depth of his knowledge are, quite literally, astonishing. He was a real source of inspiration for the whole book.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Two brilliant Liberian academics, Carl Patrick Burrowes and William Ezra Allen, gave me fascinating insights into what drove the abolition of the transatlantic slave trade and the arrival of freed African-Americans from the United States. Dr Kitouni Daho is one of Algeria's foremost specialists on the Numidians, those key allies of Rome whom the Roman historian Livy described as &lt;i&gt;&#8220;by far the best horsemen in Africa&#8221;&lt;/i&gt;.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Professor Doualye Konat&#233;, one of Africa's most eminent academics, spoke to me at length about the 1236 &#8220;Manden Charter&#8221;, which granted freedom, dignity and equality to every citizen of the Mali empire founded by Sundiata Keita. Professor Nigel Penn, of the University of Cape Town, has written extensively on the first European settlers in what would become South Africa, and on how they treated the Khoi and San peoples on their arrival. He works to debunk the myth of the &#8220;empty land&#8221; these Europeans supposedly arrived on.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;These are just a few of the many academics I met. I've tried to faithfully convey some of their views, their research and their conclusions.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;aside class=&#034;spip_dame&#034;&gt;
&lt;p&gt; &#8220;Sudan wasn't just a great African civilisation &#8212; it was a superpower&#8221;&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;/aside&gt;
&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Victoria Brittain: As a woman of Sudanese origin, what did you learn about your country of birth?&lt;/strong&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The period of ancient Sudanese history I focused on is the 8&lt;sup class=&#034;typo_exposants&#034;&gt;th&lt;/sup&gt; century &lt;span class=&#034;caps&#034;&gt;BC&lt;/span&gt;, when Sudan was not just a great African civilisation, but a superpower &#8212; one that protected the princes of Byblos and Tyre, in modern-day Lebanon, and King Hezekiah of Judah, and that fought the formidable Assyrian army.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Dr Shadia Taha, a Sudanese archaeologist, taught me a great deal, particularly about the history of ancient northern Sudan. The Egyptologists and archaeologists who went to work in Sudan long regarded ancient Sudan as a colony, or a mere offshoot of Egyptian culture &#8212; one that supposedly did nothing more than imitate Egypt and passively absorb its knowledge. Dr Taha's research has shown that, in reality, the two civilisations influenced each other, and that ancient northern Sudan had been, in its earliest form, an advanced civilisation that predated ancient Greece and Rome &#8212; yet one that has never received the recognition it deserves.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Victoria Brittain: East Africa was profoundly shaped by the arrival of the Arabs, whether through the slave trade eastward, the fusion of African and Arab cultures, or the spread of Islam&#8230;&lt;/strong&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Zeinab Badawi:&lt;/strong&gt; The Arabs made contact with Africans as early as the 7&lt;sup class=&#034;typo_exposants&#034;&gt;th&lt;/sup&gt; century &#8212; centuries before the Europeans. They brought their religion, Islam, with them, of course. They helped spread literacy, since many African Muslims learned to read the Quran and even wrote in Arabic. Arabs sometimes settled and forged marriage alliances with local populations, as in East Africa. By 711, the Arabs had all but completed the conquest of North Africa. The history of Africa is therefore inextricably bound up with the Arabs, their language and Islam.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The grim aspect of this is that 14&#160;million Africans were deported by Arabs and their partners between the 7&lt;sup class=&#034;typo_exposants&#034;&gt;th&lt;/sup&gt; and 19&lt;sup class=&#034;typo_exposants&#034;&gt;th&lt;/sup&gt; centuries to Arab lands, as well as to the Persian Gulf and India. That substantial estimate covers every route &#8212; across the Sahara to North Africa and the Arab families living there, as well as across the Red Sea, the Mediterranean and the Indian Ocean. The great majority, close to 10&#160;million, were transported via the Indian Ocean.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;aside class=&#034;spip_dame&#034;&gt;
&lt;p&gt; &#8220;Once converted to Islam, the Swahili proved willing partners for the Arabs in the acquisition of enslaved Africans&#8221;&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;/aside&gt;
&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Victoria Brittain: Is the subject of the Indian Ocean slave trade taboo, and why?&lt;/strong&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;By the 9&lt;sup class=&#034;typo_exposants&#034;&gt;th&lt;/sup&gt; century, most of East Africa's coastal towns were predominantly populated by Swahili people, whose culture combined African, Arab and, to a lesser extent, Indian elements. Many Swahili had converted to Islam and proved willing partners for the Arabs in the acquisition of enslaved Africans. There is deep reluctance to address this trade, both in the Arab world and in East Africa itself &#8212; the understandable discomfort of Muslim Swahili communities over their ancestors' involvement in this trade makes any open discussion of the subject particularly uncomfortable.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;According to Professor Felix Chami, a Tanzanian historian, the merging of African and Arab cultures and the adoption of Islam created &lt;i&gt;&#8220;a major problem in the history of coastal East Africa&#8221;&lt;/i&gt;. He argues &#8212; and many African academics share this view &#8212; that the Swahili's proximity to the Arabs made it easier for some of them to acquire non-Swahili African captives for enslavement.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;In the Arab world, the only exhibition devoted to this subject is in Qatar, in a museum that opened in 2015, built on the site of a former slave trader's house. And there is no debate there over reparations of the kind we're familiar with regarding the transatlantic slave trade&lt;sup class='ref_note'&gt;&lt;a href=&#034;#nb2-1&#034; class=&#034;spip_note&#034; rel=&#034;appendix&#034; title=&#034;The Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination, a panel of (&#8230;)&#034; id=&#034;nh2-1&#034;&gt;1&lt;/a&gt;&lt;/sup&gt;.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Victoria Brittain: Can Arab slavery and transatlantic slavery really be compared?&lt;/strong&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Slavery remains slavery, but there are major differences. Transatlantic slavery was built on the ownership of people and favoured men for plantation labour. Arabs, on the whole, preferred enslaved women, destined to become concubines or domestic servants. Another key difference: if an Arab man fathered a child with an enslaved African woman, that child was born free and could even rise to high social standing. What's more, enslaved African men in the Arab world could serve as soldiers, scribes, musicians and so on; they were not confined to hard labour alone.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;That said, one particularly cruel aspect of their enslavement by Arabs is that many were castrated to serve as eunuchs, tasked with guarding women within households. In the transatlantic trade, if a white man fathered a child with an enslaved African woman, that child, too, was born into bondage.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Victoria Brittain: What did you discover, over the course of your travels, about attitudes towards restitution and reparations?&lt;/strong&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Zeinab Badawi:&lt;/strong&gt; I think the more objects are returned, the more momentum can be sustained. The great majority of African academics I spoke to want to see their artworks restituted. I've visited many museums across the continent and found that they display very little of real significance: the centrepieces are often mere replicas of the originals, which remain held in Western museums or collections.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;aside class=&#034;spip_dame&#034;&gt;
&lt;p&gt; &#8220;Many people underestimate the role women played in shaping the continent's past&#8221;&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;/aside&gt;
&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Victoria Brittain: The subject of reparations sparks fierce debate&#8230;&lt;/strong&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;A unified position among people of African descent would make things easier. The plan put forward by the Caribbean Community (Caricom) strikes me as sound&lt;sup class='ref_note'&gt;&lt;a href=&#034;#nb2-2&#034; class=&#034;spip_note&#034; rel=&#034;appendix&#034; title=&#034;See in particular &#171;&#160;Les Cara&#239;bes plaident pour une justice r&#233;paratrice&#160;&#187;, (&#8230;)&#034; id=&#034;nh2-2&#034;&gt;2&lt;/a&gt;&lt;/sup&gt;. Taken up by the African Union, it essentially defines reparations as development aid. And at a time when development aid is being scaled back, that would be one good way of making up the shortfall.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Victoria Brittain: A strong thread runs through your account: that of the heroic women of African history, from the collective political suicide of the rebel women of the village of Walo, to powerful queens such as Queen Idia of Benin, Queen Njinga, who resisted the Portuguese and their slave trade in the kingdom of Ndongo (present-day Angola), and Yaa Asantewaa of Ghana, exiled to the Seychelles, where she died. How present are they in the imagination of the new generation?&lt;/strong&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Zeinab Badawi:&lt;/strong&gt; Many people underestimate the role women played in shaping the continent's past. There are plenty more examples beyond the ones you've mentioned, and really, any one of them could be chosen to illustrate their strength and significance. How present are they in the imagination of the new generation? Let me give you a striking example: the queen mothers of the ancient kingdom of Kush, in northern Sudan, who wielded enormous power. Some of them led their armies into battle. They could act as co-regents alongside their sons or husbands. They were known as Kandakas.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;And in April&#160;2019, when Sudan's young people &lt;a href=&#034;https://afriquexxi.info/Le-Soudan-sur-les-ecrans&#034;&gt;rose up against President Bashir's dictatorship&lt;/a&gt;, women were very much at the forefront of the movement. They called themselves Kandakas. They drew on Sudan's distant past to assert themselves on today's social and political stage. Similarly, Yaa Asantewaa has become a national symbol in Ghana. She appears on coins, banknotes and stamps, and a girls' school was even named in her honour when Ghana won independence in 1957 under President Kwame Nkrumah, who turned her into a genuine national icon.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;h2 class=&#034;spip&#034;&gt;#&lt;/h2&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Zeinab Badawi, &lt;i&gt;An African History of Africa&lt;/i&gt;, &#201;ditions du Faubourg, 18&#160;September&#160;2026, &#8364;24.90 (French edition).&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;figure class='spip_document_3516 spip_documents spip_documents_center'
style=&#034;max-width:falsepx;&#034; data-w=&#034;false&#034;&gt;
&lt;span &gt;
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&lt;/figure&gt;&lt;/div&gt;
		&lt;hr /&gt;
		&lt;div class='rss_notes'&gt;&lt;div id=&#034;nb2-1&#034;&gt;
&lt;p&gt;&lt;sup class='lien_note'&gt;&lt;a href=&#034;#nh2-1&#034; class=&#034;spip_note&#034; title=&#034;Footnotes 2-1&#034; rev=&#034;appendix&#034;&gt;1&lt;/a&gt;&lt;/sup&gt;The Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination, a panel of independent United Nations experts, found in a report submitted on 1&#160;September that &lt;i&gt;&#8220;States parties must implement comprehensive reparation measures for people of African descent, covering all aspects of reparations.&#8221;&lt;/i&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;/div&gt;&lt;div id=&#034;nb2-2&#034;&gt;
&lt;p&gt;&lt;sup class='lien_note'&gt;&lt;a href=&#034;#nh2-2&#034; class=&#034;spip_note&#034; title=&#034;Footnotes 2-2&#034; rev=&#034;appendix&#034;&gt;2&lt;/a&gt;&lt;/sup&gt;See in particular &lt;a href=&#034;https://courier.unesco.org/fr/articles/les-caraibes-plaident-pour-une-justice-reparatrice&#034; class=&#034;spip_out&#034; rel=&#034;external&#034;&gt;&#171;&#160;Les Cara&#239;bes plaident pour une justice r&#233;paratrice&#160;&#187;&lt;/a&gt;, Unesco, 21&#160;June&#160;2024.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;/div&gt;&lt;/div&gt;
		
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